Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - CRITICAL UPDATE

DTG: 231953Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 231930Z NOV 25 – 231953Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational status remains CRITICAL. The Russian Federation (RF) has successfully executed the geographical expansion of deep interdiction fire, specifically targeting the Kharkiv logistics corridor with sustained Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) waves. Simultaneously, ground forces claim consolidation of gains on the main axis near Krasnoarmiisk/Pokrovsk. Critically, the Information Environment (IO) shows signs of stabilization at the allied strategic level (Geneva talks success), but a dangerous new domestic IO risk has emerged. The window for Plan 7-B MOD execution remains critical, requiring immediate resource diversion to protect the northern logistics vector.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Main Effort (Pokrovsk Axis / Krasnoarmiisk): Pro-RF sources claim ongoing "clearing" operations in Krasnoarmiisk (Pokrovsk) and continued tactical advances on the Druzhkivka axis (19:34Z, 19:34Z). This indicates high RF morale and maintained pressure toward the M-30 GLOC.
• Deep Battle (Interdiction Validation):
  • Kharkiv Oblast: Multiple waves of UAS confirmed incoming from the North/East (19:26Z, 19:48Z, 19:52Z). Confirmed UAV impact in the Saltivskyi District, Kharkiv City (19:37Z). This confirms the high-priority threat to the northern logistics vector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Sloviansk: RF aviation employed Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) on Sloviansk, resulting in 5 civilian casualties, including two children (19:39Z). This validates the continued RF kinetic effort to fix and degrade the eastern logistics hub.
  • Deep Counter-Strike (UAF): Confirmed explosions and PVO activity in Anapa, RF, sustaining UAF deep threat capability (19:24Z).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Conditions remain conducive to deep strike and UAS/RPV operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Forces are synchronized, executing tactical advances while maintaining high-tempo deep interdiction fire across all three key logistics corridors (Lozova/Pavlohrad, Sloviansk, Kharkiv/Balakliia). RF C2 is HIGHLY effective. UAF: Active C-UAS defense successfully engaged UAS in Kharkiv, confirming defensive readiness, but asset distribution is strained. Strategic C2 stability is improving following positive Geneva developments.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREATCON: KINETIC CULMINATION IMMINENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF maintains the demonstrated capability to execute synchronous kinetic strikes (KABs on Sloviansk, UAS on Kharkiv) aimed at preemptively degrading the UAF reserve counter-move (Plan 7-B MOD), while pushing tactical gains in the Pokrovsk sector.

Intention (Immediate - Next 6 Hours):

1. GLOC Severance: Achieve tactical physical control of the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske NLT 232200Z. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Logistics Denial: Sustain maximum interdiction fire saturation on the Kharkiv corridor (Balakliia/Staryi Saltiv) to ensure Plan 7-B MOD movement cannot proceed safely from the North. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3. Ballistic Strike Prep: Final positioning of strategic strike assets ahead of the NLT 240000Z mass launch.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The most significant kinetic adaptation is the confirmed, immediate follow-through on the Kharkiv strike plan (19:26Z, 19:37Z). This confirms RF tactical ISR is highly effective and integrated, identifying new UAF staging areas and reacting immediately.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains sufficient for both ground operations and strategic strike execution. UAF logistics faces acute, confirmed pressure from both eastern (Sloviansk KABs) and northern (Kharkiv UAS) strikes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains HIGH. UAF C2 now benefits from mitigation of external political paralysis, shifting the threat focus to internal political cohesion (see Section 4).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensively stressed but adapting. The successful diplomatic developments in Geneva (19:31Z, 19:42Z) have created a positive psychological operational environment for the National Command Authority (NCA), potentially reducing the political risk associated with authorizing Plan 7-B MOD. Tactical C-UAS readiness is confirmed in Kharkiv.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes (Strategic/Diplomatic):

• Diplomatic Breakthrough: Geneva talks (Ukraine, US, EU) reported as "most productive day" by US Senator Rubio (19:42Z, 19:51Z), and President Zelenskyy confirming that the "Trump team hears us" (19:31Z). This is a critical mitigation of the previous diplomatic crisis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH)
• C-UAS Activity: Confirmed engagement of UAS over Kharkiv (19:37Z).

