Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - HYBRID THREAT SYNCHRONIZATION

DTG: 231530Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 231500Z NOV 25 – 231530Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational environment remains in a state of Critical Threat Synchronization (Ground/Kinetic/Cognitive). The tactical window for mitigating the RF penetration threat on the Pokrovsk Axis is now closed/critically overdue (Plan 7-B commitment). Intelligence confirms RF efforts to lock UAF operational reserves in place while simultaneously preparing an imminent, high-impact strategic kinetic strike against CNI in the deep rear NLT 240000Z. RF Information Operations (IO) have immediately adapted to exploit new perceived friction in Western political support.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Main Effort (Pokrovsk Axis): High-intensity mechanized exploitation by RF 40th/155th OMBR continues west of Mirnohrad. The M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) remains the decisive objective for RF. If the GLOC is physically or functionally severed, it risks isolating UAF forward defensive positions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Deep Rear (Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk): The threat of a high-volume, high-impact ballistic missile strike is confirmed imminent. Previous SAR data identifying the 2652th GRAU base remains the primary indicator.
• Key Terrain: The Rodynske junction (near the M-30/T-05-15 intersection) is assessed as the most probable physical interdiction point for RF Spetsnaz (SpN) elements.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Stable atmospheric conditions favor sustained RF ISR (UAV/Satellite) and ballistic/cruise missile operations. Ground conditions support high-tempo mechanized maneuver.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Forces are optimized for exploitation (Pokrovsk) and strategic denial (Kinetic strike prep). C2 remains highly synchronized, demonstrated by the immediate integration of new Western political friction (Merz statement) into the IO campaign. UAF: Defensive lines are under severe strain. Reserve maneuver (Plan 7-B) is critically delayed, placing extreme pressure on front-line commanders to hold open the GLOC. AD assets are on high alert but require confirmation of Anti-Ballistic Mode readiness.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREATCON: CRITICAL)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF maintains the proven capability to execute simultaneous military-strategic and cognitive operations intended to induce operational paralysis (Ground, Kinetic, Hybrid).

Intention (Immediate - Critical Focus):

1. Kinetic Strike: Execute high-volume strategic missile strike NLT 240000Z NOV 25 targeting CNI/C2 nodes in the Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk axis.
2. GLOC Severance: Achieve functional denial or physical control of the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC within the next 6-12 hours, leveraging SpN/Mechanized exploitation.
3. IO Exploitation (Adaptive Priority): Immediately leverage perceived diplomatic fissures within the NATO/US coalition (e.g., Merz's comments regarding the Trump peace plan) to reinforce the narrative of Ukrainian abandonment and political instability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF Intelligence Services (RFIS) have demonstrated superior agility in the cognitive domain. The initial "ingratitude" narrative has been instantly supplemented by the "Western disunity/alternative plan" narrative following German politician Merz's remarks (23/14:59Z). This confirms RF C2 doctrine prioritizes continuous, real-time exploitation of perceived fissures in UAF international support.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Logistics sustainment for ground forces on the Pokrovsk axis remains adequate for continued exploitation. Strategic missile/drone stocks (2652th GRAU) are confirmed high, supporting the imminent strike. The successful UAF strike on the Shatura TPP (Moscow Oblast) may initiate a reallocation of RF internal AD assets, but this remains unconfirmed. (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT: MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly centralized and effective, particularly in synchronizing battlefield exploitation (40th/155th OMBR tempo) with deep strike preparations and coordinated IO counter-narratives.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Operationally critical. Political stabilization efforts (Umerov/Zelensky statements) provide essential strategic cover, but tactical integrity is jeopardized by the failure to commit operational reserves at the specified time (NLT 231500Z).

READINESS: Tactical readiness (SOF, deep strike units) remains HIGH. Operational readiness to stabilize the Pokrovsk front is CRITICALLY LOW pending the immediate execution of Plan 7-B.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmed strategic reach via the Shatura TPP strike.
• Successful high-level diplomatic mitigation of destabilizing US policy rumors.

Setbacks:

• The continued non-execution of Plan 7-B escalates the risk of operational GLOC severance, potentially turning the tactical breach west of Mirnohrad into a critical operational setback.
• The previous confirmed fatal attack on the Odesa TCC continues to drain rear-area security resources and morale.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate commitment of Plan 7-B forces to prevent the M-30 GLOC severance.

