Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - ACTIVE THREAT SYNCHRONIZATION: EXPLOITATION PHASE II

DTG: 231700Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 231630Z NOV 25 – 231700Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The enemy is escalating the kinetic phase on the Pokrovsk Axis through the introduction of massed high-yield ordnance (FAB-3000M54), designed to break remaining forward defenses and terrorize supporting settlements, thereby clearing the path for Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) severance. Simultaneously, the strategic Information Operation (IO) has transitioned from general narrative to Active Attribution, falsely citing high-level Ukrainian officials to confirm the fabricated "peace plan," thus maximizing cognitive paralysis at the National Command Authority (NCA) level. The overall threat synchronization (Kinetic, Cognitive, Deep Strike preparation) remains CRITICAL.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Main Effort (Pokrovsk Axis): Kinetic pressure has intensified dramatically. Confirmed deployment of a FAB-3000M54 glide bomb strike against residential areas in Myrnohrad (15:48Z). This signals RF intent to utilize extreme force to facilitate the ground advance toward the Rodynske junction and the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC. RF pro-war channels claim "critical success" in encircling UAF forces, likely exaggerated but reflective of perceived RF momentum. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH on intent and ordnance use)
• Deep Rear (Air/ISR): Confirmed high-level Russian Reconnaissance/Strike Preparation Vehicle (RPV/UAV) activity over Eastern Dnipropetrovsk (15:30Z) and Northern Kharkiv/Southern Sumy (15:45Z, 15:50Z). This pattern confirms continued targeting preparation prior to the anticipated ballistic strike NLT 240000Z.
• RF Deep Strike: Confirmed Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) that fire at the Shaturskaya GRES (Moscow region) was extinguished (15:30Z), indicating Ukraine's long-range deep strike capability is operational, but its ability to sustain critical pressure on RF CNI may be limited.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Conditions remain favorable for persistent air, drone, and mechanized operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Forces are operating under maximum kinetic authorization, evidenced by the use of the FAB-3000. RF Aviation assets are committed to deep targeting and Close Air Support (CAS). C2 remains highly effective, linking extreme kinetic force with simultaneous cognitive operations. UAF: Forward units near Myrnohrad/Rodynske are under extreme existential threat. Defense is constrained by the delay in launching the revised reserve plan (Plan 7-B MOD). Active counter-RPV measures are engaged in the deep rear.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREATCON: CRITICAL EXECUTION)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: Confirmed RF capability to deploy strategic-grade air-delivered ordnance (FAB-3000M54) on tactical targets, significantly raising the cost of defense and increasing the probability of rapid operational breakthrough. Intention (Immediate - Next 6 Hours):

1. Kinetic Collapse: Use massed ordnance (FAB series) and ground assault to force an immediate operational collapse of UAF forward positions at Myrnohrad/Rodynske, guaranteeing GLOC severance.
2. Cognitive Decapitation (Active Attribution): Maximize internal UAF friction and NCA delay by disseminating the fabricated "Peace Plan" claims and falsely attributing them to Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council (SNBO) Secretary Umerov (15:43Z).
3. Ballistic Strike Finalization: Complete target verification and readiness for the high-impact ballistic missile strike (Iskander/KN-23) NLT 240000Z.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Ordnance Escalation: Shift from standard KAB-500/1500 usage to the heavier FAB-3000M54 indicates an operational decision to use extreme destructive force to clear the tactical area immediately, accepting the international outrage.
• IO Precision Targeting: The shift to false attribution (quoting Umerov) is a high-risk, high-reward tactical IO move designed to bypass initial skepticism and force an immediate, damaging public denial from the NCA, diverting resources from kinetic command.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The ability to deploy FAB-3000 indicates robust heavy ordnance logistics chains. Sustained RPV activity suggests adequate ISR platform availability.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is proving highly adaptive and synchronized, immediately integrating the kinetic escalation (FAB-3000) with the refined cognitive attack (Umerov attribution).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Facing extreme duress. Forward units are defending against heavy armor and massed ordnance; survivability is rapidly decreasing. Readiness remains high on the local tactical level (counter-UAS operations), but the inability to maneuver reserves (Plan 7-B MOD) is the critical operational deficiency.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmed successful engagement of RF reconnaissance UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk, demonstrating operational AD readiness in the deep rear against probing threats.

