Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 231400Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 231300Z NOV 25 – 231400Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The Russian Federation (RF) continues its synchronized strategy, maximizing kinetic pressure on the Pokrovsk/Myrnorhad Axis while achieving confirmed strategic success in degrading critical national infrastructure (Chernihiv energy grid). The threat of operational paralysis through hybrid warfare remains CRITICAL.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Main Effort (Pokrovsk Axis): High-tempo combat continues. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) units are confirmed conducting successful counter-interdiction strikes using FPV assets in the area of operations (AOR), validating the criticality of the M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) defense. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Southern Axis (Vostok Group): RF Ministry of Defence (MOD) claims successful tactical advances by the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA) near Velyka Novosilka, specifically claiming the capture of Tikhoye and Otradnoye (23/13:04Z). If confirmed, this indicates RF intent to apply flank pressure to the main Donetsk defensive belt, forcing resource diversion. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Deep Kinetic Strikes: RF air assets have executed sustained strikes, confirming the use of KABs on Zaporizhzhia Oblast (23/12:59Z) and the launch of a suspected Strike UAV towards Izmail District, Odesa Region (23/13:14Z). Crucially, confirmed reporting from multiple sources (23/13:08Z, 13:19Z) indicates the destruction of the "last working energy generating unit" in Chernihiv Oblast, marking a significant degradation of UAF regional power capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes to mobility or aerial operations are observed or forecast in the immediate 12-hour window.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: RF forces are actively exploiting tactical gains and leveraging confirmed infrastructure damage to reinforce the IO narrative that UAF resistance is futile. The synchronized application of kinetic force (Pokrovsk) and strategic denial (Chernihiv energy) is highly effective.

UAF: Defensive posture maintained. SSO counter-interdiction remains effective, buying time for strategic decision-making. High-level diplomatic engagement is active (Canada PM), countering the RF IO narrative. The commitment of Plan 7-B remains the single critical operational control measure that has yet to be executed.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREATCON: CRITICAL)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF maintains the capability to execute deep infrastructure denial operations synchronized with continuous high-intensity mechanized attacks on the main effort (Pokrovsk).

Intention (Immediate):

1. Achieve Operational Interdiction: Sever the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC within the next 24 hours.
2. Inflict Strategic Paralysis: Maximize public and political distress by eliminating key infrastructure nodes (e.g., Chernihiv) to compel NCA resource diversion and inhibit the timely commitment of strategic reserves.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The verified destruction of the Chernihiv energy unit demonstrates a key adaptation: RF is shifting resources to reliably target and confirm the destruction of critical regional infrastructure, likely using highly accurate cruise missiles or specialized KAB variants, rather than simply relying on broad saturation shelling. This confirms a priority shift from general harassment to strategic denial.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF air-delivered precision munitions (KAB/FAB) sustainment remains high across multiple sectors (Zaporizhzhia, Pokrovsk). Manpower issues (foreign recruitment) are secondary to the immediate capacity for kinetic strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly cohesive and synchronized, effectively linking tactical ground maneuver (Pokrovsk) with strategic denial operations (Chernihiv) and complex diplomatic IO (Geneva talks framing).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive resilience around Pokrovsk is sustained by localized SSO counter-attacks. However, the posture is defined by strategic indecision concerning the deployment of decisive maneuver reserves (Plan 7-B).

READINESS: Tactical readiness (SSO/Frontline units) is HIGH. Strategic readiness is REDUCED due to the compounding effects of hybrid pressure and infrastructure losses (Chernihiv).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmed successful FPV strikes by SSO units stabilizing the immediate Pokrovsk defensive periphery (23/13:23Z).
• HUR’s continued robust counter-IO/psychological operations (e.g., exposing Russian teachers, promoting Belarusian cooperation) maintains information superiority in key target audiences.

Setbacks:

• Operational loss of significant regional power generation capacity following the strike in Chernihiv, impacting civilian morale and military redundancy.
• The confirmation of RF claimed advances near Tikhoye/Otradnoye, indicating pressure across multiple axes.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Execution of Plan 7-B (Decisive Reserve Commitment).

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The ongoing strategic hesitation, fueled by the hybrid crisis (Geneva IO + Infrastructure Denial), continues to prevent the necessary massing of force required to defeat the Pokrovsk penetration.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Primary Objective: Undermine Diplomatic Legitimacy and Internal Cohesion.

