Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL CRISIS PHASE (UPDATE 1)

DTG: 232155Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 232123Z NOV 25 – 232155Z NOV 25 OVERALL THREATCON: CRITICAL // IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational crisis has intensified within the last 30 minutes, primarily due to the failure to execute Plan 7-B MOD by the previous optimal window (232130Z) and a confirmed escalation in RF information operations. Kinetic interdiction lethality in the Kharkiv corridor is confirmed higher than previously estimated. The primary tactical objectives remain preventing the severance of the Pokrovsk M-30 GLOC and securing a reserve transit corridor before the anticipated strategic ballistic strike NLT 240000Z.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis: RF ground pressure remains focused on achieving tactical control over the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske. Severance is expected momentarily (NLT 232200Z). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kharkiv Corridor (Deep Battle): Confirmed UAS strikes continue. New air alerts indicate potential targeting shift towards secondary routes or high-value logistics/staging areas.
• Flank Threats: UAS activity noted over Pechenihy (Kharkiv) and Izmail (Odesa), indicating persistent RF efforts to distract and fix UAF AD assets across multiple domains.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear and stable conditions persist, continuing to favor RF ISR and deep strike platforms, which are currently being leveraged for route denial.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: RF is utilizing the delay in UAF reserve deployment to maximum advantage, synchronizing deep kinetic interdiction with a highly specific, high-level information deception campaign designed to paralyze UAF National Command Authority (NCA). UAF: Plan 7-B MOD reserve elements remain static or dangerously slow in transit due to the high-risk environment and delay in execution authorization. Zaporizhzhia Oblast Administration issuing an ALERT (M 21:43:55) strongly suggests RF preparations for the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike are advancing rapidly.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

Capability: RF has demonstrated the capability to rapidly escalate the cognitive domain by introducing highly sensitive, named individuals into the false "peace plan" narrative. Intention (Immediate - Next 30 minutes):

1. GLOC Severance: Complete tactical control over M-30 GLOC near Rodynske. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Cognitive Decapitation: Utilize the newly amplified TASS narrative (naming NATO SACEUR GEN Grinkevich and J. Kushner) to maximize confusion and paralysis within the NCA, preventing the timely authorization of Plan 7-B MOD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3. Targeting Consolidation: Finalizing launch parameters and target data for the massed ballistic strike NLT 240000Z, likely aimed at disrupting C2 for the Plan 7-B relief effort. (D-S Belief: Missile Strike in Zaporizhzhia Oblast - 0.252)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The most critical adaptation is the IO Escalation (M 21:40:58). RF is moving beyond general disinformation to specific, high-value deception aimed directly at the strategic decision-making level. This suggests RF C2 believes the IO component is the decisive factor in defeating Plan 7-B MOD.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF operational logistics remain sufficient to support the strategic strike package and ongoing ground pressure on Pokrovsk.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization is HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. The coordinated timing of IO amplification, sustained kinetic interdiction, and the imminent strategic strike displays a high level of multi-domain integration.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive-Critical. The delay in execution has increased exposure. READINESS: Tactical readiness is severely degraded by casualty events and psychological stress induced by the combined kinetic/IO attack.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Significant Setback: Confirmed casualty count in Kharkiv has risen to 3 KIA and 15 WIA (M 21:29:56, 21:50:07). This high rate of injury (15 WIA) relative to fatalities confirms the effectiveness of RF cluster/fragmentation payloads or high strike density on staging areas.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate execution of Plan 7-B MOD using dispersed tactics. CONSTRAINT: The failure to launch by the optimal window now means the maneuver is proceeding under maximum enemy IO influence and kinetic risk, increasing the required air defense/EW support exponentially.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF state media (TASS) has published a highly successful deception piece asserting that GEN Alexus Grinkevich (NATO SACEUR) and Jared Kushner are participating in Geneva peace talks.

• Analysis: This IO is designed to achieve maximum cognitive friction, implying not only U.S. government division but also NATO complicity in forcing a resolution, directly undermining the NCA's political justification for continuing high-risk offensive/defensive operations.
• Threat Level: HIGH—This deception must be neutralized immediately, as its impact is designed to last until the NLT 240000Z strike.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The increased casualty count in Kharkiv (3 KIA, 15 WIA) will place severe immediate strain on local medical and administrative services, diverting resources and increasing local pressure on UAF commands operating in the transit corridors.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The NYT report suggesting the "working version" of a US peace plan differs (M 21:23:45) is a weak counter-narrative against the specific, high-profile names cited by TASS. The focus must remain on managing the crisis induced by the RF IO.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (232155Z - 240355Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Severance: RF forces achieve functional physical control over the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske NLT 232200Z.
2. Strategic Strike Execution: The RF will launch the massed Ballistic Missile Strike Package NLT 240000Z, targeting key UAF C2 and J-FIRE nodes in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia Oblasts.
3. IO Sustainment: RF will sustain and broaden the "peace framework" narrative through third-party amplifiers until the ballistic strike lands, maximizing operational paralysis.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF UAS surveillance (operating with impunity due to distracted AD) achieves real-time BDA on the Plan 7-B MOD command column (V-3 priority target) moving along secondary routes. This BDA enables the RF to shift the targeting priorities of the NLT 240000Z strategic strike package to an operational reserve concentration area instead of a static C2 node. This results in the functional destruction of the UAF strategic reserve capability, leading to forward defensive collapse on the Pokrovsk Axis before 240600Z.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The tactical and cognitive situation requires immediate, decisive action to prevent operational paralysis and reserve force destruction.

1. J3/OPERATIONAL COMMAND: EMERGENCY MANEUVER EXECUTION (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Immediately issue EXECUTE order for Plan 7-B MOD. Assume the Rodynske junction is lost. Emphasize dispersed movement and radio silence along pre-surveyed secondary routes. Operational risk is unavoidable; prioritize intact arrival of combat power over transit security.
   • Rationale: Further delay guarantees catastrophic interdiction by RF kinetic assets prior to the NLT 240000Z C2 disruption strike.

2. STRATCOM/NCA: IO COUNTER-STRIKE AND DAMAGE LIMITATION (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: NCA must issue an immediate, highly publicized denial, explicitly naming the TASS report and labeling the inclusion of GEN Grinkevich and J. Kushner as a malicious act of enemy strategic deception aimed at paralyzing UAF defenses ahead of the missile strike. Coordinate denial messaging with high-level U.S. and NATO officials if possible.
   • Rationale: Neutralizing the cognitive attack is as critical as mitigating the kinetic threat. This denial must land before the NLT 240000Z strike to maintain command focus.

3. AIR FORCE/JFS: HARDENING AND PROTECTION.

   • Action: Reconfirm that high-value air defense assets (Patriot/SAMP-T) are operating exclusively in Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Mode and are reserved solely for the NLT 240000Z wave. Furthermore, dedicate all available low-altitude mobile SHORAD and EW assets to accompany Plan 7-B MOD along its secondary routes, operating 5km ahead of the column to detect and disrupt RPV surveillance.
   • Rationale: The high casualty count (3 KIA, 15 WIA) validates the extreme risk of UAS interdiction. The strategic strike requires maximum ABM capability.

//END SITREP//