Setbacks (Tactical/Kinetic):

• Confirmed RF use of KABs on Sloviansk (19:39Z).
• Confirmed UAS strikes in Kharkiv city (19:37Z).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid reinforcement and re-tasking of mobile C-UAS assets to provide dedicated, real-time convoy protection for Plan 7-B MOD movement specifically through the targeted Kharkiv/Balakliia sector. CONSTRAINT: Need for rapid logistical assessment of damage caused by KAB strikes in Sloviansk and UAS strikes in Kharkiv.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO continues to push narratives of operational success (MoD 19:35Z, 19:45Z) and attempt to degrade UAF social cohesion (Dva Mayora 19:26Z).

CRITICAL NEW IO THREAT (Internal Cohesion): President Zelenskyy stated that partner intelligence suggests the Russian position is "entering through certain subjects from Ukraine" (19:44Z). This statement, while intended to expose internal vulnerability, immediately creates a high-risk internal IO environment, potentially leading to distrust of domestic political/military figures.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Confirmed kinetic strikes on Sloviansk (civilian casualties) and Kharkiv (urban strike) will negatively impact civilian morale, offsetting the positive diplomatic news. UAF military morale benefits from successful deep strikes (Anapa) and C-UAS actions.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

DECISIVE IMPROVEMENT: The Geneva talks, including key US figures, have substantially mitigated the diplomatic crisis reported previously. EU Ambassadors are convening an emergency session (19:43Z) to discuss the outcomes, indicating high-level international commitment remains active.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (231953Z - 240153Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Severance: RF ground forces will commit final resources to sever the M-30 GLOC west of Rodynske (NLT 232200Z).
2. Deep Strike Wave 1: Focused UAS saturation will continue across the Kharkiv, Sloviansk, and Zaporizhzhia axis (19:31Z, 19:52Z), targeting reconnaissance elements, logistics stockpiles, and forward C-UAS/EW systems prior to the strategic ballistic strike.
3. IO Shift: RF IO will immediately leverage the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike to declare operational culmination, regardless of the strike's actual success, aiming to maximize psychological effect and exploit the newly opened internal Ukrainian cohesion fracture point (19:44Z statement).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The RF strategic ballistic strike NLT 240000Z successfully strikes a key component of the Plan 7-B MOD reserve staging, specifically within the newly targeted Kharkiv corridor (Balakliia rail junction or a command element). This degradation, combined with the successful physical severance of the M-30 GLOC, forces J3 to either delay or significantly reduce the scale of Plan 7-B MOD, leading to the collapse of the Pokrovsk front line units.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Operational Command: PROTECT THE NORTHERN APPROACH.

   • Action: Execute Plan 7-B MOD NLT 232000Z. The key modification is the mandatory establishment of a Dedicated Mobile C-UAS Escort Force (minimum 2x batteries) to cover the reserve movement in the Kharkiv/Balakliia corridor.
   • Rationale: The threat to the Kharkiv vector is validated by confirmed strikes (19:37Z). Failure to protect this route guarantees interdiction success before the strategic strike.

2. STRATCOM/NCA: CONTAIN THE INTERNAL IO RISK.

   • Action: Immediately transition the narrative from diplomatic relief (Geneva success) to urgent domestic unity. The NCA must issue a targeted statement addressing the "internal subject" vulnerability (19:44Z) by calling for zero tolerance for internal compromise and framing the accusation as the latest, desperate RF tactic to destabilize Ukraine from within.
   • Rationale: The diplomatic threat is contained, but RF IO has successfully shifted focus to sowing internal distrust, which could paralyze Plan 7-B MOD authorization or movement via internal C2 friction.

3. Air Force/JFS: DEFENSE FOCUS ON BALLISTIC THREAT.

   • Action: Maintain priority allocation of Patriot/SAMP-T interceptors for Anti-Ballistic Mode only, conserving high-value interceptors for the NLT 240000Z wave. Continue to rely on SHORAD and mobile EW for C-UAS protection on reserve movement routes.
   • Rationale: The proximity of the strategic strike window demands preservation of high-end AD assets against the MDCOA of C2 decapitation.

//END SITREP//