Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB) SITUATION REPORT

DTG: 231500Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 231400Z NOV 25 – 231500Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains dominated by the RF exploitation effort directed at the Pokrovsk / Myrnorhad Axis aimed at severing the M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC).

CURRENT KINETIC FOCUS:

• Pokrovsk Urban Area: UAF Airborne Assault Forces (DShV, 7th Corps) report successfully clearing the center of Pokrovsk and denying RF forces the ability to consolidate. Heavy infantry and small-arms combat continues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - based on UAF DShV reporting, corroborated by RF IO mocking the 'Fortress' narrative.)
• Myrnorhad: Confirmed use of heavy thermobaric munitions (ODAB) on Myrnorhad, indicating RF is prioritizing the destruction of defensive positions adjacent to the M-30 GLOC, preparing for the 40th/155th OMBR breakthrough exploitation.
• Dnipropetrovsk/Vostok Sector: RF MoD claims the liberation of Tikhoe, Otradnoye, Volchye, and Gay in the Dnipropetrovsk region. If confirmed, this represents a significant secondary breakthrough attempt (Group Vostok) aimed at increasing pressure on UAF reserves planned for the Pokrovsk crisis. (CONFIDENCE: LOW - RF claim, high operational risk if true. Verification is CRITICAL.)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cool conditions. No restrictions on kinetic operations in the East. Note: RF domestic forecasts anticipate icing conditions near Moscow (Shatura area), which may marginally impede RF deep-rear damage assessment and repair efforts.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF:

• RF Groups "Yug" and "Vostok" are engaged in synchronized claims of success in DNR (Petrovskoye) and Dnipropetrovsk (Otradnoye/Tikhoe), respectively.
• Confirmed continued use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) and heavy FPV drone attacks in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk areas, confirming intent to fix reserves. UAF:
• DShV units maintain defensive integrity in Pokrovsk center.
• UAF (118th Mech Br) successfully repelled a mechanized assault in the Zaporizhzhia direction, confirming defensive competence in secondary axes.
• Deep Strike capability remains confirmed via evidence of the sustained attack on Shatura GRES.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: The RF retains the capability to execute a dual-front warfighting methodology: kinetic exploitation on the M-30 GLOC supported by an aggressive, high-value hybrid campaign aimed at strategic decision paralysis in Kyiv. Intentions (Kinetic): Exploit the vulnerability created by the strategic strike window (1300Z, previous SITREP) by driving 40th/155th OMBR into the tactical rear to physically interdict the M-30 GLOC (MLCOA). Intentions (Hybrid - Decapitation Effort): RF IO is now focusing on the immediate operational-political environment by propagating high-level corruption allegations against key NCA figures (Umerov). The intent is to link operational failure (Pokrovsk) with internal corruption, thereby eroding domestic trust in command decisions, particularly regarding territorial concessions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary tactical shift is the amplification of the Dnipropetrovsk/Vostok axis claims. This suggests an attempt to compel UAF General Staff to divert Plan 7-B reserves away from the Pokrovsk crisis area to defend key terrain near Dnipro city (if Otradnoye/Tikhoe claims are validated).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF strategic sustainment is under pressure due to the Shatura GRES strike (energy disruption), but tactical sustainment for the exploitation forces (40th/155th OMBR) remains adequate for the immediate assault. UAF deep strike capacity must maintain pressure to degrade follow-on RF logistics.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 shows high synchronization between ground operations (Group Vostok) and the national IO strategy (Umerov/Peace Plan narrative). This implies a centrally directed, multi-domain attack aimed at both the physical GLOC and the cognitive center of gravity (NCA cohesion).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: CRITICAL. While urban defense in Pokrovsk is holding, the threat has shifted to the external maneuver elements (40th/155th OMBR) and the internal political environment. READINESS: Tactical units remain resilient in defensive actions (DShV at Pokrovsk; 118th Mech Br at Zaporizhzhia). Strategic readiness is challenged by the need to commit reserves (Plan 7-B) while simultaneously managing high-impact internal political friction.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Successful counter-penetration by DShV in Pokrovsk center.
• Confirmed psychological and infrastructure damage from the Shatura GRES drone strike.
• Successful localized defense against mechanized assault in Zaporizhzhia.