Setbacks:

• The use of FAB-3000 near Myrnohrad represents a significant escalation in the kinetic setback, raising the immediate loss rate and humanitarian crisis risk.
• The requirement to immediately counter the Umerov-attributed "Peace Plan" narrative is placing severe strain on STRATCOM and NCA attention during the critical kinetic phase.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate authorization and launch of Plan 7-B MOD to prevent catastrophic operational loss at the Rodynske junction. CONSTRAINT: C2 saturation due to the simultaneous response requirement to both extreme kinetic force and strategic diplomatic deception.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF deception campaign is now in the Disinformation-by-Attribution Phase.

• Mechanism: Fabricated quote attributed to SNBO Secretary Umerov regarding the "final stage of peace plan agreement" in Geneva.
• Conflict Point: This contrasts directly with confirmed reports from Reuters, Suspilne, and Ukrainian sources stating that the main part of US-UA negotiations in Geneva has only just commenced (15:47Z, 15:49Z).
• Objective: To convince UAF soldiers and the population that the war effort is futile and that capitulation is imminent, undermining the will to resist the kinetic push at Pokrovsk.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The documented FAB-3000 strike on a civilian area in Myrnohrad will generate intense fear and humanitarian distress, which the RF IO will immediately leverage by asserting that the ongoing destruction is meaningless since the "deal is already done." Frontline morale is expected to drop sharply unless the NCA issues an immediate, powerful denial.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The existence of genuine US-UA talks in Geneva creates a perfect vector for RF deception. Western allies (e.g., German reports on the "Trump deadline") must be coordinated with to issue a unified denial that confirms the talks are about support, not surrender. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 12 HOURS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (231700Z - 232300Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Severance Achieved: Utilizing continued FAB series ordnance and mechanized units (40th/155th OMBR), RF forces will achieve practical, if not absolute, control over the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC near Rodynske, isolating UAF forward elements.
2. IO Saturation: RF will flood global and domestic channels with "proof" of the Umerov fabrication, aiming to force the NCA response during the most intense kinetic phase.
3. RPV/ISR Surge: The frequency of RF reconnaissance RPV flights over Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia will surge (expected NLT 232200Z) as the final targeting data for the ballistic strike is acquired.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF achieves decisive kinetic success by severing the GLOC and surrounding UAF forward units. The UAF NCA fails to launch Plan 7-B MOD effectively due to internal focus on neutralizing the IO threat. The failure allows RF to consolidate gains. Subsequently, the massed ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z) successfully degrades or destroys the Joint Fires (J-FIRE) coordination center, making coordinated AD and counter-fire responses impossible and leading to the operational failure of the Pokrovsk sector.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: CONFIRM AND LAUNCH 7-B MOD BY 231715Z.

   • Action: The risk assessment has shifted from high tactical risk to imminent operational catastrophe if reserves are not committed. Launch the revised plan immediately, accepting potential losses during transit.
   • Rationale: The introduction of the FAB-3000 confirms RF is attempting to force an immediate operational break. Speed is the only variable remaining to stabilize the front.

2. STRATCOM/NCA: IMMEDIATE AND SPECIFIC COUNTER-ATTRIBUTION.

   • Action: The President/NCA must issue an immediate, highly publicized statement (NLT 231730Z) explicitly denying the attribution of the peace plan claim to SNBO Secretary Umerov. The messaging must link the fabrication directly to the war crimes committed by the FAB-3000 strike on Myrnohrad.
   • Rationale: Neutralize the cognitive attack before it generates operational consequences. The delay in denial validates the enemy's narrative.

3. Air Force/JFS Command: EXECUTE HARD AD PRIORITIZATION SHIFT.

   • Action: Shift all high-value AD systems (Patriot/SAMP-T) to Anti-Ballistic Mode immediately. Do not expend interceptors on Shahed or low-value RPVs observed in Dnipropetrovsk/Kharkiv, unless they pose an immediate threat to the AD battery itself.
   • Rationale: The persistent RPV activity is targeting reconnaissance for the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike. Conserving interceptors for the strategic kinetic threat is paramount.

4. J3/Southern Command: RE-EVALUATE STEPNOHIRSK FLANK FIX.

   • Action: Despite the severity of the Pokrovsk crisis, J3 must confirm the successful deployment of the reinforced company tactical group to the western flank of Stepnohirsk to prevent RF flanking maneuver from further fixing UAF southern reserves needed for potential counter-attack operations.
   • Rationale: Preventing the Stepnohirsk maneuver from becoming an operational crisis prevents RF from creating a two-front dilemma that would entirely exhaust UAF reserve options.

//END SITREP//