Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) UPDATE

DTG: 231430Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 231400Z NOV 25 – 231430Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational picture remains dominated by the synchronized kinetic push on the Pokrovsk Axis and confirmed escalation in strategic infrastructure denial operations, now focused on the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Ukrainian counter-interdiction teams (SBU/SSO) are achieving tactical successes against enemy UAV logistics, but the strategic decision regarding reserve commitment (Plan 7-B) remains the critical constraint.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Main Effort (Pokrovsk Axis): High-intensity combat continues. UAF Special Forces (SBU Alpha) report confirmed successes against RF logistics and fire support assets (snipers, FPV, Zala, Gerbera warehouses) near Pokrovsk (23/13:50Z, 23/13:56Z). This temporarily mitigates the immediate pressure on the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC but does not eliminate the deep penetration threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Deep Rear Targets (Zaporizhzhia): High volume of RF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) activity confirmed over Zaporizhzhia (23/13:39Z). This activity, coupled with previous attack footage and high D-S belief (0.53 cumulative), indicates an imminent high-impact kinetic strike on C2 or Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) in the region, replicating the Chernihiv denial operation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Secondary Axes: RF claims operational advances on the Krasny Liman (Lyman) front (23/13:35Z). These claims, combined with the earlier Vostok Group pressure near Velyka Novosilka, suggest RF intent to fix UAF resources across multiple, lower-priority sectors. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

High-level ISR activity indicates RF is exploiting favorable conditions for long-range drone/missile guidance. No significant changes affecting ground mobility.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: RF is actively shaping the battlespace for a strategic missile/drone strike against Zaporizhzhia CNI while sustaining kinetic pressure to prevent UAF reserve commitment. UAF: Active defense is sustained by localized SOF/SBU superiority in the tactical drone fight. Air Defense (AD) assets must be immediately re-tasked based on the confirmed threat to Zaporizhzhia.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREATCON: CRITICAL)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF maintains synchronized capability to execute strategic CNI denial (using missile/drone packages identified at 2652th GRAU) simultaneous with high-tempo mechanized penetration (Pokrovsk).

Intention (Immediate - Confirmed Shift):

1. Infrastructure Denial (Zaporizhzhia): Execute high-impact strike on a key energy/C2 node in Zaporizhzhia Oblast NLT 240000Z NOV 25.
2. Degrade Repair Capacity: Actively target UAF energy repair crews and maintenance assets near the front line (confirmed drone strike on energy workers, 23/13:39Z).
3. Maintain Pokrovsk Pressure: Prevent UAF from massing reserves by threatening the M-30 GLOC.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift toward specifically targeting repair/service vehicles and personnel demonstrates a critical adaptation by the RF to prolong the effects of infrastructure damage and increase the cost of UAF recovery.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

While UAF strikes successfully suppressed some RF tactical UAV supplies in the Pokrovsk sector, the strategic missile readiness (based on 2652th GRAU activity from previous reporting) and sustained KAB usage confirm high overall strategic kinetic sustainment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 maintains highly effective synchronization between deep strategic strikes, ground penetration efforts, and diplomatic information operations (pushing the "adjustments to US plan" narrative, 23/13:39Z).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive resilience in the tactical sector is bolstered by highly effective SSO/SBU counter-UAV and interdiction operations. The strategic posture remains dangerously constrained by hesitation to execute Plan 7-B, which is compounding the risk from the hybrid threat.

READINESS: Tactical readiness (SOF/Drone units) is HIGH. Strategic decision-making readiness is MODERATE, having been temporarily stabilized by the President’s political engagement on the Geneva talks.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmed kinetic suppression of RF logistics and sniper positions in the Pokrovsk penetration zone by SBU Alpha (FP-2 drone use).
• President Zelensky’s statement (23/13:55Z) provides necessary clarity regarding the Geneva negotiations, mitigating the political friction risk identified in previous reporting.

Setbacks:

• Confirmed targeting of frontline energy repair workers in Donetsk Oblast.
• Confirmed RF ISR over Zaporizhzhia indicates high vulnerability to imminent strategic strike.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Execution of Plan 7-B.