Setbacks:

• The immediate vulnerability posed by the corruption allegations against Umerov creates a political security crisis that RF is actively exploiting.
• Heavy fire (ODAB) on Myrnorhad and adjacent settlements increases civilian risk and complicates reserve deployment logistics.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid, confirmed intelligence on the veracity and scale of the claimed RF gains in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Otradnoye/Tikhoe). This dictates where Plan 7-B assets must be prioritized. CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: NCA Cohesion. The political attack threatens to constrain strategic decision-making time needed for military action.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Primary Objective: Achieve Cognitive Decapitation.

1. Weaponizing Corruption: Linking Umerov (NSDC/former MoD) to corruption charges and simultaneously claiming he is "ready for compromise" on territory. This aims to delegitimize the entire NCA and any potential Western-backed peace process.
2. Peace Plan Saturation: RF exploits the flurry of competing diplomatic initiatives (Trump plan, EU counter-plan, Geneva talks) to create a perception of external abandonment and internal chaos, pressuring Kyiv to accept unfavorable terms quickly.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is volatile. The kinetic success of the Shatura GRES strike is a potent positive, but the intense information saturation regarding corruption allegations and continuous frontline pressure risks fostering deep distrust in the government's competence and integrity.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The diplomatic arena is now extremely active and competitive:

• US delegation (Rubio, Whitkoff) is in Geneva for talks.
• European leaders (Tusk) express caution regarding the Trump plan and are developing counter-proposals, indicating internal Western friction.
• RF propaganda actively uses these talks to promote the narrative that territorial concessions are inevitable, supported by alleged leaks (TASS, WP citing Umerov).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (231500Z - 240300Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Interdiction: RF 40th/155th OMBR initiates kinetic engagement or establishes high-volume interdiction fire on the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC corridor to prevent the deployment of Plan 7-B reserves.
2. Hybrid Escalation: The Umerov corruption narrative will be amplified by RF security services, potentially leading to further high-profile leaks or targeted arrests/attacks (similar to the Odesa TCC incident) to force UAF internal security resources to divert from the frontline effort.
3. Feint Consolidation: RF will attempt to quickly confirm control over Tikhoe and Otradnoye, even if only nominally, to force a UAF response in Dnipropetrovsk and stretch available UAF deep reserves.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) Plan 7-B deployment is delayed or tactically degraded due to confusion stemming from the Dnipropetrovsk claims (forcing diversion) and/or sustained RF interdiction fire near Myrnorhad. The M-30 GLOC is physically cut, leading to operational isolation and subsequent attrition/encirclement of UAF forces in the Pokrovsk sector. This military setback combines with critical failure of NCA cohesion due to the corruption probe, resulting in loss of confidence from key Western allies and increased pressure for an immediate, unfavorable ceasefire.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: GLOC SECURITY - ONE PRIORITY ONLY.

   • Action: Ignore unverified Dnipropetrovsk claims (Tikhoe/Otradnoye) for the immediate operational deployment of Plan 7-B. Prioritize the entire 7-B package for aggressive deployment to reinforce blocking positions on the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC corridor.
   • Rationale: The Pokrovsk GLOC crisis represents the MDCOA. Diverting forces based on unverified IO-amplified claims risks catastrophic failure on the main axis.

2. STRATCOM/NCA: HARDEN THE COGNITIVE DOMAIN.

   • Action: The NCA must immediately issue a clear, unified statement of support for the stability of command structures (NSDC, MoD, President’s Office) and publicly denounce the corruption allegations as a coordinated RF information-terrorist operation. Do NOT allow the narrative of internal fracture to gain traction.
   • Rationale: Decapitation attempts must be met by assertive demonstrations of cohesion.

3. Air Force/JFS: SUPPRESSION OF THERMOBARIC THREAT.

   • Action: Direct high-value artillery assets (HIMARS/MLRS) to target any identified RF launch platforms or storage areas used for ODAB and other high-calibre HE targeting Myrnorhad and Pokrovsk.
   • Rationale: Reducing the extreme kinetic pressure on Myrnorhad facilitates the maneuver and integration of incoming Plan 7-B units.

4. J2/ISR Command: DEDICATE RESOURCES TO CRITICAL GAPS.

   • Action: Repurpose ISR assets currently observing secondary axes to focus exclusively on achieving CRITICAL (1) and CRITICAL (2) data points within the next 3 hours (NLT 231800Z).
   • Rationale: Decision-making regarding Plan 7-B must be based on validated intelligence, not RF propaganda amplified by tactical feints.

//END SITREP//