Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - ACTIVE THREAT SYNCHRONIZATION: OPERATIONAL CRISIS

DTG: 231700Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 231630Z NOV 25 – 231700Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational status on the Pokrovsk Axis is assessed as CRITICAL/OPERATIONAL CRISIS due to the confirmed failure/delay in executing the planned reserve maneuver (Plan 7-B MOD). Russian Federation (RF) forces are exploiting this vacuum, accelerating their assault on the Rodynske junction. RF military media claims substantial control over Rodynske (16:06Z), signaling immediate, irreversible threat to the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC severance. This kinetic escalation is synchronized with deep reconnaissance activity (UAV/RPV) in the Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk sectors and the ongoing strategic Information Operation (IO) designed to paralyze the National Command Authority (NCA) during the most intense combat phase.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Main Effort (Pokrovsk Axis, Krasnoarmiisk Area): RF Kinetic pressure is culminating at the Rodynske junction. RF claims large parts of the town are secured (16:06Z), putting the primary GLOC to Pokrovsk under immediate interdiction threat. Active combat is reported near Dobropillya and Nikanorivka (15:54Z). The use of the FAB-3000M54 on Myrnohrad (confirmed 16:03Z) is a destructive shaping operation designed to panic and clear the zone of advance toward Pokrovsk.
• Secondary Effort (Zaporizhzhia Front): RF flanking maneuver remains active west of Stepnohirsk, fixing UAF Southern reserve options.
• Deep Rear (ISR/AD): Confirmed low-altitude Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) activity over Kharkiv Oblast (near Lyubotyn, 16:00Z), consistent with final target verification for the anticipated high-yield ballistic strike.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Conditions remain highly favorable for persistent air, drone, and mechanized operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: 40th/155th Separate Marine Brigades (OMBR) are committed to exploitation. RF Air Defense assets (1st/1545th AA Regts) are actively increasing readiness posture (SAR confirmation), indicating force protection measures are underway for the strategic deep strike NLT 240000Z. UAF: Forward units are under intense duress at Rodynske. Operational focus is split between managing the kinetic crisis and countering the critical IO threat. Reserve deployment remains the single most critical operational requirement.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREATCON: CRITICAL EXECUTION)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: Confirmed RF capability to rapidly synchronize strategic-level ordnance deployment (FAB-3000M54) with targeted diplomatic deception and deep strike preparation. RF AD posture confirms capability to cover offensive operations and deep strike launches.

Intention (Immediate - Next 6 Hours):

1. GLOC Operational Severance: Achieve physical interdiction and control of the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC at Rodynske to isolate UAF forward defense sectors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Cognitive Overload: Sustain and escalate the "Peace Plan" attribution IO to prevent UAF NCA from authorizing reserve maneuvers (Plan 7-B MOD).
3. Ballistic Strike Countdown: Complete final targeting refinement for the massed high-impact ballistic missile strike (Iskander/KN-23) targeting UAF C2 hubs NLT 240000Z.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• High-Risk Commitment: RF claims substantial control of Rodynske (16:06Z), indicating a willingness to accept high losses to achieve immediate operational breakthrough and GLOC severance.
• IO Diversion Amplified: RF is actively launching a secondary IO effort regarding mass Ukrainian refugee deportation from the US (15:54Z, 16:07Z), aiming to further undermine public confidence and morale simultaneously with the kinetic attack.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Logistics chains remain robust, supporting the sustained delivery of heavy guided bombs (FAB series). The confirmation of rising activity at RF AD regiments confirms strategic resource allocation toward protecting the deep strike launch capability.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective and synchronized. The immediate coupling of kinetic claims (Rodynske capture) with the cognitive attack (Peace Plan) demonstrates rapid tactical-strategic coordination.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Operational readiness is currently strained by the inability to commit reserves in time to mitigate the Rodynske crisis. Forward defensive units demonstrate high tactical resolve, but operational survivability is rapidly diminishing under FAB-3000 strikes.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setbacks:

• Confirmed deep penetration by RF forces into Rodynske, severely endangering the primary GLOC.
• The psychological impact of the FAB-3000 strike requires immediate, sustained internal messaging to counteract fear and RF deception.

Successes:

• UAF Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) is successfully initiating counter-IO by confirming that US-UA talks are productive and centered on support/cooperation, directly contradicting RF deception narratives (16:22Z).
• Confirmed successful application of FPV drones by elements of the 38th Separate Marine Brigade against RF patrols, demonstrating local tactical effectiveness.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate commitment of Plan 7-B MOD reserves. This move must be authorized despite the cognitive friction created by the RF IO. CONSTRAINT: Limited high-value Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) interceptor inventory necessitates strict prioritization (see Recommendation 3).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF is in the Crisis Amplification Phase.

