Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - CRITICAL KINETIC ESCALATION

DTG: 240130Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240053Z NOV 25 – 240130Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AREA: POKROVSK AXIS (CRITICAL) / CHERNIHIV (DISTRACTION) OVERALL THREATCON: OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION UNDER MASS TACTICAL FIRE

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The enemy (RF) has immediately followed the NLT 240000Z strategic strike window with a heavy, localized tactical escalation, employing Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) in the Donetsk sector to support the ground exploitation of the Pokrovsk breach. Dispersed UAV activity continues across deep rear areas (Chernihiv, Odesa) to fix UAF Air Defense (AD). The decisive point remains the vulnerability of the M-30 GLOC and the ability of UAF Plan 7-B MOD reserves to successfully bypass the interdiction zone under heavy fire.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): RF ground forces (40th/155th OMBR) are now operating under a protective blanket of heavy fire provided by tactical aviation (KABs). This creates a highly lethal zone on the M-30 GLOC bypass routes. The immediate focus shifts from holding the M-30 to surviving maneuver around the M-30.
• Deep Rear: Confirmed persistent UAV operations targeting the Northern flank (Chernihiv/Kozelets/Slavutych, 01:15Z). This confirms the RF operational objective of fixing UAF medium-range AD assets away from the critical fight in the East.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions continue to favor RF tactical aviation (KAB delivery) and FPV drone operations (01:06Z FPV confirmation), increasing the lethality of RF deep interdiction strikes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: RF elements are heavily synchronized, demonstrating a shift to direct fire support for ground exploitation. Tactical aviation is active in the Southeast (01:16Z), coordinating KAB strikes with 40th/155th OMBR movements. UAF: Plan 7-B MOD forces must execute maneuver under direct, immediate kinetic threat (KABs). Decentralized COOP protocols must prioritize speed and concealment over maintaining established routes.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

Capability: RF maintains the capacity to transition seamlessly from strategic paralysis (ballistic strike uncertainty) to decisive tactical exploitation (KAB/CAS saturation). They possess air superiority necessary to sustain this fire support. Intention (Next 4 Hours):

1. Accelerate Breach (Primary): Utilize KAB saturation to suppress and degrade UAF defensive efforts around Rodynske, forcing rapid fragmentation or retreat.
2. Interdict Reserves: Actively search for and target Plan 7-B MOD movement routes using FPV/ISR coordinated with tactical aviation strikes.
3. Sustain IO: Maintain high tempo, geographically diverse disinformation (Kupyansk friendly fire) to fragment UAF public attention and confidence.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The immediate and sustained use of tactical aviation (KABs) post-zero-hour is a critical escalation indicator (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). This confirms the RF intends to use maximum kinetic force to capitalize on the perceived C2 vacuum and M-30 severance. The confirmed FPV kill by 56th OBSPN (01:06Z) highlights the localized tactical lethality being maintained alongside massed fire.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Logistics chains are assessed as sufficient to support continuous KAB delivery cycles and sustain the 40th/155th OMBR push.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization remains HIGHLY EFFECTIVE (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). The coordinated use of tactical aviation (KAB) simultaneously with deep UAV distractions (Chernihiv) and targeted IO confirms robust multi-domain command capability.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive maneuver is now the critical priority. UAF forces must accept greater risk during the transit of Plan 7-B MOD elements. READINESS: Tactical readiness must incorporate immediate response drills for high-explosive aerial bombardment (KABs), including rapid dispersal and hardened cover utilization.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback: The introduction of massed KAB strikes has severely degraded the operational environment for maneuver and counter-fire planning in the Pokrovsk sector. This is the most significant tactical setback since the failure of Plan 7-B initiation.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Mobile, immediate-response short-range AD (SHORAD) to protect the Plan 7-B MOD assembly areas from RF tactical aviation, FPV drones, and ground ISR. CONSTRAINT: Medium-range AD assets are already stretched by UAV fixing operations and the need to reserve high-value interceptors for the MDCOA ballistic threat (which remains unconfirmed).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO campaign is focused on generating tactical-level ridicule and political distraction:

