Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - POST-ZERO HOUR EXPLOITATION

DTG: 240053Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240023Z NOV 25 – 240053Z NOV 25 OVERALL THREATCON: OPERATIONAL PARALYSIS / CRITICAL GROUND EXPLOITATION

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational crisis continues immediately following the predicted ballistic strike zero-hour (NLT 240000Z). The central intelligence gap—the status and effectiveness of the strategic missile strike BDA—remains unresolved. RF forces are leveraging this C2 uncertainty through highly synchronized multi-domain action, confirming ground exploitation on the Pokrovsk axis and expanding kinetic distraction via UAVs in deep rear areas.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): The M-30 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) near Rodynske remains the decisive point. Confirmed RF penetration (40th/155th OMBR) is exploiting the C2 vacuum created by the strategic strike uncertainty and IO campaign.
• Deep Rear: RF UAV activity has been confirmed targeting Izmail (Odesa Oblast, 00:25Z) and the Iziumskyi district (Kharkiv region, 00:30Z). This indicates the RF is expanding the zone of kinetic distraction to fix UAF Air Defense (AD) assets far from the main area of operational decision-making (Dnipropetrovsk).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions persist, favoring continued RF ISR, UAV operations, and high-precision targeting should a secondary ballistic strike be launched.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Maintaining a highly synchronized multi-domain offensive. Synchronization includes ground exploitation, active kinetic distraction (UAVs), and cognitive diversion (TASS normalization reports, diplomatic narrative testing). UAF: Assessed as operating under fragmented, decentralized C2 structures. The failure to confirm BDA or the status of Plan 7-B MOD reserves necessitates continued adherence to Continuity of Operations (COOP) protocols at the Army Corps level.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

Capability: RF maintains full strategic and tactical capacity for escalation, including a reserved or follow-on ballistic strike package. The ability to launch simultaneous UAV waves across distant fronts (Odesa, Kharkiv) while conducting ground exploitation confirms deep operational reach. Intention (Next 6 Hours):

1. M-30 Interdiction: Complete the physical severance of the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske.
2. AD Fixing: Sustain low-cost UAV pressure on UAF rear areas to force AD expenditure and distract ISR focus from the critical BDA confirmation gap.
3. Diplomatic Probing: Utilize newly amplified international political commentary (Senator Graham) to test the credibility and vulnerability of the Western commitment/diplomatic unity, reinforcing the RF's strategic deception campaign.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The deployment of geographically distant UAV waves post-zero-hour (00:25Z, 00:30Z) is a confirmed adaptation. This tactic serves as cover for ground forces, while testing UAF AD resource limits after the expenditure expected during the NLT 240000Z window.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Sufficient logistics are assessed to support the 40th/155th OMBR's current offensive tempo. No immediate sustainment issues observed.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization remains HIGHLY EFFECTIVE (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). The precision orchestration of ground, kinetic, and information domain maneuvers confirms seamless multi-domain command continuity through the crisis window.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Critical. UAF AD assets are now faced with immediate, widespread kinetic threats (UAVs) despite maintaining high alert for the unconfirmed strategic ballistic threat. READINESS: Tactical readiness must continue to focus on decentralized GLOC defense and the execution of Plan 7-B MOD maneuver, prioritizing speed over security during transit.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

The continued operational setback is the lack of C2 clarity, forcing field commanders to make high-risk decisions regarding reserve commitment without confirmation of damage assessment or strike success/failure.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Reallocation of ISR assets to immediately determine the exact composition and vulnerability of the RF force holding the M-30 GLOC. CONSTRAINT: Limited inventory of high-value AD interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) strained by the need to address low-value, distributed UAV attacks while reserving for the MDCOA ballistic strike.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO campaign has entered a third phase focused on distraction and fragmentation:

• Diversion/Normalization: TASS reporting on domestic consumer protection (alcohol prices, 00:38Z) attempts to reduce the perceived severity of the crisis.
• Fragmentation Probing: Amplification of US Congressional figures (Senator Graham, 00:51Z) questioning the structure of the peace process directly targets Western consensus and feeds into the existing "Geneva Framework" deception narrative.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is under sustained pressure due to the continuous synchronization of ground losses (Pokrovsk POW footage), lack of strike confirmation, and ongoing generalized air raid alerts across disparate regions (Izmail, Kharkiv).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF efforts are now focused on fracturing the US/UA relationship. The effective use of Graham's quote attempts to sow distrust regarding war termination goals, which undermines Kyiv’s position when seeking continued military aid.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. M-30 Confirmed Severed: RF forces successfully cut and hold the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske, establishing a stable forward defensive position against UAF counter-exploitation efforts.
2. IO Sustainment: RF continues to amplify narratives questioning UAF diplomatic reliability and military competence, using UAV attacks as background kinetic reinforcement.
3. Pressure on Stepnohirsk: RF forces west of Stepnohirsk will intensify probing attacks to ensure UAF Southern reserves remain fixed and unavailable for redeployment to the critical Pokrovsk sector.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF successfully severs the GLOC and launches a second, highly precise ballistic strike package aimed at the primary mobile concentrations of Plan 7-B MOD (identified via real-time ISR during their decentralized movement). This operational synchronization leads to a complete rout of UAF forces in the Pokrovsk sector and opens the axis for strategic RF mechanized exploitation.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The focus is shifting from defense of the M-30 to mitigation of its loss and protection of strategic reserves.

1. AIR DEFENSE (AIR FORCE): ADOPT ANTI-BALLISTIC PRIORITY ONLY.

   • Action: Explicitly order AD units utilizing high-value interceptors (e.g., Patriot) to disengage from low-value, persistent UAV threats in Izmail and Kharkiv. Conserve all high-value interceptors for immediate response to a follow-on ballistic strike targeting Plan 7-B MOD.
   • Rationale: Preventing the decapitation of strategic reserves is the highest priority; accepting minor infrastructure damage from UAVs is a necessary calculated risk.

2. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER (J3): SECURE SECONDARY AXES FOR PLAN 7-B MOD.

   • Action: Immediately dedicate engineer and reconnaissance assets to ensure the viability and security of the bypass routes identified for Plan 7-B MOD assets, focusing on mine clearance and light RF infiltration screening along those axes. Assume the M-30 is lost for now.
   • Rationale: The reserve force must establish a defensive line behind the current penetration point without delay or interdiction.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): FIRM US ALLIANCE DEFENSE.

   • Action: Issue a robust and unified denial of any diplomatic fracturing, directly rebutting the RF amplification of US political concerns. Use high-ranking military and political figures to convey the message that "RF deception is designed to cover tactical failures, not promote peace."
   • Rationale: Rapidly neutralize the political threat introduced by the RF's latest probing IO and maintain critical international confidence.

4. J-FIRE COMMANDERS: DELAY DIRECT CONTACT AT RODYNSKE.

   • Action: Shift all Joint Fires (MLRS, heavy artillery) from targeting the immediate RF penetration elements at Rodynske to pre-planned interdiction points targeting the RF rear logistics and movement corridors 5-10km behind the M-30 GLOC.
   • Rationale: Disrupting RF reinforcement and sustainment is more effective than attempting to dislodge the entrenched forward element at high cost.

//END SITREP//