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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-23 11:28:43Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-23 10:58:39Z)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 231400Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 231240Z NOV 25 – 231400Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

STATUS: CRITICAL / KINETIC EXPLOITATION. The RF focus remains the Pokrovsk / Myrnorhad Axis and the severance of the M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC).

CURRENT KINETIC FOCUS: The critical 231300Z RF strategic missile strike window is now past. Initial reports suggest AD response has been activated, but full damage assessment is pending.

ENEMY CLAIMS (IO Assessment): RF sources are aggressively claiming decisive victory and encirclement ("котел") of UAF units in the Pokrovsk-Myrnorhad area (Mash 0757Z). Separately, RF MoD claims "liberation" of Otradnoye and Tikhoe in the Dnipropetrovsk region (Group "Vostok," 0815Z, 0850Z), attempting to demonstrate simultaneous operational success across multiple sectors. Confidence: HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear and cool conditions prevail. No significant environmental factors are restricting either ground maneuver or air/UAS operations. Confidence: HIGH

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS (Group "West"): RF tactical aviation is highly active, employing Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) against civilian and military targets in the Dnipropetrovsk region (UAF Air Force 0802Z), confirming sustained air superiority over the immediate tactical depth. RF continues synchronized mass UAV attacks (69 UAF intercepts confirmed, 0805Z). UAF CONTROL MEASURES: AD posture was activated for ABM defense during the 1300Z window. UAF units maintain strong tactical defense in secondary sectors (77th AEMBr successfully repelled assault near Bohuslavka, Kharkiv region, 0828Z). Confidence: HIGH


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF demonstrated sustained capability for synchronized kinetic-hybrid action (strategic strike + ground assault + IO amplification). They possess adequate reserves (40th/155th OMBR) to leverage any tactical penetration caused by the preceding strategic missile strikes. Confirmed Intentions (Post-Strike):

  1. Consolidate Breakthrough: Accelerate 40th/155th OMBR mechanized movement to physically cut the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC, focusing efforts on the tactical rear of Myrnorhad.
  2. Degrade C2/Logistics: Exploit the damage inflicted by the strategic missile strike (2652th GRAU assets) to disrupt the movement and direction of UAF Plan 7-B reserves.
  3. Internal Paralysis: Amplify domestic corruption narratives ("Pianist" rumors 0816Z; "Flamingo" corruption 0818Z) alongside frontline success claims to induce political friction in Kyiv. Confidence: HIGH

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF continues to emphasize technological solutions for force protection and tactical advantage, including the documented use of ground robotic platforms for counter-mine warfare (Rybary 0824Z), suggesting adaptation to UAF mine barriers. RF is prioritizing the neutralization of UAF deep strike capability (claiming 75 UAV intercepts, 0841Z). Confidence: MEDIUM

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Strategic logistics readiness remains high, confirmed by the predicted missile strike execution. Tactical sustainment for exploitation units (40th/155th OMBR) is sufficient. However, UAF strikes on RF infrastructure (Shatura GRES) are confirmed by open-source information (Irina 0754Z), confirming imposition of strategic friction. Confidence: MEDIUM-HIGH

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains focused. The simultaneous deployment of the strike package and the ground maneuver units implies effective coordination. The true effectiveness of RF national command resilience following the Shatura GRES strike is still being tested. Confidence: MEDIUM


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: CRITICAL. Units in the Pokrovsk sector are under extreme pressure. Forces in the South are also facing high fire intensity (870+ strikes in Zaporizhzhia Oblast in 24 hours, 0901Z), which limits inter-regional redeployment options. READINESS: UAF AD demonstrated success in defending against RF UAV waves (69 suppressed/destroyed, 0805Z). Tactical maneuver units (77th AEMBr) are proving resilient in defense when properly resourced.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

  • Deep Strike: Confirmed damage to Shatura GRES (Moscow Oblast), demonstrating strategic reach and asymmetric retaliatory capacity.
  • Tactical Resilience: Successful repulse of RF assault group near Bohuslavka (Kharkiv axis) by the 77th AEMBr.
  • AD Efficacy: High rate of successful intercepts against RF UAVs during recent saturation attacks.

Setbacks:

  • The status and readiness of Plan 7-B/TFR deployment remains the central operational risk.
  • Persistent power generation constraints across the country (RBC-Ukraine 0850Z) impact mobilization capacity and civilian morale.
  • Heavy kinetic pressure across multiple axes (Pokrovsk, Zaporizhzhia).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Confirmation of physical movement and protection status of Plan 7-B reserves toward the M-30 GLOC. Immediate assessment of damage inflicted by the 1300Z strategic strike on C2 nodes. CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: ISR/Recce coverage of the RF penetration depth (5-10km west of Myrnorhad).


