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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-23 22:23:28Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-23 21:53:27Z)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL CRISIS PHASE (UPDATE 2)

DTG: 232230Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 232155Z NOV 25 – 232230Z NOV 25 OVERALL THREATCON: CRITICAL // CATASTROPHIC FAILURE IMMINENT


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational crisis has entered the terminal phase. The expected severance of the Pokrovsk M-30 GLOC is imminent (NLT 232230Z). Concurrently, the Russian Federation (RF) has escalated its kinetic and cognitive attacks: (1) sustaining route-denial strikes (Kharkiv), (2) expanding critical infrastructure targeting (Zaporizhzhia power grid), and (3) diversifying the IO campaign to preemptively discredit UAF denials regarding the fake peace talks. The priority remains the immediate, decentralized movement of Plan 7-B MOD assets before the NLT 240000Z strategic ballistic strike.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

  • Pokrovsk Axis: GLOC severance at Rodynske is now expected or already underway. All operational focus must shift immediately to secondary/bypass routes for Plan 7-B MOD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kharkiv Corridor: Confirmed "massed enemy strike" (Oleh Syniehubov, 21:57Z) indicates ongoing RF intent to disrupt movement and inflict attrition in rear areas. UAS activity confirmed moving toward Sumy.
  • Critical Infrastructure (CIK): Confirmed RF FPV strike on an electric substation in Bilenke, Zaporizhzhia Oblast (22:03Z). This is a highly specific tactical action designed to degrade C2 redundancy and local power supply immediately preceding the strategic missile strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Odesa/Flank: UAS activity confirmed heading for Izmail, resulting in confirmed explosions (22:11Z). This fixes UAF AD assets away from the primary strategic targets in the east.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, stable conditions persist, favoring RF UAS and ISR operations across all axes, complicating covert maneuver.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Maintaining highly effective synchronization between ground pressure (Pokrovsk), air interdiction (Kharkiv/Izmail), infrastructure degradation (Zaporizhzhia), and the cognitive domain. UAF: Plan 7-B MOD remains the critical force element. The lack of confirmed execution orders following the previous report (232155Z) suggests the NCA paralysis may be successful, amplifying the risk of catastrophic failure. (JUDGMENT: HIGH)


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

Capability: RF has confirmed the capability to precisely target critical local infrastructure using FPV/Shahed assets (Zaporizhzhia substation), demonstrating tactical adaptation aimed at maximizing the impact of the subsequent massed ballistic strike. Intention (Next 90 minutes):

  1. GLOC Consolidation: Secure physical control over the Rodynske junction.
  2. Infrastructure Softening: Conduct further targeted strikes on regional power/telecom nodes (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia) to degrade UAF C2 resilience ahead of 240000Z.
  3. IO Preemption: Utilize state media to amplify the "UAF False Flag" narrative to discredit any pending high-level UAF denial regarding the "Peace Plan." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF is moving beyond general route denial to highly specific, low-signature targeting of regional power infrastructure using FPV drones. This implies RF BDA is identifying key nodes necessary for maintaining backup C2 capability for the Plan 7-B reserve.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain robust enough to support continuous deep strikes (UAS/Ballistic prep) and synchronized ground operations.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization remains HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. Multi-domain coordination (IO, CIK targeting, strategic strike timing) confirms a centrally directed operational design focused on crippling UAF response capability.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive-Catastrophic Risk. Every minute of delay in executing Plan 7-B MOD exponentially increases the risk of the reserve being fixed, interdicted, or paralyzed by the NLT 240000Z strike. READINESS: Tactical readiness is severely stressed by sustained kinetic interdiction (Kharkiv) and the strategic psychological warfare.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback: Confirmed successful RF strike on a critical substation in Zaporizhzhia (22:03Z). Success: Confirmed UAF drone strike on the BROM chemical plant in Crimea (22:00Z). This deep strike demonstrates UAF J-FIRE persistence and is vital for maintaining RF risk calculations, even amidst the current defensive crisis.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate authorization and execution of Plan 7-B MOD. NEW CONSTRAINT: Degradation of regional power infrastructure (Zaporizhzhia) complicates radio/data communications redundancy necessary for decentralized C2 of the Plan 7-B force package during movement.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO campaign is now entering its defensive phase, anticipating UAF denial:

