Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL CULMINATION PHASE

DTG: 231730Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 231700Z NOV 25 – 231730Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational status on the Pokrovsk Axis remains CRITICAL/OPERATIONAL CRISIS. The UAF National Command Authority (NCA) has successfully neutralized the RF Information Operation (IO) threat, but the kinetic risk has intensified, driven by localized enemy tactical success claims and confirmed RF ISR activity targeting UAF operational depth. The decisive point is the immediate execution of Plan 7-B MOD prior to the anticipated RF operational culminating point (GLOC severance + Strategic Ballistic Strike NLT 240000Z).

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Main Effort (Pokrovsk Axis): Fighting is concentrated around the Rodynske junction (M-30/T-05-15 GLOC).
• Dobropillia Salient (New Threat Vector): RF sources are claiming the capture of Oktyabrske (Shakhove). If confirmed, this indicates RF exploitation has expanded westward, directly threatening the operational rear of Myrnohrad and the planned transit corridor for Plan 7-B MOD reserves.
• Deep Rear: Confirmed RF Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) activity targeting logistical and command nodes in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, specifically reporting drones heading toward Pavlohrad. Pavlohrad is a critical rail hub and potential staging area for reserves, directly correlating with the NLT 240000Z strike preparation.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No material change. Conditions remain conducive to persistent mechanized and air/drone operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Forces continue aggressive exploitation, employing IO/kinetic synchronization. Claims of territorial gain outside the immediate axis (Shakhove, Tikhoe/Otradnoye) are designed to dilute UAF reserve commitment and generate panic. Confirmed shift of UAS assets to deep reconnaissance missions. UAF: Forward defense is highly degraded. The primary control measure remains the pending launch of Plan 7-B MOD. Ukrainian STRATCOM has completed Phase 1 of the counter-IO.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREATCON: CRITICAL KINETIC/STRATEGIC STRIKE)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF retains the capability to execute GLOC severance at Rodynske within 6 hours and launch a synchronized strategic ballistic strike (Iskander/KN-23 package) NLT 240000Z targeting C2/Logistics hubs (Dnipropetrovsk/Pavlohrad).

Intention (Immediate - Next 6 Hours):

1. GLOC Severance & Envelopment: Exploit the gap near Rodynske and press westward toward the Dobropillia salient to threaten the flank of any relief force. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Pre-Strike ISR: Maximize deep ISR collection over identified C2 and logistics nodes (Pavlohrad area) using UAS assets to refine targeting data for the strategic strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3. IO Diversion: Use claims of deep territorial conquest (Shakhove, Tikhoe, Otradnoye) and diplomatic friction (Europe vs. US on peace plan details) to distract from the Pokrovsk crisis and Strategic Strike preparation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Expanded Threat Axis: RF claims of success near Shakhove/Dobropillia indicate a potential shift from linear penetration at Rodynske to a broader operational envelopment threat aimed at the UAF rear area defense structure. (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT)
• Targeting Confirmation: The confirmed UAS vector toward Pavlohrad substantiates the intelligence assessment regarding the critical C2/Logistics targets for the NLT 240000Z strike.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains sufficient for current offensive operations. Critical focus remains on ballistic asset readiness (evidenced by previous SAR/SIGINT and current deep ISR).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrated high responsiveness in pivoting the IO narrative following the UAF presidential counter-move. Synchronization between deep kinetic preparation (UAS/Strike) and ground exploitation (Rodynske/Shakhove) suggests effective operational coordination.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: The UAF posture has shifted from psychologically paralyzed (due to IO) to critically vulnerable (due to kinetic delay). STRATCOM success has restored command clarity, but this clarity must be immediately translated into kinetic action. Readiness is contingent on the physical launch and protected transit of Plan 7-B MOD.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setbacks:

• Unverified Territorial Loss Claim: The RF claim of capturing Shakhove introduces a high-priority threat to the operational rear.
• Continued Delay: No confirmed status of initial column movement for Plan 7-B MOD (CRITICAL GAP 1 persists).