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO (Domination Effort): High-volume claims of decisive battlefield success (Pokrovsk 'kettle'), coupled with the internal corruption leaks ("Pianist," "Flamingo") and political attacks against NCA cohesion. The goal is internal fracture and external paralysis. UAF Counter-Narrative: Needs aggressive amplification. The successful Shatura GRES strike must be leveraged immediately to displace the narrative of frontline failure and shift the focus back to Russian strategic vulnerability. NCA messaging (President Zelenskyy on Ternopil casualties, 0837Z) continues to focus on national tragedy and the need for external aid.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is under simultaneous pressure from strategic strikes (Ternopil casualties, 33 dead) and local power outages. The deep strike on Shatura GRES offers a temporary, high-impact morale offset, but its effect will rapidly dissipate without frontline stabilization. Confidence: MEDIUM

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The international domain is characterized by competing, contradictory peace proposals (US vs. EU, 0805Z, 0830Z). RF sources are exploiting this friction, noting that the US might offer offensive weapons (Tomahawks) only after a settlement (TASS 0901Z). This narrative delays current aid commitments by suggesting future compensation. The immediate focus must be countering the narrative that UAF is willing to consider concessions. Confidence: HIGH


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (231400Z - 232000Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

  1. Exploitation and Consolidation: RF 40th/155th OMBR utilizes the post-strike confusion and any C2 degradation to consolidate the localized penetration west of Myrnorhad and attempt to establish physical control (or high-intensity interdiction fire control) over a section of the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC.
  2. Information Blitz: RF state and aligned media channels will conduct a coordinated information blitz, featuring exaggerated claims of operational encirclement and simultaneous reports of new corruption scandals in Ukraine to induce internal distrust and pressure the NCA.
  3. Secondary Attack: Continued KAB/artillery pressure on Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk axes to fix UAF reserves and prevent their repositioning towards the Pokrovsk crisis.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF penetration achieves decisive local success in severing the M-30 GLOC before Plan 7-B reserves can establish a robust blocking position. This leads to the operational isolation of significant UAF combat elements near Pokrovsk. Concurrently, the hybrid campaign achieves critical mass, forcing the NCA to reallocate security and intelligence assets from combat support to internal stability, leading to a loss of operational initiative on the Eastern Front.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

TimeframeEvent/Decision PointTriggering IndicatorStatus/Update
IMMEDIATE (J3/J4)Post-Strike BDA Confirmation.Damage assessments (IMINT/HUMINT) of key C2/Logistics nodes post-1300Z strike.CRITICAL - NOW.
NLT 231530Z (J3/Forward)Plan 7-B Initial Engagement.First kinetic contact reported between Plan 7-B lead elements and RF exploitation forces (40th/155th OMBR).CRITICAL - IMMINENT.
NLT 240001Z (J2/STRATCOM)Hybrid Operations Counter-Response.Public release of forensic data on Odesa TCC attack and sustained messaging on Shatura GRES.URGENT.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL (1)Strategic Strike Damage Assessment (BDA).IMINT/HUMINT/Damage Assessment Teams: Rapid, post-strike BDA targeting known C2, energy, and reserve assembly areas (e.g., Kostiantynivka).LOW
CRITICAL (2)Plan 7-B Protection Status.EW/SIGINT/UAS ISR: Continuous monitoring of the reserve movement corridor for signs of RF Spetsnaz activity (Priority 3, previous report) and RF interdiction fire.MEDIUM
HIGH (3)RF Claim Verification (Dnipropetrovsk).IMINT/UAS Reconnaissance: Verify RF claims of capturing Otradnoye and Tikhoe. Determine if these are tactical feints or true deep-area penetrations.LOW
HIGH (4)AD System Performance.Air Force/AD Command: Detailed report on intercept success rate, missile types intercepted (if 2652th GRAU assets confirmed), and remaining high-value interceptor inventory.MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. J3/Reserve Command: GLOC SECURITY AND INTERDICTION FIRE.

    • Action: Dedicate all available long-range artillery and HIMARS assets to suppressing RF interdiction fire and known assembly areas (pre-planned targets) immediately in the depth of the Myrnorhad breach. Plan 7-B movement must be protected by rolling artillery barrages.
    • Rationale: The critical phase is now protecting the deployment of reserves from RF artillery and tactical aviation, allowing them to establish blocking positions on the M-30.
  2. J2/ISR Command: IMMEDIATE POST-STRIKE BDA AND COUNTER-SPETSNAZ.

    • Action: Prioritize collection assets (UAS/EW) to confirm the status of C2 nodes hit in the 1300Z strike. Simultaneously, commit ground tactical reconnaissance teams (SBS/Special Ops) to actively hunt RF Spetsnaz or sabotage groups operating near the reserve movement corridors.
    • Rationale: Preventing the isolation of Plan 7-B by Spetsnaz and ensuring command links are maintained is paramount to resisting the MDCOA.
  3. STRATCOM/NCA: AGGRESSIVE COUNTER-PROPAGANDA PACKAGE.

    • Action: Immediately release a unified message package that: a) Confirms the strategic retaliatory damage (Shatura GRES), b) Denounces RF claims of "kettle" at Pokrovsk as blatant falsehoods, and c) Rejects all foreign peace proposals based on territorial concessions, highlighting the ongoing RF brutality (Ternopil example).
    • Rationale: Strategic communication must immediately counter RF IO efforts to break political and public will while kinetic engagement is underway.
  4. Air Force/AD Command: RE-EVALUATE AND CONSERVE. (Immediate after BDA)

    • Action: Following BDA confirmation of damage from the 1300Z strike, adjust remaining AD assets to protect critical backup C2 nodes and the primary energy infrastructure required for winter sustainment. Strictly enforce conservation of high-value interceptors.
    • Rationale: RF will follow the strategic strike with secondary strikes targeting recovery efforts. Preserve capacity for future waves.

//END SITREP//

Previous (2025-11-23 10:58:39Z)

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