MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - CRITICAL RESPONSE SYNCHRONIZATION
DTG: 231700Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 231630Z NOV 25 – 231700Z NOV 25
PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)
The operational status on the Pokrovsk Axis remains CRITICAL/OPERATIONAL CRISIS. While UAF National Command Authority (NCA) has successfully initiated a high-level counter-Information Operation (IO) to mitigate the cognitive paralysis threat, confirmation of the reserve maneuver (Plan 7-B MOD) launch remains outstanding and critically urgent. RF forces continue to maintain pressure, confirming offensive actions on the Southern Axis (Orikhiv) designed to fix UAF reserves. The strategic threat of a massed ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z) is undiminished.
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
- Main Effort (Pokrovsk Axis): RF forces are maximizing exploitation around the Rodynske junction. Operational status suggests the M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) is functionally unusable, requiring immediate stabilization or bypass route identification.
- Secondary Effort (Zaporizhzhia Front): RF kinetic activity is confirmed in the Orikhiv-Novodanylivka area. This supports the assessment that RF aims to prevent redeployment of Southern reserves toward the Pokrovsk crisis.
- Deep Kinetic Pressure: RF airstrikes are impacting cities in the operational rear (e.g., Sloviansk confirmed hit, 4 casualties), indicating a high commitment to massed destruction and psychological warfare across the depth of the defense.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
No material change. Conditions remain conducive to persistent mechanized and air/drone operations.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF: Forces remain committed to rapid breakthrough exploitation (40th/155th OMBR). RF is demonstrating immediate tactical C2 by responding to the UAF IO counter-narrative, attempting to pivot the information space. Deep forces continue pre-strike ISR/UAS activity (Kharkiv area).
UAF: Forward units are sustaining unacceptable losses. The critical decision to deploy Plan 7-B MOD must be confirmed and executed immediately to avert operational collapse. STRATCOM has executed the required high-level counter-IO maneuver (see Section 4).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREATCON: CRITICAL KINETIC/STRATEGIC STRIKE)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capability: RF maintains the immediate capability to execute GLOC severance and C2 decapitation via the strategic ballistic strike. RF IO displays high agility in responding to UAF counter-messaging.
Intention (Immediate - Next 6 Hours):
- Exploitation: RF will aggressively consolidate the Rodynske area, seeking to establish fixed fire control over the M-30 GLOC and prepare for the final assault on Pokrovsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- C2 Disruption: Ensure the successful execution of the ballistic strike NLT 240000Z, which is the operational culminating point for this current offensive sequence.
- IO Stabilization: Shift the IO narrative to downplay the significance of UAF/US diplomatic activity and claim the UAF population is distracted, thereby minimizing the impact of Zelenskyy’s counter-narrative. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
- Sustained Southern Fix: Continued, verifiable RF offensive actions in the Orikhiv sector confirm that the secondary objective is to strategically fix UAF reserves in the South.
- IO Pivot: RF media is immediately challenging the efficacy of the Ukrainian President's counter-IO move, attempting to steer domestic conversation away from the kinetic crisis and toward internal friction (e.g., claiming public apathy toward Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk).
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
Confirmed continued allocation of long-range offensive resources (ballistic missile preparation) and high-yield aerial ordnance (FAB series use). RF sustainment remains adequate for the current offensive pace.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains effective, evidenced by the synchronization of kinetic attacks (Orikhiv/Sloviansk strikes) with the immediate adaptation of the IO effort following the UAF presidential statement.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
POSTURE: The forward defense is at the point of operational culmination. The psychological threat posed by the RF IO has been substantially mitigated by the NCA's public diplomacy, clearing the way for command focus on the kinetic crisis. Readiness hinges entirely on the immediate execution of Plan 7-B MOD.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Setbacks:
- Confirmed continued civilian casualties in the operational rear (Sloviansk, Zaporizhzhia district), degrading local security and consuming local resources.
- Lack of timely confirmation of Plan 7-B MOD movement.
Successes:
- STRATCOM Counter-IO Success: President Zelenskyy’s public statement (16:40Z) explicitly framed the Geneva talks as security cooperation and countered the RF narrative regarding US gratitude/support. This is a critical success in stabilizing the Cognitive Domain and protecting C2 integrity.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate authorization and launch of Plan 7-B MOD reserves.
CONSTRAINT: The limited inventory of high-value Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) interceptors remains the key constraint against the anticipated 240000Z strategic strike. Strict conservation protocols must be adhered to.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF launched a complex, multi-layered IO to achieve cognitive paralysis, characterized by:
- Primary Vector (Peace Plan): Goal was to freeze NCA decision-making regarding Plan 7-B MOD.
- UAF Counter-Strike (16:40Z): The NCA successfully launched the counter-narrative, reframing the talks as productive security discussions and directly acknowledging US support, neutralizing the immediate threat of cognitive paralysis.