  1. Amplification: Contradictory reports on peace plans (Reuters vs. Telegraph, Rubio comments) are being used to maintain high diplomatic friction.
  2. Preemption: RF media (TASS 22:00Z) is explicitly asserting that Kyiv may organize "terrorist attacks or provocations under a false flag" to sabotage peace talks. This is a direct, preemptive narrative designed to neutralize the NCA's expected denial of the Grinkevich/Kushner story and discredit any kinetic UAF action (like the Plan 7-B counter-attack) as an act of escalation. (JUDGMENT: HIGH)
  3. Counter-Narrative: News regarding a potential Zelensky visit (22:09Z) is a strong positive signal but risks being drowned out by the volume and specificity of the RF deception.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Sustained massed strikes (Kharkiv) combined with the simultaneous information chaos severely erode trust and morale. Internal discussions (petitions - 22:07Z) reflect the deep psychological stress on the population.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The high volume of contradictory diplomatic reporting confirms that the RF IO is successfully sowing division and confusion amongst Kyiv's international partners, distracting them from supporting immediate UAF defensive actions.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (232230Z - 240230Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

  1. Completion of GLOC Interdiction: RF forces establish interlocking fires across the M-30 GLOC at Rodynske, functionally severing the line.
  2. CIK Pre-Strike Softening: RF continues FPV/UAS strikes on power grid and telecom CIK nodes in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia Oblasts until 232330Z.
  3. Ballistic Strike Execution: Massed Ballistic Missile Strike Package launched NLT 240000Z, targeting priority UAF C2/Logistics hubs and secondary reserve staging areas.
  4. Information Warfare Culmination: RF leverages the "false flag" narrative post-strike to blame any UAF operational failure or kinetic response on internal political sabotage.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ISR/UAS, operating with complete air superiority in key transit corridors, detects the location of the delayed Plan 7-B MOD reserve elements. RF immediately shifts the targeting parameters of the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike from static C2 nodes to the reserve's concentration area or command convoy. A successful strike results in the operational annihilation of the strategic reserve, leading to the collapse of the Pokrovsk defense by 240600Z.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

TimeframeEvent/Decision PointTriggering IndicatorStatus/Update
NOW - 232245ZFINAL PLAN 7-B MOD EXECUTE ORDER.J3/Operational Command issues EXECUTE order for dispersed movement.CRITICAL: This is the absolute latest point to begin dispersed maneuver before the CIK and ballistic strikes render C2 impossible.
NLT 232300ZConfirm CIK Damage Assessment.BDA confirms local/regional power/C2 node status in Zaporizhzhia region.URGENT: Required to ensure Plan 7-B MOD has redundant communications.
NLT 240000ZStrategic Ballistic Strike Arrival.First confirmed launch signature.AIR DEFENSE EXECUTION POINT.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL (1)CIK Damage Assessment and C2 Redundancy.BDA/SIGINT: Urgent assessment of functional damage to the Zaporizhzhia substation and corresponding loss of primary/backup communications capability along the intended Plan 7-B MOD transit routes.LOW
CRITICAL (2)RF GLOC Interdiction Depth (Rodynske).ISR/HUMINT: Real-time location of RF maneuver elements (40th/155th OMBR) to plot the safest ingress/egress points for secondary routes.LOW
CRITICAL (3)RF Ballistic Targeting Confirmation.SIGINT/ELINT: Confirmation of specific targeting data (coordinates/asset concentration) for the NLT 240000Z strike to optimize ABM positioning.MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The critical situation demands immediate execution and a unified strategic communications counter-attack.

  1. J3/OPERATIONAL COMMAND: MANEUVER EXECUTION (IMMEDIATE, NO DELAY).

    • Action: Immediately issue EXECUTE order for Plan 7-B MOD, using previously selected secondary/tertiary routes and dispersed formation. Assume primary C2 nodes may fail (due to CIK targeting). Prioritize movement over security assessment; communicate execution via pre-arranged redundant channels (satellite, fiber, or runner if necessary).
    • Rationale: The time remaining to mitigate the risk of the NLT 240000Z strike is measured in minutes.
  2. STRATCOM/NCA: IO COUNTER-STRIKE & PREEMPTIVE DENIAL (IMMEDIATE).

    • Action: NCA must issue a dual-purpose denial. Explicitly: (1) Denounce the Grinkevich/Kushner story as a strategic deception aimed at paralyzing UAF defenses ahead of the missile strike. (2) Preemptively denounce the new "false flag" narrative, stating that RF is planning to blame Kyiv for its own coordinated strikes on civilian infrastructure (referencing the Zaporizhzhia substation strike).
    • Rationale: Neutralizing the cognitive environment is necessary to restore command clarity and credibility before the kinetic attack lands.
  3. AIR FORCE/JFS: ASSET PROTECTION AND C2 HARDENING.

    • Action: Immediately shift all available mobile EW assets (ECM/ESM) and short-range air defense (SHORAD) to the immediate vicinity of Plan 7-B MOD's initial staging/transit routes. These assets must prioritize low-altitude RPV/UAS detection and jamming to prevent the RF from confirming the reserve's location for the ballistic strike.
    • Rationale: Preventing RF BDA on the reserve (the MDCOA) is the single most important kinetic mitigation action remaining.

//END SITREP//

Previous (2025-11-23 21:53:27Z)

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