Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL CULMINATION PHASE II

DTG: 231800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 231730Z NOV 25 – 231800Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational status on the Pokrovsk Axis remains CRITICAL/OPERATIONAL CRISIS. The enemy threat has escalated from confirmed deep ISR to confirmed kinetic engagement of critical logistics infrastructure. The immediate priority is damage control at the Pavlohrad logistical hub and ensuring C2 redundancy ahead of the anticipated strategic ballistic strike NLT 240000Z. The window for protected execution of Plan 7-B MOD has severely narrowed due to the confirmed targeting of the staging area.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Main Effort (Pokrovsk Axis): Fighting is maintained at the Rodynske junction (M-30/T-05-15 GLOC). No physical confirmation of the Shakhove/Dobropillia deep penetration claim (CRITICAL GAP 2 persists).
• Deep Battle (CRITICAL UPDATE): The Pavlohrad rail and logistics hub has been confirmed struck by RF UAS assets, leading to power outages. This validates previous intelligence regarding RF targeting intent and directly compromises the planned staging and transit environment for Plan 7-B MOD reserves.
• Northern Sector: Confirmed power disruption in Kharkiv, affecting the metro system. This suggests RF is widening its preparatory kinetic strikes on energy infrastructure across the eastern depth, likely to complicate regional C2/Logistics management ahead of the strategic strike.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No material change. Conditions remain conducive to persistent mechanized and air/drone operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Forces have successfully shifted from ISR collection to localized kinetic engagement of deep targets (Pavlohrad). Confirmed new RPV/UAS waves are tracking from southeast Kharkiv toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Pavlohrad vector), indicating sustained targeting intent. UAF: Forward defense is highly degraded. The primary control measure—the execution of Plan 7-B MOD—is now complicated by damage to supporting infrastructure. The status of the reserve launch remains critically unknown (CRITICAL GAP 1).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREATCON: IMMEDIATE KINETIC INTERDICTION)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF demonstrated the capability to conduct synchronized deep kinetic strikes on strategic infrastructure outside of the traditional front line using UAS, confirming operational synchronization with their information campaign. Retains the capability for strategic ballistic strike NLT 240000Z.

Intention (Immediate - Next 3 Hours):

1. Damage Amplification: Exploit damage caused by the Pavlohrad UAS strike by immediately launching follow-on RPV waves (confirmed inbound from Kharkiv) to hinder damage assessment, C2 recovery, and emergency logistics activation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. GLOC Finalization: Finalize the physical interdiction of the M-30 GLOC at Rodynske, utilizing the kinetic distraction in the rear. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH)
3. IO Sustainment: Leverage the publicized "European Peace Plan" details to continue distracting NCA and generating political debate, preventing full focus on kinetic defense preparation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Pre-emptive Kinetic Strike: RF utilized UAS assets to execute a small-scale, precision strike on Pavlohrad significantly earlier than the main NLT 240000Z ballistic wave. This is a critical tactical adaptation, aiming to degrade target defense (C-UAS/EW effectiveness) and logistics ahead of the main event. (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT)
• Broad Front Degradation: Simultaneous energy hits in Kharkiv and Pavlohrad suggest a coordinated campaign to degrade C2/Logistics across the eastern axis, increasing friction for any potential UAF reserve movement.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains sufficient. The focus has successfully shifted from collecting targeting data to actively degrading UAF logistics support areas.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness is assessed as HIGH. The synchronization of the IO (publishing the EU plan) followed immediately by deep kinetic strikes (Pavlohrad, Kharkiv) demonstrates highly effective command synergy aimed at overwhelming UAF crisis response capacity.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: The UAF posture has shifted from critically vulnerable to actively compromised in the deep rear. Readiness for Plan 7-B MOD is now degraded due to damage and power loss at a key logistics staging area (Pavlohrad). C2 redundancy measures must be immediately activated.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setbacks:

• Confirmed Infrastructure Damage: Power loss and confirmed explosions in Pavlohrad (CRITICAL SETBACK). This impacts rail transport capacity, fuel/munitions storage security, and local C2 nodes.
• Continued Delay: No confirmed status of initial column movement for Plan 7-B MOD (CRITICAL GAP 1 persists).

