Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB) SITUATION REPORT

DTG: 231300Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 232000Z NOV 25 (Previous SITREP) – 231300Z NOV 25 (Current) PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation remains defined by the Russian Federation's (RF) coordinated multi-domain effort to achieve an operational breakthrough along the Pokrovsk / Myrnorhad Axis while simultaneously undermining the Ukrainian National Command Authority (NCA) through hybrid means.

• Main Effort (Pokrovsk Direction): High-intensity combat persists across the sector, with GS ZSU confirming clashes near Myrnohrad, Rodynske, Novoekonomichne, and Udachne (23/11:16Z). This indicates RF pressure is fully engaged in exploiting the tactical breach identified previously, specifically targeting the rear approaches to the M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kostiantynivka Buffer: Clashes are confirmed near Kostiantynivka approaches (GS ZSU 23/11:16Z), validating the high threat assessment to the GLOC corridor. RF claims the "liberation" of Petrovskoe (Pazeno) (23/12:13Z), a minor tactical gain if confirmed, indicating persistent advances towards the Sloviansk/Kramatorsk defensive belt.
• Deep Kinetic Strikes: RF aviation is utilizing high volumes of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs/FABs) against forward UAF positions (Kolodeznoe, 23/11:20Z) and against the deep rear, specifically targeting Sumy and Kharkiv regions (AFU Air Force 23/12:16Z, 12:36Z). Confirmed civilian casualties in Dnipro and Ternopil underscore the continued use of punishment strikes to degrade civilian morale.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Current: No immediate restrictions.
• Forecast (24 NOV): Expected rainfall and warmer temperatures (up to +15C) across key operational areas. (JUDGMENT): This may slightly restrict off-road mobility for heavy mechanized assets but will not impede main road movements or tactical air operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Engaged in simultaneous kinetic (Pokrovsk) and cognitive (Geneva IO) maneuvers. Disseminating heavy tactical propaganda (Archangel of Spetsnaz 23/11:05Z) synchronized with assault waves. Evidence of continued reliance on foreign recruitment (Kenya) suggests persistent RF internal manpower attrition problems.

UAF: Defensive posture maintained. SSO units are actively conducting successful interdiction strikes against RF advances in the Donetsk region (23/11:21Z, 11:50Z), demonstrating effective tactical counter-action. The strategic decision regarding Plan 7-B commitment remains the critical operational control measure.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF retains the kinetic capability to achieve local GLOC interdiction and the information warfare capacity to destabilize UAF political cohesion during external diplomatic talks.

Intention (Immediate): Exploit the vulnerability of the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC corridor while maximizing internal confusion regarding the outcome of the Geneva diplomatic consultations.

Tactical COAs:

1. GLOC Seizure (MLCOA): RF mechanized and mobile infantry (40th/155th OMBR) will attempt penetration of the Myrnorhad protective barrier to physically control or place under effective direct fire the M-30 GLOC. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Psychological Warfare Escalation (MLCOA): RF state media (TASS, pro-war channels) will aggressively frame the Geneva talks as a process leading to mandatory Ukrainian territorial compromise based on the "Trump Peace Plan," attempting to isolate NCA leadership from the general public and Western allies. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has successfully integrated diplomatic events (Geneva talks) into its hybrid warfare strategy. RF IO is no longer simply creating general confusion, but rather targeting the specific outcome and legitimacy of the diplomatic process by emphasizing foreign (US) control over Ukrainian sovereignty in the peace process (Reuters/Trump claims, 23/12:28Z).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Structural RF manpower deficiencies continue, evidenced by the reported reliance on mass recruitment of non-Slavic foreign nationals (Kenya). While tactical logistics support appears sufficient for the current high-tempo attack (FAB/KAB usage is sustained), strategic resilience remains low. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in coordinating the Pokrovsk kinetic push with strategic IO messaging. The primary target of the hybrid operation is clearly UAF strategic C2/decision-making (specifically concerning Plan 7-B reserve deployment).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive holding action across the entire Eastern front, with localized counter-interdiction operations utilizing SSO/drone assets. The defense remains stretched but cohesive in key urban centers.

READINESS: Tactical readiness is high (SSO engagement success, active DShV defense). Strategic readiness is challenged by resource allocation requirements (e.g., 43rd Brigade fundraising requirements) and the critical, time-sensitive need for the commitment of Plan 7-B.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmed successful precision strikes by SSO units against RF ground assets along the primary assault axis.
• President Zelensky's public statement (23/11:48Z) reinforces UAF control of the diplomatic narrative by focusing on "ending the war" constructively, countering RF attempts to frame the talks as purely concession-based.

