Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB) SITUATION REPORT

DTG: 232000Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 231500Z NOV 25 – 232000Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains critically centered on the Pokrovsk / Myrnorhad Axis (Krasnoarmeisk Direction). The RF primary objective is the physical severance of the M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC), running toward Kostiantynivka.

• Pokrovsk Urban Area: DShV elements maintain effective urban defense. Localized small-arms and indirect fire engagements are constant, but RF has been denied consolidation in the center. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kostiantynivka GLOC: Patrol Police reports confirm ongoing civilian evacuation from Kostiantynivka (21 Nov), indicating continuous pressure and humanitarian concern at the critical rear node of the logistics corridor.
• Secondary Axis (Dnipropetrovsk): The explosive RF claims regarding the capture of Tikhoe/Otradnoye remain uncorroborated by RF MoD official releases (23 Nov, 10:55Z). This strongly suggests the claims were purely an Information Operation (IO) designed to draw UAF reserves.
• ISR Activity: Confirmed RF reconnaissance UAV activity over Zaporizhzhia and Northern Kherson (23 Nov, 10:53Z and 11:02Z). This confirms sustained RF intention to fix UAF forces in the south, but not necessarily immediate major ground maneuver.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions prevail across the East and South. No significant restrictions on air or ground maneuver.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF:

• RF Groups "Yug" (Pokrovsk) are engaged in sustained, high-intensity exploitation attempts using the 40th/155th OMBR.
• Confirmed adherence to the synchronized strategy of kinetic pressure (Pokrovsk) and high-impact IO (Umerov allegations, massive casualty claims). UAF:
• 132nd Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (DShV): Confirmed active combat operations and high morale (23 Nov DShV post), suggesting tactical stability in the immediate Pokrovsk defensive line.
• Plan 7-B Reserves: The strategic decision on deployment remains the critical focus. Intelligence suggests reserves are being held, pending validation of the Dnipropetrovsk claims (which now appear invalid).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF retains the kinetic capability to achieve a localized operational breakthrough west of Myrnorhad and the logistical capability to sustain the current high-tempo attack for 72+ hours. Intention (Immediate): Achieve tactical paralysis of UAF reserves by combining the threat of GLOC interdiction with the cognitive disruption caused by the Umerov scandal and the Dnipropetrovsk feint. Tactical COAs:

1. GLOC Interdiction (MLCOA): 40th/155th OMBR attempts to bypass UAF blocking positions, utilizing Spetsnaz and mobile fire teams to physically cut the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC corridor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Sustained KAB/ODAB Strikes: Continued heavy kinetic bombardment of Myrnorhad and Kostiantynivka approaches to degrade infrastructure and complicate reserve deployment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary adaptation is the amplification of IO messaging concurrent with kinetic action:

• Massive exaggeration of UAF casualties (Basurin claims 500,000 dead). This is a clear strategic IO attempt to demoralize the Ukrainian public and military leadership, and potentially influence Western diplomatic talks by suggesting Ukraine is near collapse.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• Tactical: Sufficient for immediate assault (40th/155th OMBR).
• Strategic: Internal RF reports reveal acute budgetary strain (e.g., Khakassia suspending war payments) and heavy reliance on vulnerable groups (orphans) for front-line recruitment. This indicates structural fatigue and low resilience against sustained UAF deep strikes. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly synchronized across military, security (FSB/GRU hybrid activities like the Odesa TCC attack, previous report), and state media operations (Basurin, TASS peace plan leaks). This synchronization is the enemy’s decisive advantage.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive stability maintained in key urban nodes (Pokrovsk). Highly flexible reserve management required due to high volume of RF feints. READINESS: Tactical units remain motivated and effective (DShV). Strategic readiness hinges on the prompt, correct allocation of Plan 7-B assets to the main effort (Pokrovsk GLOC).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmation that the Dnipropetrovsk advance claims were likely a failed feint, reducing the immediate requirement for resource diversion to the secondary axis.
• Sustained defensive cohesion by DShV in the Pokrovsk sector.