1. Sovereignty Erosion: RF channels aggressively frame European support (Ursula von der Leyen's principles) as external imposition, claiming the EU demands restrict UAF sovereignty over its armed forces and reconstruction funds (23/12:59Z, 13:19Z). This reinforces the "Trump Plan" narrative of Ukrainian political control residing abroad.
2. Validation of Kinetic Success: RF sources immediately amplify confirmed destruction of UAF infrastructure (Chernihiv energy) using Western media (The Guardian) to increase shock effect domestically and legitimize RF operational success externally.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The successful kinetic strike on critical infrastructure (Chernihiv) is expected to cause a significant, immediate decline in civilian morale and increase public pressure on the NCA to mitigate the strikes (Dempster-Shafer analysis supports high belief in Energy Sector attack success). RF counter-messages (SHAMAN concerts, historical propaganda) aim to solidify domestic RF morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• EU Stance: EC President von der Leyen confirms key principles for peace: preservation of UAF borders, maintenance of UAF force strength, and guaranteed EU/international involvement in reconstruction funding (23/13:24Z). This provides a firm counter-narrative against the RF's claims of mandatory territorial concession.
• Political Clarity: Polish leadership (Tusk) expressing desire for clarity on the authorship of the US peace plan (23/13:09Z) underscores the persistent, destabilizing confusion generated by the RF IO campaign targeting the Geneva talks.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours (231400Z - 241400Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Continued GLOC Interdiction: RF will sustain mechanized and aviation pressure on the Myrnorhad/Rodynske sector, aiming for physical control of the M-30 GLOC, capitalizing on potential resource reallocation caused by the Chernihiv strike.
2. Infrastructure Cascade Attack: Following the Chernihiv success, RF will attempt to strike high-value, high-impact regional energy nodes in the South (Zaporizhzhia, Odesa) or the North (Kharkiv), using confirmed drone and KAB assets to maximize operational disruption.
3. Diplomatic-Kinetic Synchronization: IO channels will intensify messaging about the "inevitability" of UAF collapse (using infrastructure damage as proof) timed to coincide with any further tactical advances on the Pokrovsk axis.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a critical, sustained kinetic breakthrough in the Pokrovsk sector. Due to strategic hesitation (driven by maximized hybrid pressure and the need to defend rear infrastructure), the commitment of Plan 7-B is delayed by >12 hours. This delay allows the RF 40th/155th OMBR to bypass isolated forward UAF units, secure key choke points on the GLOC, and establish a deep fire zone, necessitating a disorderly and costly withdrawal from the entire Pokrovsk salient.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: IMMEDIATE RESERVE COMMITMENT (PLAN 7-B).

   • Action: Execute Plan 7-B NLT 231500Z. Prioritize rapid, aggressive counter-attack to stabilize the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC corridor and eliminate the penetration forces (40th/155th OMBR).
   • Rationale: The threat has maximized; further delay risks irreversible operational collapse in the sector.

2. Air Force/JFS Command: INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE PROTOCOL (CHERNIHIV LESSON).

   • Action: Immediately transition high-value Air Defense assets to protect key energy and C2 nodes in Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, and Kharkiv regions. Prioritize intercepting ballistic and high-speed cruise missile vectors targeting critical regional infrastructure, based on the confirmed RF success in Chernihiv.
   • Rationale: RF demonstrated capability to successfully target and neutralize major power generation. Proactive defense is required to prevent cascade failure.

3. STRATCOM/NCA: SOVEREIGNTY COUNTER-NARRATIVE.

   • Action: The NCA, through a high-profile, multi-lingual press event, must endorse and amplify the three principles articulated by EC President von der Leyen (no territorial compromise, no UAF force reduction). This message must be framed as a joint, unified position to refute the RF narrative of US/EU diplomatic control.
   • Rationale: Decisive IO is required to restore political cohesion and eliminate the source of strategic hesitation regarding Plan 7-B commitment.

4. J3/JFS: FLANK MONITORING.

   • Action: Increase ISR coverage (UAS/IMINT) on the Velyka Novosilka sector to confirm or deny RF claims of capturing Tikhoye/Otradnoye. If confirmed, prepare an immediate counter-fire plan to suppress further RF advances on the flank of the Donetsk defense.
   • Rationale: RF is probing secondary axes; failure to respond quickly could force the commitment of already strained maneuver forces to peripheral defense.

//END SITREP//