Successes:

• IO Victory Confirmation: The diplomatic outcome (US/UA confirming "progress" and "productive meeting") publicly validates the UAF counter-narrative, solidifying the cognitive domain against the primary RF IO vector.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate authorization and launch of Plan 7-B MOD, coupled with dedicated Electronic Warfare (EW) and Counter-UAS (C-UAS) coverage during reserve transit. CONSTRAINT: Severe shortage of high-value Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) interceptors for the NLT 240000Z strike, compounded by increasing RF deep ISR activity.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO has entered the post-Geneva phase, focusing on:

1. Sowing Discord (Peace Plan Details): RF sources are selectively leaking unconfirmed details (e.g., European "red lines" regarding troop limits, territorial exchanges) to create an image of Western disagreement and compel UAF public debate, diverting attention from the tactical crisis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Territorial Exaggeration: Claims of securing Tikhoye/Otradnoye (Dnipropetrovsk) and Shakhove (Dobropillia) aim to convince local populations that RF forces are everywhere, fostering localized panic and undermining confidence in UAF leadership.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

NCA statements (Zelenskyy/Yermak) have successfully stabilized high-level political morale and international confidence. Local morale remains fragile, exposed to both continued deep strikes and the newly introduced RF claims of deep penetration into the operational rear (Shakhove claim). Local governance continues promoting economic resilience (Kryvyi Rih briefing), which provides necessary structural counter-messaging.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The conclusion of the Geneva talks with public confirmation of "significant progress" reinforces US/UA partnership against the RF narrative of abandonment. This success provides necessary political capital for the NCA to focus solely on the kinetic crisis.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 12 HOURS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (231730Z - 232330Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Interdiction and Penetration: RF forces will finalize the physical interdiction of the M-30 GLOC at Rodynske and simultaneously attempt to confirm the claimed foothold near Shakhove/Dobropillia, exploiting the operational flank of the main defense.
2. Terminal Targeting Refinement: RF will use the next four hours (NLT 232200Z) to maximize UAS coverage over Dnipropetrovsk/Pavlohrad C2/Logistics nodes to ensure terminal accuracy of the NLT 240000Z strategic strike package.
3. Proactive Interception: RF long-range fires and deep aviation (VKS/PVO) will execute pre-emptive strikes on known or suspected mobilization areas, searching for the initial columns of Plan 7-B MOD.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) Delayed execution of Plan 7-B MOD (past 231800Z) allows RF forces to consolidate control over the Rodynske GLOC and confirm the penetration near Shakhove. Reserve columns, when launched, are forced onto compromised or contested routes. This transit friction is amplified by targeted RF air strikes. The resulting delay prevents stabilization of the Pokrovsk axis, coinciding with the successful penetration of UAF Air Defense by the strategic ballistic package (NLT 240000Z), resulting in C2 decapitation and operational failure on the axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Revised)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Operational Command: IMMEDIATE RESERVE LAUNCH AND FLANK SECURITY.

   • Action: Execute the Plan 7-B MOD launch order NLT 231745Z. Simultaneously, divert one reinforced Mechanized Infantry Company (MIC) from secondary logistics protection roles to conduct immediate rapid reconnaissance and screening operations toward the Shakhove/Dobropillia salient to deny RF claims of deep penetration and protect the reserve flank (CRITICAL GAP 2).
   • Rationale: The threat to the operational flank is now as urgent as the threat to the front. The reserves must move now, accepting risk, but their transit route must be screened.

2. Air Force/JFS Command: DEDICATED C-UAS OPERATIONS (PAVLOHRAD/DNIPROPETROVSK).

   • Action: Immediately task all available mobile SHORAD and dedicated C-UAS/EW units to establish a protective dome over the Pavlohrad logistics hub and C2 nodes in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Prioritize disruption of RF ISR/UAS assets operating in this area (HIGH GAP 3) to degrade terminal guidance accuracy for the strategic ballistic strike.
   • Rationale: Denying RF ISR is the most effective pre-strike measure, conserving scarce high-value ABM interceptors for the main ballistic wave (NLT 240000Z).

3. STRATCOM/NCA: COUNTER-NARRATIVE ON TERRITORIAL CLAIMS.

   • Action: Preemptively issue official statements denying the RF claims of capturing Tikhoe and Otradnoye, labeling these claims as "Psychological Warfare designed to induce panic prior to a massed strike." Simultaneously, initiate immediate official verification of the Shakhove claim and prepare a localized denial if proven false.
   • Rationale: Maintain the cognitive domain victory by ensuring RF IO does not successfully pivot from the diplomatic defeat to localized panic driven by unverified territorial claims.

//END SITREP//