• Main Vector: The false "Geneva Peace Framework" narrative is being reinforced by claims that the US delegation is discussing a joint US-RF plan (Bloomberg, cited 16:10Z).
• Counter-Narrative: Ukrainian and Western sources (Reuters, UAF STRATCOM 16:22Z) are now actively denying the surrender narrative and confirming the talks are productive security negotiations, but the information space is saturated.
• Secondary Vector: Aggressive dissemination of the narrative that mass Ukrainian deportations from the US are imminent due to immigration policy (15:54Z, 16:07Z). Objective: Undermine domestic faith in Western allies and foster despair among refugee populations, which is leveraged by RF media claiming the war effort is futile.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The documented FAB-3000 strike on Myrnohrad (16:03Z) coupled with the synchronized IO creates a high risk of morale collapse in the immediate operational rear. The NCA must manage the information crisis and the kinetic crisis simultaneously to prevent cognitive failure.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

FACT: High-level US-UA bilateral talks are ongoing and described by US officials as "productive." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). JUDGMENT: The RF IO campaign is highly effective at exploiting the secrecy of these talks, transforming legitimate discussions about future support into perceived negotiations for surrender. Immediate, transparent communication is essential to maintain international and domestic confidence.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 12 HOURS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (231700Z - 232300Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Operational GLOC Severance: RF forces will consolidate control over the Rodynske junction, achieving effective GLOC M-30 interdiction through combined ground, indirect fire, and CAS (Close Air Support).
2. Strike Execution Preparation: RF ISR activity will peak NLT 232200Z, finalizing coordinates for the strategic ballistic strike package.
3. NCA Response Testing: RF IO will intensify in the next 2-3 hours, specifically looking for delays or ambiguities in the NCA response to the "Peace Plan" narrative to exploit hesitancy on reserve deployment.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The immediate kinetic advance at Rodynske, supported by continued FAB strikes, achieves complete encirclement and destruction of UAF forward defenses due to delayed reserve commitment. This kinetic success allows RF to rapidly consolidate the Pokrovsk approach. The NCA's attention remains focused on neutralizing the IO threat, allowing the strategic ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z) to successfully degrade the Joint Fires (J-FIRE) coordination center. The resulting systemic command failure leads to a cascading operational rout on the Pokrovsk axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: IMMEDIATE RESERVE LAUNCH (PLAN 7-B MOD).

   • Action: Operational Command must immediately authorize the movement of Plan 7-B MOD reserves NLT 231715Z. The mission must prioritize GLOC clearing and securing secondary firing positions south of Pokrovsk, accepting the likelihood of direct engagement during transit due to RF claims of Rodynske control.
   • Rationale: The tactical situation has metastasized into an operational crisis. Further delay guarantees the collapse of the Pokrovsk axis.

2. STRATCOM/NCA: DUAL-VECTOR COUNTER-ATTRIBUTION (IO DEFLECTION).

   • Action: a) Immediately issue a top-level denial linking the "Peace Plan" narrative directly to the war crime committed by the FAB-3000 strike on Myrnohrad. Frame the deception as a cover for mass murder. b) Initiate a separate, coordinated message with US partners to publicly refute the "deportation" narrative, reassuring both the diaspora and domestic population of continued support.
   • Rationale: Effective IO defense requires linking the cognitive attack to the kinetic atrocity to maintain morale and inoculate the population.

3. Air Force/JFS Command: EXECUTE HARD ABM INTERCEPTOR CONSERVATION.

   • Action: Shift all assigned Patriot/SAMP-T batteries to maximum readiness and restrict engagements exclusively to Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs) (Iskander/KN-23). Explicitly prohibit the expenditure of high-value interceptors on loitering munitions (Shahed) or low-value RPVs observed in the deep rear until the 240000Z strike window closes.
   • Rationale: The NLT 240000Z strategic strike is the single greatest kinetic threat; interceptor conservation is essential for survival of the J-FIRE network.

4. J3/Southern Command: STEPNOHIRSK FLANK ISOLATION.

   • Action: Confirm the immediate deployment of the reinforced company tactical group to the western flank of Stepnohirsk as previously directed. Maintain this force as a fixed reserve and authorize pre-emptive artillery strikes on confirmed RF staging areas threatening the bypass corridor.
   • Rationale: Prevent RF from successfully creating a multi-front operational dilemma that would further strain the already committed reserve forces.

//END SITREP//