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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-24 00:23:29Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-23 23:53:26Z)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - POST-ZERO HOUR ASSESSMENT

DTG: 240023Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 232353Z NOV 25 – 240023Z NOV 25 OVERALL THREATCON: CRITICAL/POST-IMPACT UNCERTAINTY


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational situation has transitioned past the predicted zero-hour (NLT 240000Z) for the RF strategic ballistic strike. Crucially, kinetic confirmation (Battle Damage Assessment or interception success) for the massed ballistic missile strike remains UNREPORTED. This intelligence gap is the highest immediate priority.

The RF hybrid strategy is confirmed to be executing on the ground and in the information domain: RF-affiliated channels claimed confirmation of captured Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Pokrovsk at 00:02Z, indicating successful ground exploitation/penetration at the moment of kinetic culmination. Simultaneously, the RF IO campaign successfully maintained high-level C2 distraction through the zero-hour by amplifying false "Geneva Framework" narratives.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

  • Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): Intelligence suggests RF forces achieved tactical success in exploiting the vulnerability around the Rodynske junction. The POW footage (00:02Z) serves as strong circumstantial evidence that RF ground forces, likely elements of the 40th/155th OMBR, have successfully penetrated or encircled forward Ukrainian defensive positions, potentially cutting the M-30 GLOC. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Based on RF propaganda)
  • Deep Rear C2: Air raid alerts were reportedly cancelled in Zaporizhzhia (23:55Z), potentially indicating the diversionary UAV wave passed. This does not confirm the fate of the high-value ballistic strike targeting Dnipropetrovsk C2 nodes.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions persist, favoring continued RF ISR and high-precision strike capabilities, should the ballistic package have been delayed or held in reserve.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: RF is prioritizing ground exploitation on the Pokrovsk axis, synchronized with maximum cognitive pressure on UAF high command. UAF: C2 is highly decentralized or paralyzed. The failure to confirm BDA or the status of the Plan 7-B MOD reserves puts the entire operational command structure in a state of crisis.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

Capability: RF maintains full capability for ground exploitation and immediate deep strike. The strategic strike package (Iskander/KN-23) is either executed without reporting, or reserved for a follow-on strike targeting confirmed UAF reserve movement. Intention (Next 6 Hours):

  1. Ground Consolidation: Rapidly secure the M-30 GLOC severance near Rodynske, leveraging the C2 vacuum created by the IO campaign and the expectation of a major strike.
  2. Sustained IO Paralysis: Continue pushing the "Geneva Peace Framework" narrative (confirmed 00:09Z, 00:10Z) to prevent UAF NCA from focusing on military command and BDA synthesis.
  3. Strike Re-assessment: If the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike was delayed or failed, RF intelligence will be actively assessing the current location/status of high-value UAF C2 and reserve staging areas (Plan 7-B MOD) for immediate re-targeting.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The immediate post-zero-hour propaganda (POW video, 00:02Z) demonstrates a successful tactical pivot by RF to immediately exploit the ground situation in Pokrovsk, regardless of the reported success of the deep strike. This suggests the RF plan accounted for potential kinetic BDA failure and prioritized ground follow-through.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Sufficient logistics are assessed to support the 40th/155th OMBR's current offensive tempo to secure the GLOC. No immediate sustainment issues observed.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization remains HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. The precision timing of ground propaganda confirmation (POWs) and high-level IO amplification confirms successful multi-domain orchestration post-240000Z. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Critically vulnerable to cascading tactical failures on the Pokrovsk axis. Field units are likely confused regarding the status of NCA command, especially if a large-scale strike was expected but not confirmed. READINESS: Tactical readiness must shift from terminal defense to immediate, aggressive Damage Assessment and Decentralized Counter-Exploitation.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback: Confirmed RF ground penetration/encirclement near Pokrovsk (based on POW footage timestamp). The failure to receive BDA on the strategic strike represents a major C2 failure, potentially confirming the effectiveness of the RF AD saturation/decoy plan.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, real-time BDA synthesis of C2 nodes and reserve staging areas. CONSTRAINT: C2 paralysis due to the successful IO and kinetic pressure continues to constrain decision-making and resource allocation for the Pokrovsk crisis.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO campaign has successfully transitioned into the exploitation phase:

  1. Strategic Paralysis: RU media amplified the "Geneva Peace Framework" and US/UA agreement (00:09Z, 00:10Z), securing the desired strategic confusion through the critical strike window.
  2. Tactical Narrative: The immediate release of POW footage (00:02Z) links the strategic paralysis to tactical success, creating a devastating narrative of collapse for Ukrainian morale and international perception.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confusion and vacuum created by the non-reporting of the ballistic strike, combined with the successful strategic IO, creates maximum psychological stress on commanders and the public. The POW video directly undermines frontline morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The sustained IO focus on the Geneva talks implies that the RF goal is to justify its ongoing military action as a response to UAF/Western duplicity or diplomatic maneuvering, rather than an unprovoked attack. This provides political cover for further escalation.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