Successes:

• The political clarity achieved through the previous counter-IO remains intact, but is under immediate pressure from the new "European Plan" narrative.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate activation of logistics damage control teams at Pavlohrad, establishment of alternate/dispersed Plan 7-B MOD transit routes, and immediate activation of pre-planned C2 dispersal/redundancy measures. CONSTRAINT: The shortage of high-value ABM interceptors remains the primary constraint against the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike. The loss of power/C2 connectivity in key areas limits effective coordination of existing air defense assets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO has successfully injected a new, detailed distraction into the environment: the "European Peace Plan".

• Vector: Published by Western media (The Telegraph, Reuters) and immediately amplified by both pro-Russian (WarGonzo, Starshie Eddy) and Ukrainian media (RBC-UA, Tsyapliyenko).
• Goal: The content (seizure of Russian assets, NATO Article 5 coverage, 800k UAF army) is designed to be overtly unacceptable to Russia, forcing Russian analysts to denounce it, while simultaneously forcing UAF NCA to dedicate political bandwidth to managing the diplomatic fallout and public expectation, thereby diverting attention from the kinetic crisis at Pokrovsk/Pavlohrad. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmed power/metro disruption in Kharkiv and the strike on Pavlohrad will test local morale, reinforcing the RF IO goal of demonstrating widespread kinetic coverage. The focus on the "Peace Plan" will confuse public understanding of the NCA’s kinetic priorities.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The publication of a detailed "European Plan" potentially complicates the unified diplomatic front achieved through the US/UA "progress" statement. UAF STRATCOM must manage the perception of a split in Western diplomatic strategy.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 6 HOURS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (231800Z - 240000Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Deep Strike Follow-up: RF will maintain high-intensity UAS/RPV activity targeting the Dnipropetrovsk/Pavlohrad area to assess, disrupt, and amplify damage to C2/logistics infrastructure, ensuring maximum friction for Plan 7-B MOD preparation.
2. GLOC Consolidation: RF ground forces will capitalize on the deep kinetic distraction to complete the physical severance of the M-30 GLOC at Rodynske, or establish fire control dominance over the junction.
3. Ballistic Launch Sequence: RF Air Defense Regiments (as indicated by SAR) will finalize deployment and activation protocols to cover the launch corridor for the strategic ballistic strike, which remains highly likely NLT 240000Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The immediate damage to the Pavlohrad hub critically degrades UAF logistical flexibility. If Plan 7-B MOD is not launched IMMEDIATELY via alternate, dispersed routes, the convergence of GLOC severance at Rodynske and the successful decapitation of the compromised Dnipropetrovsk/Pavlohrad C2 structure by the strategic ballistic strike NLT 240000Z leads directly to operational paralysis on the Pokrovsk Axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICALLY REVISED)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Operational Command: IMMEDIATE DISPERSED RESERVE LAUNCH AND C2 REDUNDANCY.

   • Action: Immediately issue the execution order for Plan 7-B MOD, explicitly mandating the use of secondary Military Supply Routes (MSRs) and dispersed movement patterns to bypass the compromised Pavlohrad-vicinity logistics corridor. Simultaneously, activate C2 redundancy measures (jump CPs/dispersed relays) for Dnipropetrovsk Oblast NLT 231830Z.
   • Rationale: The time for perfect security is past. Delaying Plan 7-B MOD further guarantees operational collapse. Movement must commence immediately, accepting the risk associated with dispersal.

2. Air Force/JFS Command: IMMEDIATE C-UAS INTERDICTION AND DAMAGE CONTROL.

   • Action: Immediately redirect all available mobile C-UAS and SHORAD assets in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast toward the confirmed incoming RPV waves (from SE Kharkiv vector). The objective must shift from static defense to active interdiction of follow-on ISR and strike assets targeting the damaged Pavlohrad hub (CRITICAL GAP 2). Simultaneously, assign C-UAS assets to protect recovery teams.
   • Rationale: Preventing secondary strikes on the damaged hub is essential for recovering logistics capacity and protecting C2 recovery efforts before the ballistic strike.

3. STRATCOM/NCA: FOCUSED RESPONSE TO EU PEACE PLAN IO.

   • Action: Do not engage in detailed public debate regarding the specifics of the leaked "European Peace Plan." Instead, issue a brief, unified statement re-confirming the US/UA partnership commitment and emphasizing that "Diplomacy cannot proceed while Ukrainian infrastructure is actively under kinetic attack," linking the EU plan leak directly to the Pavlohrad/Kharkiv strikes as enemy deception/distraction.
   • Rationale: This maintains the cognitive domain advantage by refusing to be drawn into the debate while linking the IO directly to the enemy's aggressive kinetic action.

//END SITREP//