Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - CRITICAL KINETIC PHASE

DTG: 232053Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 232025Z NOV 25 – 232053Z NOV 25 OVERALL THREATCON: CRITICAL // KINETIC CULMINATION PHASE ACTIVE

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational crisis remains focused on preventing simultaneous collapse on the Pokrovsk Axis and critical logistical paralysis in the Kharkiv Corridor. Kinetic activity against UAF logistics has intensified: confirmed UAS strikes in Kharkiv now report two (2) Killed In Action (KIA) and eight (8) Wounded In Action (WIA), including a 12-year-old civilian. This escalation confirms the Enemy's (RF) successful application of deep interdiction to preempt the deployment of Plan 7-B MOD reserves. The window for safe and effective deployment is now near closure.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis: RF ground pressure on Rodynske and the M-30 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) remains the central operational threat. Projected GLOC severance timeline is NLT 232200Z.
• Deep Battle (Kharkiv Corridor): The Shevchenkivskyi district and surrounding logistics staging areas are confirmed High-Value Target (HVT) zones. Continued UAS presence (Confirmed: UAS inbound from the North at 20:41Z) indicates sustained RF intent to maintain route denial operations, directly targeting the planned transit corridor for Plan 7-B MOD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Stepnohirsk Flank: The RF flanking maneuver in Zaporizhzhia remains unconfirmed but must be assumed to be fixing Southern reserves.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No changes. Conditions favor RF air and UAS operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Displaying high synchronization between kinetic deep strike (UAS) and hybrid warfare (Information Operations). The immediate objective is route contamination and delay of UAF reserves. UAF: The National Command Authority (NCA) has confirmed political clarity, but tactical inertia and physical damage delay the execution of Plan 7-B MOD. C-UAS resources are confirmed overwhelmed in the Kharkiv sector.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF has proven the capability to deliver lethal, precise UAS strikes deep behind the contact line, resulting in elevated civilian and military logistics casualties. This capability directly challenges UAF freedom of movement for large-scale operational maneuver.

Intention (Immediate - Next 3 Hours):

1. Casualty Generation/Route Contamination: Intensify UAS strikes (as evidenced by new UAS tracking) to increase the perceived risk and actual cost of moving Plan 7-B MOD assets through the Kharkiv/Balakliia corridor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. GLOC Severance: Achieve physical tactical control over a segment of the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske NLT 232200Z. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The only significant adaptation is the increased lethality of the deep strike campaign, reflected by the casualty count (2 KIA, 8 WIA, including a minor). This suggests greater targeting accuracy or resource allocation toward infrastructure critical to the reserve movement.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Confirmed logistics nodes degradation in Kharkiv (Shevchenkivskyi district) significantly increases the transit risk and reduces the window for staging essential fuel and ammunition required for the Plan 7-B MOD counter-offensive.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, executing highly coordinated kinetic operations synchronized with a high-level Information Operation (IO) campaign designed to create NCA paralysis or allied friction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Post-Geneva clarity allows focus on execution. However, the confirmed casualty report introduces severe tactical risk. Plan 7-B MOD readiness must be assessed against the current state of infrastructure damage.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Strategic Successes: Diplomatic engagement remains high (Rubio confirms detailed US plan; potential Zelenskyy US visit on the line). Tactical Setbacks: Confirmed escalation of fatalities (2 KIA) and injuries (8 WIA) in Kharkiv due to effective RF UAS interdiction.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate launch and layered defense of Plan 7-B MOD. CONSTRAINT: Lack of real-time Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for critical road/rail junctions in Kharkiv inhibits the planning of low-risk secondary transit routes.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is capitalizing on diplomatic uncertainty and internal political optics:

1. Friction Narrative: Pro-RF channels are actively amplifying President Zelenskyy’s comments regarding "subjects from Ukraine" promoting the "Russian position," aiming to create internal distrust and purge concerns within Kyiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Diplomatic Ineffectiveness: RF IO channels (e.g., Alex Parker Returns) are using specific visual observations (e.g., Umerov’s demeanor during talks) to frame negotiations as disorganized or ineffective, undermining the diplomatic success. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
3. Peace Plan Confusion: The simultaneous emergence of two differing "peace plan" versions (US vs. EU/Reuters) is being leveraged by RF sources to sow confusion regarding Kyiv’s strategic objectives and international support unity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmed fatalities, especially the reported injury of a 12-year-old civilian in Kharkiv, will significantly depress local morale and increase pressure on local military leadership to deliver immediate, effective air defense. This complicates the risk calculus for using urban areas for staging logistics.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Confirmed progress in Geneva. US Senator Rubio has specified the US plan contains 26-28 points. Reports of a potential Zelenskyy visit to the US contingent upon Geneva success reinforces the strategic importance of the current talks and requires STRATCOM vigilance against IO interference.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (232053Z - 240253Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Continued Route Saturation: RF will sustain UAS/RPV interdiction (potentially shifting to higher yield payloads or denser strike patterns) across the Kharkiv/Balakliia corridor to ensure Plan 7-B MOD units are fragmented and delayed NLT 232300Z.
2. GLOC Severance: RF ground forces will achieve tactical operational control over a segment of the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske NLT 232200Z, creating a physical barrier to the Pokrovsk sector.
3. Strategic Strike Preparation: RF ballistic missile assets (Iskander/KN-23) will finalize launch sequencing for the culminating strategic strike NLT 240000Z, targeting UAF C2 infrastructure.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF interdiction successfully delays the launch of Plan 7-B MOD reserves past 232200Z. The M-30 GLOC is severed, isolating forward UAF forces. The NLT 240000Z ballistic strike then successfully targets the delayed or newly established mobile C2 elements coordinating the relief force, resulting in operational failure on the Pokrovsk axis and potential loss of strategic depth.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Operational Command: ACCEPT AND MITIGATE RISK. LAUNCH PLAN 7-B MOD IMMEDIATELY (NLT 232115Z).

   • Action: Operational Command must prioritize speed of deployment over route security. Utilize the most direct path while prioritizing forces that require immediate movement. Issue directive to bypass confirmed strike zones, accepting initial delays inherent in utilizing unimproved secondary routes.
   • Rationale: The threat to the forward defense (Pokrovsk) is immediate. Further delay guarantees MDCOA success. High casualty figures must be mitigated by movement, not hesitation.

2. Air Force/JFS: CONVOY HARDENING AND DEDICATED ESCORT.

   • Action: Immediately re-task 100% of mobile Electronic Warfare (EW) and dedicated low-level SHORAD/C-UAS units within the Kharkiv operational area to provide direct, integrated escort defense for Plan 7-B MOD convoys. Utilize high-speed EW vehicles (e.g., Bukovel-AD variants) as point protection for column C2 assets.
   • Rationale: The confirmed UAS threat is the primary physical constraint to the maneuver. Stationary AD assets are insufficient; mobile defense is required.

3. STRATCOM/NCA: IMMEDIATE COUNTER-NARRATIVE ON ALLIED FRICTION.

   • Action: STRATCOM must release synchronized statements with key US and European partners confirming absolute unity on the diplomatic path, preemptively dismissing RF IO efforts regarding the conflicting peace plan texts and internal Ukrainian friction (Zelenskyy's comments/Umerov optics). Focus message on RF attempts to leverage diplomacy to mask impending kinetic atrocities.
   • Rationale: High-level IO must be neutralized instantly to prevent diplomatic success from degrading tactical decision-making through cognitive paralysis.

//END SITREP//