Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL CRISIS PHASE

DTG: 232123Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 232053Z NOV 25 – 232123Z NOV 25 OVERALL THREATCON: CRITICAL // OPERATIONAL CRISIS POINT

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational situation has deteriorated marginally since the 2053Z report, marked by confirmed increased RF strike lethality in the deep rear. The critical race to launch Plan 7-B MOD reserves is now severely time-constrained, with the previous "optimal launch window" having expired. The tactical focus remains preventing the simultaneous severance of the Pokrovsk M-30 GLOC and neutralizing the effects of the kinetic deep interdiction campaign targeting the reserve transit corridor.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis: RF pressure remains focused on the Rodynske junction and the M-30 GLOC. RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) are highly likely to achieve tactical control over a segment of the GLOC NLT 232200Z. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kharkiv Corridor (Deep Battle): Confirmed high-yield UAS strikes continue to contaminate the primary transit route for Plan 7-B MOD reserves. Secondary routes must be finalized and utilized immediately.
• Stepnohirsk Flank: Confirmed RF maneuver west of Stepnohirsk continues to successfully fix UAF Southern reserves.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. Clear, stable conditions continue to favor RF aerial ISR and UAS/RPV strike platforms, supporting deep interdiction operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Operating in a highly synchronized multi-domain effort (Kinetic, IO, Ground Maneuver) aimed at achieving operational paralysis prior to the strategic ballistic strike NLT 240000Z. RF AD posturing (1st/1545th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiments activity) confirms preparations for large-scale offensive operations cover. UAF: Operational command is facing a complex time/risk calculus. The failure to launch Plan 7-B MOD by 2115Z increases the transit risk but makes the maneuver even more critical. C-UAS resources are confirmed overwhelmed in the interdiction zones.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

Capability: RF has confirmed a high-confidence capability to deliver lethal, precise UAS strikes with increasing fragmentation effect, evidenced by the rising casualty count in Kharkiv (3 KIA). Intention (Immediate - Next 60 minutes):

1. GLOC Severance: Achieve tactical control over the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Route Denial: Sustain kinetic pressure on key road/rail infrastructure in the Kharkiv corridor to ensure Plan 7-B MOD forces cannot deploy intact.
3. IO Amplification: Intensify the "peace plan" narrative using named US/Russian individuals (Whitkoff/Dmitriev) to exacerbate cognitive friction within the UAF NCA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary observable change is the escalation of lethality in the deep strike campaign, reflected by the confirmed casualty increase from 2 KIA to 3 KIA, signifying either higher strike density or greater targeting priority on vulnerable troop staging/transit areas.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics appear adequately supplied to support the current kinetic campaign and the imminent strategic strike package (NLT 240000Z). UAF logistics throughput capability in the Kharkiv corridor is severely degraded.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, maintaining high synchronization between the kinetic battlefield crisis (Pokrovsk), the strategic deep strike planning (NLT 240000Z), and the information warfare component.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF posture is defensive-critical. The forward defense is nearing culmination. Plan 7-B MOD forces remain static or delayed in transit, increasing vulnerability to follow-on RF kinetic operations. READINESS: Tactical readiness is degraded by the confirmed casualty event and the lack of secure transit corridors.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback: Confirmed increase in fatalities in Kharkiv to 3 KIA (up from 2 KIA), confirming the effective interdiction and high risk profile of the transit corridor. Minor Success: Confirmed report of RF personnel surrendering in the Kharkiv direction provides a minor local morale boost and tactical proof of RF vulnerabilities on secondary sectors.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, high-speed execution of Plan 7-B MOD using dispersed, low-signature convoy tactics along secondary routes. CONSTRAINT: The lack of real-time Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on alternate GLOCs prevents accurate risk-modeling for the maneuver force.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO channels (e.g., Operatsiya Z) have intensified the "peace plan" deception by introducing specific names (Whitkoff, Dmitriev) working on the alleged framework.

• Vector Aim: This move attempts to validate the false narrative, lending it greater credibility and directly aiming to freeze NCA decision-making regarding the kinetic offensive underway. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-Point: Reports confirming potential high-level diplomatic action (Zelenskyy visit to Washington) provide a high-value counter-narrative opportunity.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmed increase in civilian/military casualties in Kharkiv (3 KIA, 8 WIA) will compound local pressure on UAF forces to demonstrate effective Counter-UAS capabilities and security, potentially complicating maneuver execution in urban periphery staging areas.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

High-level diplomatic activity continues, confirming strong U.S. commitment via ongoing discussions for a potential Zelenskyy visit to Washington. This positive diplomatic signal directly contradicts the RF IO narrative of Western abandonment or disunity.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (232123Z - 240323Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Seizure: RF ground forces will seize and interdict a segment of the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske NLT 232200Z, effectively severing the primary reinforcement artery for Pokrovsk.
2. Culminating Strike: RF C2 will issue execution command for the massed Ballistic Missile Strike Package (NLT 240000Z), targeting identified UAF C2 hubs (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia) to prevent the coordination of the Plan 7-B MOD counter-move.
3. Sustained Interdiction: RF deep strike will maintain the rate of effort, seeking further high-value targets within the Plan 7-B MOD transit zone.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) Delayed UAF authorization/launch of Plan 7-B MOD (past 232130Z) permits the RF to successfully interdict the M-30 GLOC. RF UAS targeting achieves a high-casualty strike (MDCOA-Strike) on a stationary or slow-moving Plan 7-B MOD C2 element or logistics convoy. This tactical failure, combined with the successful C2 decapitation strike NLT 240000Z, leads to forward defensive collapse on the Pokrovsk Axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The tactical situation demands immediate, high-risk action to prevent operational collapse.

1. J3/OPERATIONAL COMMAND: EMERGENCY MANEUVER EXECUTION (NLT 232130Z).

   • Action: Immediately issue EXECUTE order for Plan 7-B MOD. Assume the M-30 GLOC is compromised. Direct convoys to execute pre-planned dispersal procedures, prioritizing speed along secondary, unimproved routes, accepting an estimated 10-15% delay in arrival time over complete kinetic failure during transit.
   • Rationale: The threat of further UAS interdiction on static or delayed formations outweighs the risk of difficult movement along secondary paths. Speed is critical to beat the 240000Z ballistic strike window.

2. AIR FORCE/JFS: DEFENSIVE CONVOY INTEGRATION.

   • Action: Immediately confirm the successful re-tasking of 100% mobile EW/SHORAD assets to Plan 7-B MOD escort duties. Implement a dedicated, rotating C-UAS "CAP" (Combat Air Patrol) of mobile EW vehicles positioned 5 km ahead of the lead columns to establish an electronic buffer zone against inbound RPVs.
   • Rationale: The 3 KIA confirms the inadequacy of current route protection. Dedicated, forward-deployed mobile EW is the only viable countermeasure to the current deep UAS threat.

3. STRATCOM/NCA: IMMEDIATE IO COUNTER-STRIKE.

   • Action: STRATCOM must issue an immediate, coordinated public denial with named U.S./European officials. Explicitly address the RF IO tactic of using named individuals (Whitkoff/Dmitriev) to deceive, labeling the narrative as a blatant attempt to distract from imminent RF military escalation (the NLT 240000Z strike).
   • Rationale: Neutralizing the granular RF deception is critical to maintaining NCA focus on military execution and bolstering international confidence.

//END SITREP//