  1. M-30 Severance: RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) will complete the physical severance of the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske/Varvarovka, utilizing the momentum gained during the C2 paralysis period.
  2. Information Dominance: RF will saturate information channels with BDA footage (if the strike was successful) or continue pushing POW/encirclement footage to force UAF forward units to surrender or retreat in disarray.
  3. Delayed Strike: If the strategic strike was delayed, it will be executed when UAF commanders attempt to reconstitute C2 or move reserves, maximizing the targeting of mobile assets.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF secures the Pokrovsk axis GLOC and simultaneously launches a second, highly effective ballistic strike package, successfully decapitating remaining mobile C2 nodes (e.g., Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs) for Plan 7-B MOD). This synchronization leads to the rout of forward UAF units and the creation of a stable, deep breach line enabling further RF mechanized exploitation toward Dnipropetrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

TimeframeEvent/Decision PointTriggering IndicatorStatus/Update
NOW - 240130ZCRITICAL: Post-Impact BDA & C2 Reconstitution.Successful communication links established between decentralized field commands and reserve units.IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED: Command must assume the worst-case BDA.
240130Z - 240400ZCounter-Exploitation Window (Pokrovsk).Confirmed location and strength of RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) advancing on Rodynske.CRITICAL: Field commanders must initiate pre-authorized counter-attack/GLOC clearing operations without NCA clearance if comms fail.
NLT 240600ZStrategic Communications Reclamation.NCA issues clear, definitive denial of Geneva IO and confirmation/status of Plan 7-B MOD components.High priority to reclaim the narrative and stabilize morale.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence (Analysis)
CRITICAL (1)Strategic Strike BDA. Fate of the NLT 240000Z ballistic package (Impact locations, effectiveness, interception rates).HUMINT/SIGINT/TECHINT: Immediate assessment of power grid stability, known C2 facility status (Dnipropetrovsk region), and communication failures.LOW
CRITICAL (2)Plan 7-B MOD Survival Rate/Location.HUMINT/Reporting: Confirmation of dispersal or destruction of the strategic reserve component assets and personnel.LOW
PRIORITY (3)RF Penetration Depth (Pokrovsk). Location and size of the RF element responsible for the captured POWs relative to the M-30 GLOC.ISR/SAR: Overlays of forward RF units near Rodynske/Varvarovka.MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary mission is to achieve C2 Clarity and Contain the Pokrovsk Breach simultaneously.

  1. OPERATIONAL COMMAND (J3/FIELD COMMANDERS): ASSUME C2 DECAPITATION.

    • Action: Field Commanders must immediately assume the central C2 node is non-functional or severely compromised (due to kinetic impact or IO paralysis). Execute decentralized COOP (Continuity of Operations) protocols now. All operational decisions regarding the defense of the M-30 GLOC must be made at the Army Corps/Brigade level until central command is confirmed stable.
    • Rationale: Waiting for BDA confirmation risks handing the RF a catastrophic operational breach. Decentralized action is the only immediate countermeasure against RF hybrid synchronization.
  2. PLAN 7-B MOD COMMANDERS: EXECUTE PRIMARY MISSION IMMEDIATELY.

    • Action: If Plan 7-B MOD assets survived the expected strike, they must begin rapid movement (or execute pre-authorized defensive fires) to prevent the M-30 GLOC severance. Use pre-authorized bypass corridors. Do not wait for confirmation regarding the fate of Rodynske; focus on establishing the secondary defensive line.
    • Rationale: The threat has manifested; delay is operational failure.
  3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): COUNTER THE NARRATIVE WITH FORCE.

    • Action: Issue a high-level, synchronized statement that directly addresses both the Geneva Framework IO and the Pokrovsk POW footage. The message must state: “RF claims of diplomatic progress are a synchronized, deliberate deception designed to cover operational military failures and continued aggression on the Pokrovsk axis. The release of POW footage confirms RF escalation, not peace.”
    • Rationale: Reclaim the cognitive initiative and prevent morale collapse caused by the RF’s effective linking of strategic deception and tactical ground success.
  4. AIR DEFENSE (AIR FORCE): ACTIVE DEFENSE POSTURE REMAINS.

    • Action: Despite the lack of confirmation on the NLT 240000Z strike, maintain all high-value AD assets (Patriot/SAMP-T) in Anti-Ballistic Priority Mode. A follow-up strike, targeting newly identified C2 nodes or reserve movement, remains the MDCOA.
    • Rationale: The threat has not passed, it is only delayed or unreported. Conserve interceptors.

//END SITREP//

Previous (2025-11-23 23:53:26Z)

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