Setbacks:

• Continued necessity for high-risk civilian evacuation from frontline-adjacent areas (Kostiantynivka).
• High level of internal political friction persists due to RF IO targeting NCA figures (Umerov).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid, confirmed counter-battery targeting for RF ODAB/thermobaric delivery systems near Myrnorhad. CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: Decision Inertia. The multi-domain threat is designed to overload UAF C2 with complexity, preventing the decisive commitment of reserves (Plan 7-B).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Primary Objectives: Cognitive Collapse and Diplomatic Leverage.

1. Delegitimization & Despair: Basurin's 500,000 casualty claim, combined with the Umerov corruption allegations, aims to create a public perception of a corrupt, incompetent, and collapsing state leadership forcing soldiers into a meat grinder.
2. Peace Plan Supremacy: RF security services and state media continue to leak and amplify various "peace plans" (including early Russian 30-point drafts) to frame the discussion around territorial compromise as inevitable.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Sentiment remains robust at the tactical level (DShV morale posts, citizen support for police/military), but vulnerability to high-level strategic information attacks (corruption, peace plan rumors) persists. The public needs clear, unified communication from the NCA.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The international focus on diplomatic alternatives (Geneva talks, competing US/EU plans) provides RF IO with ample material to manipulate. UAF STRATCOM must ensure RF narratives (e.g., Umerov compromise leaks) are decisively preempted in Western capitals.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (232000Z - 240800Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Cutting Attempt: RF 40th/155th OMBR will intensify kinetic action (mechanized and dismounted infantry) against the M-30/T-05-15 corridor, likely utilizing the cover of darkness (NLT 240300Z).
2. Maximum IO Pressure: RF will execute synchronized releases of disinformation (potentially high-impact fabrications regarding the NCA or military leadership) aimed at coinciding with the kinetic assault, maximizing internal confusion.
3. Feint Withdrawal/Shift: RF may formally deny or ignore the Dnipropetrovsk claims while increasing confirmed ISR activity (UAVs) in Kherson/Zaporizhzhia, sustaining the operational feint pressure.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a critical, unsustainable penetration of the UAF tactical rear near Myrnorhad, physically cutting the M-30 GLOC, isolating UAF forward elements in the Pokrovsk sector. Simultaneously, the NCA's delayed response to the Umerov crisis allows RF IO to achieve strategic decision-paralysis, preventing a coordinated counter-attack, forcing a localized tactical withdrawal under duress.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: COMMIT PLAN 7-B DECISIVELY.

   • Action: Proceed with full, non-diverted commitment of Plan 7-B reserves to reinforcement and counter-attack operations targeting the RF penetration axis near the M-30 GLOC. Formally discount the unverified Dnipropetrovsk claims as a successful enemy IO feint.
   • Rationale: Decisive concentration of force on the main axis (Pokrovsk) is required now. Delay risks operational isolation.

2. STRATCOM/NCA: IMPLEMENT COUNTER-ATTRITION IO.

   • Action: Launch a highly aggressive counter-information campaign leveraging the confirmed RF internal vulnerabilities (budget crisis, reliance on orphans, corruption reports of governors). The narrative should pivot from defending internal integrity to highlighting the RF's internal collapse and systemic failure to support its troops.
   • Rationale: This shifts the cognitive battlefield by leveraging proven facts about RF weakness, directly countering the Basurin/500k claims.

3. JFS/Artillery Command: IMMEDIATE COUNTER-FIRE MISSION.

   • Action: Dedicate all available high-precision assets (HIMARS, heavy artillery) to achieve fire superiority over RF deep indirect fire (ODAB/Thermobaric) positions targeting Myrnorhad and reserve assembly areas.
   • Rationale: Securing Myrnorhad approaches is critical to enabling the unimpeded, rapid deployment of Plan 7-B.

4. Security Services (SBU/GUR): INTERNAL IO HARDENING.

   • Action: Maintain Force Protection Condition DELTA at all TCCs (following Odesa TCC attack) and initiate rapid internal investigation into the Umerov allegations to provide the NCA with confirmed facts or definitive denials, enabling a rapid, fact-based political counter-strike against the RF hybrid attack.
   • Rationale: Protecting NCA cohesion is as vital as protecting the GLOC.

//END SITREP//