- RF Pivot: RF media (e.g., NGP Razvedka, 16:46Z) is pivoting, claiming UAF citizens are now "apathetic" to Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad. Objective: To diminish the political imperative for the NCA to act decisively on the kinetic front.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
The successful counter-IO stabilizes NCA morale and reassures international partners. However, continued deep strikes (Sloviansk, Zaporizhzhia) are actively designed to erode domestic morale and create localized panic, confirming the need for localized security and humanitarian stabilization efforts.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The public reframing of the US-UA dialogue by the NCA reinforces confidence in continued military support, directly mitigating the most damaging aspect of the RF deception campaign.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 12 HOURS)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (231700Z - 232300Z)
(HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- GLOC Control Consolidation: RF forces will finalize physical control or effective interdiction of the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC at Rodynske, achieving the primary operational objective of the current offensive phase.
- Ballistic Launch Sequence Initiation: RF will commence the final sequence for the massed strategic ballistic strike. ISR activity in the deep rear (Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk) will peak NLT 232200Z.
- Counter-Reserve Interdiction: RF aviation and long-range fire assets will search and strike suspected mobilization routes and staging areas for the Plan 7-B MOD reserves, anticipating their launch following the IO stabilization.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Despite the successful IO counter-move, bureaucratic or logistical friction prevents the timely execution of Plan 7-B MOD. RF forces secure the Pokrovsk approach, and the strategic ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z) successfully penetrates AD to degrade the Joint Fires Coordination Center. The resulting operational failure is compounded by the RF IO, which pivots to claim the successful strikes prove Ukrainian military incompetence and US abandonment. This precipitates a localized military rout and operational retreat on the Pokrovsk axis.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated)
| Timeframe | Event/Decision Point | Triggering Indicator | Status/Update |
|---|
| CRITICAL (NLT 231730Z) | Execute Plan 7-B MOD (Revised Reserve Deployment Order). | J3 confirmation of initial reserve column movement past Phase Line 1. | CRITICAL - Margin for error exhausted. Required now to influence Rodynske fight. |
| NLT 232200Z (J3/ISR) | Pre-Strike ISR Peak. | Detected peak of RPV/ISR signature activity over deep rear C2 nodes. | CRITICAL - Confirms terminal strike window is opening (T-minus 2 hours to 240000Z). |
| NLT 240000Z (Air Force/JFS) | Strategic Ballistic Strike Arrival. | First confirmed launch signature of Iskander/KN-23 package. | DEFENSE EXECUTION POINT. |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence (Pre-Analysis) |
|---|
| CRITICAL (1) | Plan 7-B MOD Movement Status. | HUMINT/LOGISTICS TRACKING: Confirmation of reserve force location, speed, and any RF contact during transit to the Pokrovsk axis. | LOW (Requires real-time reporting) |
| CRITICAL (2) | Rodynske GLOC/Bypass Viability. | Real-Time IMINT/UAS (Priority Target): Confirm precise RF control boundaries within Rodynske and identify secure bypass routes for the relief force. | LOW (High combat density) |
| HIGH (3) | Southern Reserve Fix Effectiveness. | SIGINT/IMINT (Orikhiv-Novodanylivka): Assess the required RF force commitment on the secondary axis relative to the UAF forces fixed there. Goal: Determine if any Southern reserves can be risked for the main effort. | MEDIUM |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
-
J3/Operational Command: CONFIRM AND PROTECT RESERVE LAUNCH (PLAN 7-B MOD).
- Action: Immediately confirm the NLT 231730Z launch of Plan 7-B MOD. Utilize available electronic warfare (EW) assets to cover reserve transit, particularly against RF ISR/loitering munitions seeking to identify movement corridors (CRITICAL 1/2). Accept engagement during movement; the objective is establishment of the secondary defensive line, not avoiding contact.
- Rationale: The tactical situation at Rodynske cannot be retrieved without immediate kinetic reinforcement. The window for influence is closing.
-
Air Force/JFS Command: STRICT ABM CONSERVATION AND AD RE-TASKING.
- Action: Enforce strict adherence to the interceptor conservation protocol (Patriot/SAMP-T restricted only to ABMs) until NLT 240100Z. Simultaneously, re-task short-range air defense (SHORAD) to prioritize UAV threats reported in the deep rear (e.g., Kharkiv/Slobozhanske UAV, 16:48Z) to deny terminal guidance refinement for the ballistic strike.
- Rationale: Maximize survivability against the NLT 240000Z strategic threat while degrading RF targeting accuracy.
-
STRATCOM/NCA: IMMEDIATE REGIONAL MORALE INITIATIVE.
- Action: Launch a dedicated local information campaign targeting the Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia operational rear (Myrnohrad, Sloviansk) that confirms military support is en route (Plan 7-B MOD) and links the FAB-3000 and missile strikes directly to RF desperation following UAF diplomatic success.
- Rationale: Counteract the RF pivot claiming local apathy and stabilize morale severely affected by confirmed air strikes.
//END SITREP//