Sitrep 2025-11-24 01:53:25

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 240200Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240130Z NOV 25 – 240200Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AREA: POKROVSK AXIS (CRITICAL) / CHERNIHIV (FIXATION) OVERALL THREATCON: OPERATIONAL RESERVE UNDER IMMINENT KINETIC THREAT

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational environment remains defined by the Russian Federation’s (RF) synchronization of heavy tactical air support (KABs) on the Pokrovsk axis with persistent, deep rear UAV activity designed to fix Ukrainian Air Defense (AD) assets. Recent message traffic confirms the continuation of the UAV distraction effort in the Northern sector, validating the RF’s multi-domain command structure. The critical task remains the successful maneuver and survivability of Plan 7-B MOD reserves under continuous aerial bombardment before the RF can consolidate the breach on the M-30 GLOC.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Pokrovsk Axis: The primary threat zone is the area immediately surrounding the M-30 GLOC severance and the proposed bypass corridors. RF tactical aviation maintains the dominant kinetic influence.
Deep Rear: The confirmation of new UAV activity directed at Chernihiv (240132Z) reinforces the previous assessment that RF is actively using the Northern flank for fixation and AD asset dilution. This is a deliberate, low-cost distraction.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, stable conditions continue to favor RF tactical aviation (KAB delivery) and reconnaissance missions (ISR/UAV/FPV), maintaining high lethality in the interdiction zone. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) are exploiting the breach under high-density fire coverage. They are demonstrating sustained synchronized operations across the operational depth. UAF (Plan 7-B MOD): Forces are currently engaged in high-risk maneuver protocols aimed at bypassing the KAB suppression zone.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

Capability: RF maintains demonstrated capability to sustain high-tempo guided aerial bombardment (KABs) while simultaneously executing geographically dispersed UAV/IO operations. Intention (Next 4 Hours):

Sustain Fire Superiority: Maintain KAB coverage on known/suspected UAF reserve transit routes and potential forward assembly areas.
Fix AD Assets: Continue low-cost drone missions targeting deep rear areas (Chernihiv/Odesa) to prevent UAF AD redeployment to the critical Pokrovsk sector.
Fragment Cognitive Space: Introduce diverse IO narratives (e.g., demographic shifts, diplomatic deception) to overload UAF strategic C2/STRATCOM resources.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

No new tactical adaptations noted in the kinetic domain since 01:30Z. However, the confirmed sustainment of the UAV fixation operation (Chernihiv) demonstrates high C2 resilience and adherence to the synchronized operational plan. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

KAB cycle logistics and UAV deployment sustainability are assessed as robust and sufficient for the next 12-24 hours.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization remains HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. The coordinated execution of tactical exploitation, strategic distraction (UAV), and persistent IO indicates high organizational maturity in multi-domain warfare execution. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Critical defensive maneuver. The success of Plan 7-B MOD relies entirely on speed and survivability against KAB interdiction. READINESS: Requires immediate integration of counter-KAB dispersal and movement protocols, prioritizing speed over security.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

The primary setback remains the severe degradation of maneuver freedom in the Pokrovsk sector due to KAB lethality. No new tactical successes reported in this immediate window.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Mobile, immediate-response Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) to screen the movement of Plan 7-B MOD reserves. CONSTRAINT: The continued UAV operations in the North (Chernihiv) successfully dilute SHORAD resources that should be focused on the East.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations continue to employ geographically dispersed and thematically diverse narratives:

New Vector (Sociological Distraction): Amplification of domestic Russian narratives (e.g., Crimea birth rate increase - 240146Z). This is a classical "red herring" IO designed to consume UAF strategic communication bandwidth on non-military topics and project an image of internal RF stability and societal health. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
Persistent Fixation: The Kupyansk friendly fire narrative and the Geneva diplomatic deception are assessed as ongoing, designed to maximize confusion and C2 hesitation.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale remains under pressure due to the escalation to continuous KAB bombardment on the front line, which communicates high kinetic commitment from the RF.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF continues the parallel diplomatic deception (Geneva Framework), using high-level political narrative to distract NCA from the critical tactical situation in Donetsk.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Sustained KAB Interdiction: RF tactical aviation maintains KAB suppression window until approximately 240400Z to prevent Plan 7-B MOD elements from achieving sufficient consolidation.
Increased ISR/Targeting: Intensified use of FPV/ISR along tertiary bypass routes to detect and fix maneuvering UAF reserves for KAB strikes.
Holding Line Consolidation: RF 40th/155th OMBR elements initiate preliminary fortification procedures around the M-30 GLOC breach to prepare for mechanized follow-on forces.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ISR/Air Force elements successfully track a concentration of Plan 7-B MOD vehicles or personnel attempting to bypass the M-30 interdiction zone. This movement is immediately hit by a synchronized, high-volume KAB or multi-rocket artillery strike, leading to catastrophic loss of the reserve force and operational defeat on the Pokrovsk axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