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: Timely deployment of AD assets to Zaporizhzhia and hardening of local CNI against the confirmed imminent strike.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Primary Objective: Undermine UAF Sovereignty and Negotiation Position.

1. Diplomatic Sabotage: RF channels are rapidly pushing the narrative that Ukraine and its European partners are attempting to force "adjustments" to the US-led peace plan (23/13:39Z). This maintains the narrative of external control over Ukrainian policy, even as talks proceed.
2. Moral Degradation: RF channels use highly derogatory, inflammatory language and out-of-context video clips to dehumanize UAF personnel (23/13:46Z, 23/13:52Z).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF STRATCOM is countering setbacks (infrastructure loss) with aggressive morale-boosting content, including high-impact operational videos (SBU FP-2 strikes, SKELLA 4:25 resilience video) and profiles of successful combat personnel (HUR/Artan 'Noy'). However, the continued kinetic strikes and tragic civilian losses (e.g., Ternopil) maintain public anxiety and pressure on the NCA for decisive action.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

President Zelensky’s statement (23/13:55Z) is the key diplomatic development: He confirms that US proposals can be constructively adapted to incorporate Ukrainian national interests, effectively neutralizing the immediate political crisis and providing a unified public front necessary for operational stability.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (231430Z - 240230Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Strategic Strike on Zaporizhzhia: RF Air and Missile Forces will execute a pre-meditated strike package (likely Kalibr/Iskander/Kinzhals fueled from 2652th GRAU, cued by recent ISR) targeting a high-value CNI or C2 node in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
2. GLOC Maintenance Pressure: RF mechanized forces (40th/155th OMBR) will maintain continuous high-tempo fire interdiction and localized assaults on the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC corridor to maximize casualties and prevent reserve deployment.
3. Flank Probing: RF will continue to report and perhaps achieve minor tactical gains on secondary axes (Lyman, Velyka Novosilka) to amplify the perception of widespread UAF collapse in the IO space.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF achieves tactical success through the synchronized application of hybrid and kinetic force. A successful strategic strike on Zaporizhzhia CNI/C2 inhibits UAF coordination while the commitment of Plan 7-B is delayed beyond 231800Z. The delay allows RF penetration forces to bypass forward units, secure a critical choke point on the M-30, and turn the tactical penetration into an operational encirclement risk for forward UAF elements.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: IMMEDIATE RESERVE COMMITMENT (PLAN 7-B).

   • Action: Execute Plan 7-B NLT 231500Z. Utilize the tactical breathing room provided by SBU/SSO counter-UAV strikes to initiate rapid, coordinated counter-penetration operations on the Pokrovsk GLOC.
   • Rationale: The hybrid campaign is designed to force this delay. Political cover is now in place. Failure to act risks strategic collapse in the sector (MDCOA).

2. Air Force/JFS Command: ZAPORIZHZHIA CRITICAL ASSET DEFENSE.

   • Action: Immediately re-task high-performance AD batteries to prioritize C2 and CNI defense in Zaporizhzhia Oblast against imminent ballistic/cruise missile threat, based on confirmed ISR activity. Implement layered defense targeting high-speed threats.
   • Rationale: Prevent the cascade failure and strategic paralysis experienced in Chernihiv.

3. J2/Security Services: COUNTER-SABOTAGE FOCUS (REPAIR CREWS).

   • Action: Provide immediate, localized drone and electronic warfare (EW) cover for energy and logistics repair crews operating within 20km of the Line of Contact (LOC), particularly in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia. Utilize SOF assets to pre-clear repair routes.
   • Rationale: Counter the confirmed RF adaptation of targeting essential services personnel.

4. STRATCOM/NCA: DIPLOMATIC COHESION AMPLIFICATION.

   • Action: Utilize President Zelensky’s statement (23/13:55Z) as the primary public message. Flood domestic and international channels with the narrative that US/International support is being adapted to critical Ukrainian interests, decisively countering RF narratives of imposed territorial concession.
   • Rationale: Maintain internal political cohesion required for strategic decision-making.

//END SITREP//