Setbacks:

• Continued humanitarian disaster and psychological impact of deep strikes (Ternopil casualty toll rising to 34).
• High level of strategic confusion regarding the "Trump Peace Plan" necessitates frequent, high-level diplomatic clarification.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, decisive commitment of sufficient maneuver force (Plan 7-B) to the main effort (Pokrovsk GLOC defense and counter-attack).

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The ongoing hybrid pressure—combining tactical crisis (Pokrovsk breach) with strategic uncertainty (Peace Talks IO)—continues to generate strategic hesitation, preventing the timely application of decisive reserves.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Primary Objective: Strategic Decision Paralysis.

1. Peace Deal Framing: RF and its proxies are aggressively utilizing the Geneva talks to push the narrative that the peace process is dictated by external powers (US/Trump) and will result in significant territorial losses for Ukraine.
2. Corruption Amplification: TASS is actively utilizing the unverified Umerov corruption allegations to legitimize the war as a fight against "corrupt Ukrainian leadership" (23/11:47Z).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is heavily impacted by catastrophic civilian losses in the rear (Ternopil, Dnipro), intensified by funeral footage documenting profound grief. The Dempster-Shafer analysis confirms Psychological Impact: Morale Decline for Ukrainian Civilian Population (Belief Score: 0.155). This civilian vulnerability is the RF's key secondary strategic target.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Geneva Talks: UAF, US, and EU teams are meeting. The key threat is the specific IO framing (Reuters/RF proxies) that the deal hinges entirely on a Zelensky-Trump meeting, suggesting conditional US support that forces unacceptable compromises.
• Erdogan Engagement: Upcoming phone call between Putin and Erdogan (23/12:13Z) concerning "peace initiatives and grain corridor renewal" must be monitored closely, as Turkey often acts as a spoiler or amplifier for Russian diplomatic narratives.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours (231300Z - 241300Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Breakthrough Attempt: RF ground forces will launch a sustained, high-tempo assault, likely peaking NLT 240400Z, focused on achieving the physical interdiction of the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC corridor using the 40th/155th OMBR assets in the Myrnorhad/Rodynske area.
2. High-Intensity Air Attack (KAB/FAB): RF Air Force will maximize KAB/FAB strikes to suppress UAF counter-attack vectors and destroy forward logistics nodes near the penetration points.
3. IO Amplification: RF state media will flood the information space with negative reports (e.g., peace talks collapse, new corruption leaks) timed to coincide with the kinetic assault, aiming to confuse UAF command structures.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a successful, sustained penetration, forcing the isolation of UAF Pokrovsk defenders. This kinetic success is immediately compounded by delayed or fractional commitment of Plan 7-B reserves due to NCA indecision stemming from maximized RF hybrid pressure, leading to the necessity of a large-scale, costly defensive withdrawal and the operational loss of the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka corridor.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: EXECUTE PLAN 7-B NOW.

   • Action: Immediate, phased deployment of Plan 7-B assets into the Myrnorhad-Udachne counter-penetration box. Reserves must be tasked with aggressive counter-attack to eliminate the RF penetration force (40th/155th OMBR) and re-secure the M-30 GLOC.
   • Rationale: The threat to the GLOC is maximized; hesitation risks operational isolation and tactical collapse in Pokrovsk.

2. STRATCOM/NCA: DIPLOMATIC FIREWALL.

   • Action: NCA must issue a high-profile statement (coordinated with US and EU partners) that specifically addresses and categorically rejects the premise that the peace process is pre-determined by US internal politics (i.e., the Zelensky-Trump finalization claim). Emphasize that UAF sovereignty over territory is non-negotiable.
   • Rationale: Decisive political counter-IO is required to restore internal cohesion and prevent Western diplomatic pressure from being leveraged by RF.

3. JFS/Artillery Command: ANTI-KAB MISSION PRIORITY.

   • Action: Allocate high-precision assets (HIMARS, MRLS) primarily to Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and Counter-Battery Fire (CBF) missions against confirmed or highly suspected RF KAB/FAB ground control and loading positions.
   • Rationale: Reducing KAB/FAB use is essential for preserving UAF maneuver forces and civilian infrastructure.

4. Air Force Command: DEFENSIVE MANEUVER.

   • Action: Conduct aggressive dispersal and hardening of Air Defense assets in the Sumy/Kharkiv sectors to mitigate the impact of the newly focused KAB strikes in the North.
   • Rationale: RF is sustaining pressure on secondary axes to fix UAF AD assets away from the main effort.

//END SITREP//