Timeframe	Event/Decision Point	Triggering Indicator	Status/Update
NOW - 240230Z	Critical SHORAD Allocation.	Confirmed successful re-tasking of mobile SHORAD assets (Gepard/MANPADS) to Plan 7-B MOD movement paths.	IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED.
240200Z - 240400Z	Plan 7-B MOD Evasion Complete.	Confirmed successful transit and dispersal of Plan 7-B MOD elements into secondary defensive positions.	CRITICAL WINDOW: Vulnerability peaks during movement.
NLT 240600Z	RF Breaching Success Assessment.	Confirmation of RF mechanized reserves moving through the M-30 GLOC breach.	If confirmed, tactical counter-attack opportunity closes.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Collection Requirement (CR)	Confidence (Analysis)
CRITICAL (1)	Plan 7-B MOD Real-Time Position. Location and speed of UAF Plan 7-B MOD elements relative to RF tactical fire zones.	HUMINT/CEWI: Dedicated C-UAS (Counter-UAS) teams must provide movement confirmation and threat warnings along bypass routes.	HIGH
PRIORITY (2)	RF KAB/Air Asset Readiness. Projected capacity of RF tactical aviation to sustain the current KAB sortie rate (e.g., ordnance availability/pilot fatigue).	IMINT/TECHINT: Dedicated surveillance on confirmed RF forward operating airfields and support logistics hubs in the Southern Military District (SMD).	MEDIUM
PRIORITY (3)	RF Objective Beyond Rodynske. Specific RF objectives (terrain features, secondary GLOCs) beyond Rodynske once the M-30 is secured.	All-Source Analysis: Review RF Doctrine/Order of Battle (ORBAT) for indicators of deep exploitation objectives (e.g., towards Kurakhove/Selydove).	LOW

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The critical operational requirement is preserving the maneuvering reserve force from aerial annihilation. Recommendations focus on resource allocation and speed of execution.

AIR DEFENSE (AIR FORCE): ABANDON CHERNIHIV INTERCEPTION MISSION.
- Action: Immediately issue an explicit directive to cease the use of medium/high-value AD systems against low-grade UAVs in the Chernihiv/Northern fixed zone. Consolidate and re-task all mobile SHORAD assets to act as a close-in traveling screen for Plan 7-B MOD movement.
- Rationale: The UAV activity is a confirmed, low-cost distraction. Allowing these drones to proceed is acceptable collateral damage compared to the operational defeat caused by KAB strikes on the reserve force.
OPERATIONAL MANEUVER (J3): EMBED SHORAD AND INCREASE DISPERSION.
- Action: Integrate the re-tasked SHORAD assets directly into the command structure of the maneuvering Plan 7-B MOD elements. Increase vehicle dispersion intervals beyond standard doctrine to mitigate the lethal radius of KAB strikes, even if this complicates unit cohesion.
- Rationale: Dispersed movement coupled with point defense is the best current countermeasure against guided aerial bombardment (KAB) and coordinated FPV hunting.
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): FOCUS SOLELY ON THE KINETIC THREAT.
- Action: Ignore and refuse to comment on newly introduced RF sociological IO vectors (e.g., Crimea demographics). Focus all public messaging exclusively on the brutality of the KAB bombardment in Donetsk and the confirmed attempts by the RF to use diplomatic deception to cover kinetic escalation.
- Rationale: Deny the enemy the ability to consume STRATCOM capacity on non-operational distractions.

//END SITREP//

Situation Report