• Ridicule/Discredit (Kupyansk): TASS report claiming two UAF saboteur groups engaged in friendly fire (01:09Z). This is a classical "false flag" narrative designed to waste UAF C2 attention on a secondary axis (Kupyansk) and discredit UAF special operations. (DS belief supports an incident, but not the TASS interpretation).
• Normalization (FPV): The immediate distribution of FPV kill footage (01:06Z) serves to lower UAF morale and normalize the lethality of RF tactical capabilities.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is acutely threatened by the shift from intermittent UAV attacks to continuous aerial bombardment (KABs) near the front line, signaling a dramatic operational deterioration.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF continues to reinforce the high-level deception narrative (Geneva Framework) as confirmed by high DS belief (0.39) regarding diplomatic disagreements on scheduling. This parallel diplomatic probing is designed to amplify internal US/UA policy friction.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Fire Corridor Establishment: RF tactical aviation maintains KAB coverage on key Pokrovsk sector infrastructure (bypass routes, field fortifications) for the next 4-6 hours, securing the M-30 breach area for mechanized reinforcement.
2. Mechanized Follow-on: The 40th/155th OMBR penetration group consolidates their hold on the GLOC, using FPV drones (56th OBSPN elements) as forward reconnaissance screens.
3. Stepnohirsk Pressure: RF forces west of Stepnohirsk intensify diversionary probing, effectively fixing UAF Southern reserves and ensuring they cannot counter-exploit Pokrovsk.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF utilizes real-time ISR, capitalizing on Plan 7-B MOD movement errors caused by KAB suppression, to guide a massed air or missile strike (secondary ballistic package or massed KAB deployment) onto the highly concentrated UAF reserve force during its transit. This results in the strategic defeat of the relief effort and opens the Pokrovsk axis for deep operational exploitation toward the Dnipro River.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate threat is not strategic decapitation (ballistic), but tactical annihilation (KABs) of the Plan 7-B MOD maneuver. The priority is mitigating KAB lethality to preserve the operational reserve.

1. AIR DEFENSE (AIR FORCE): DEDICATE SHORAD TO MANEUVER PROTECTION.

   • Action: Immediately re-task all available mobile SHORAD assets (e.g., Gepard, Avenger, MANPADS teams) to provide point defense/traveling screen for Plan 7-B MOD movement corridors and assembly areas. Accept the loss of low-value, distributed UAV targets in Chernihiv/Izmail.
   • Rationale: Preventing lethal KAB strikes on concentrated reserve forces is paramount. SHORAD is necessary to deter RF tactical aviation and localized FPV threats identified by the 56th OBSPN activity.

2. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER (J3): HIGH-SPEED DISPERSAL AND CONCEALMENT.

   • Action: Order Plan 7-B MOD elements to immediately increase speed of movement (even at risk of vehicle damage) and utilize maximum electronic and visual concealment measures. Movement must be primarily conducted off-road or using secondary/tertiary routes, assuming all paved GLOCs are zeroed for KAB strikes.
   • Rationale: The threat of tactical air-to-ground guided munitions (KAB) and FPV drones requires operational tempo that exceeds the RF sensor-to-shooter cycle.

3. JOINT FIRES (J-FIRE): COUNTER-FIRE ON RF ISR/SPOTTERS.

   • Action: Shift J-FIRE focus (155mm, MLRS) from RF logistics rear to suppressing identified RF Forward Observers (FO) and ISR platforms that are likely coordinating the KAB strikes in the Pokrovsk sector. This requires rapid counter-battery/counter-ISR missions.
   • Rationale: Disrupting the observation loop of the KAB strike cycle is the most effective way to reduce the accuracy and operational impact of the aerial bombardment.

4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): REFOCUS ON KINETIC FAILURE.

   • Action: Issue a high-level public statement that ties the diplomatic deception (Geneva Framework) directly to the massive increase in RF bombardment (KABs) in the East. Message: "The enemy speaks of peace only when they are preparing their greatest violence." Use visual evidence of KAB impact zones if available.
   • Rationale: Neutralize the Kupyansk/Geneva IO by immediately linking all RF diplomatic and IO actions to the clear, undeniable kinetic aggression in Donetsk.

//END SITREP//