CONSTRAINT: Time. The operational window for preemptive counter-penetration operations is now essentially exhausted. Forces must be committed under high risk of interdiction.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is operating a dual-track strategy aimed at maximizing internal and external psychological pressure:

1. External Pressure/Fragmentation: Immediate amplification of the Merz statement to suggest internal NATO/EU disagreement over the US peace plan, framing Ukraine as a liability facing diplomatic abandonment.
2. Internal Demoralization: Continuous linkage of frontline losses (Pokrovsk) and deep rear kinetic strikes (anticipated Zaporizhzhia strike/Ternopil tragedy) with narratives of political instability ("ingratitude," "srach" among leaders).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is under stress due to the sustained high kinetic threat and the confirmed rear-area security vulnerabilities (Odesa TCC). StratCom efforts must pivot to aggressively counter the foreign policy fragility narrative introduced by the Merz statement.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

UAF diplomacy has been successful in establishing positive framing (Umerov). However, the immediate RF counter-IO targeting German/US political friction suggests international unity is the primary RF vulnerability being probed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (231530Z - 240330Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Operational Severance: RF SpN, supported by mechanized exploitation units (40th/155th OMBR), will successfully interdict the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC corridor near Rodynske, preventing the rapid deployment of UAF reserves.
2. Strategic Denial Strike: RF will launch a combined missile package (ballistic and cruise) NLT 240000Z NOV 25 targeting high-value CNI nodes (Energy/Distribution centers) and/or Command and Control (C2) facilities in the Dnipropetrovsk or Zaporizhzhia operational zone.
3. Hybrid Amplification: RF IO channels will synchronize the kinetic strike impact (e.g., power grid failure) with narratives of strategic failure linked to Western political unreliability.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF achieves operational severance of the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC simultaneous with a successful, high-casualty strategic ballistic strike against a UAF operational C2 node. The resulting command disruption (MDCOA 1) combined with isolated forward units (MDCOA 2) could enable the RF 40th/155th OMBR to achieve a shallow encirclement of UAF fighting positions west of Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: IMMEDIATE RESERVE DEPLOYMENT (PLAN 7-B).

   • Action: Issue immediate execution orders for Plan 7-B, accepting the inherent risk of RF interdiction fire. Prioritize rapid movement over concealment.
   • Rationale: The tactical cost of delaying deployment now exceeds the cost of interdiction. Deployment is mandatory to prevent operational severance of the M-30 GLOC and consequent operational collapse of forward lines (MDCOA).

2. Air Force/JFS Command: PRIORITIZE ANTI-BALLISTIC INTERCEPTORS.

   • Action: Confirm all strategic AD batteries (Patriot/SAMP-T) are actively operating in Anti-Ballistic Mode. Immediately reposition mobile short-range AD (e.g., Gepard/Avenger) to exclusively protect the primary GLOC (M-30 corridor) against tactical air/UAV interdiction attempts targeting 7-B movement.
   • Rationale: Mitigate the MLCOA of strategic paralysis NLT 240000Z while providing necessary tactical AD cover for the critical reserve maneuver.

3. STRATCOM/J2: COUNTER ADVERSARIAL NARRATIVES AGGRESSIVELY.

   • Action: Launch a coordinated counter-IO effort immediately addressing the Merz statement. Frame the message as: "Ukrainian commitment is absolute, regardless of foreign political cycles," and emphasize that UAF strategic actions (Shatura strike, Plan 7-B deployment) confirm self-reliance and unified national commitment.
   • Rationale: Neutralize the new RF IO vector aimed at internal and external fragmentation by projecting unwavering national resolve and operational stability.

4. Security Services (SBU): GLOC ANTI-SABOTAGE INTERDICTION.

   • Action: Immediately deploy Spetsnaz/SBU counter-sabotage teams ahead of the Plan 7-B maneuver units to sweep the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC corridor, focusing on the Rodynske junction, to preempt RF SpN IED placement or physical ambush attempts.
   • Rationale: Prevent the critical infrastructure disruption necessary for RF MLCOA 1 (GLOC Severance).

//END SITREP//