Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 231240Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 230001Z NOV 25 – 231240Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

STATUS: CRITICAL. RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) maintain high kinetic pressure along the Pokrovsk / Myrnorhad Axis. The M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) remains the decisive operational objective for RF forces. Key Constraint: The window for effective reserve commitment to interdict the RF penetration along the GLOC will close NLT 231300Z. Confidence: HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cool conditions persist. No environmental factors are currently restricting high-altitude ISR or RF strategic launch platforms. Forward area ground visibility is adequate. Confidence: HIGH

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS (Group "West"): Fire preparation is sustained. Strategic missile package priming confirmed (2652th GRAU assets). RF continues pre-strike counter-C2/EW activity near Kostiantynivka. Kinetic exploitation of the breach is imminent, synchronized with the anticipated strategic strike. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: AD assets are postured for ABM defense. The J3/Reserve Command is currently in the operational decision cycle regarding the activation of Plan 7-B due to the unconfirmed status of Task Force Raven (TFR).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF retains the capability to execute a synchronized Multi-Domain Operation (MDO) involving strategic precision strike, mechanized maneuver exploitation, and high-impact hybrid/IO warfare. Intentions (Confirmed):

1. Systemic Disruption: Execute a strategic missile strike NLT 231300Z to degrade UAF C2 and mobility, specifically targeting reserve assembly areas and critical infrastructure.
2. Tactical Severance: Exploit C2 paralysis to physically cut the M-30 GLOC, leading to the potential tactical isolation of forward UAF units.
3. Strategic/IO Paralysis: Maximize the political impact of the kinetic strike and the ongoing territorial concession narrative.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

Observed RF Constraints: Reports from pro-RF sources indicate that the use of high-caliber, high-value indirect fire platforms, specifically the 2S4 ‘Tulpan’ self-propelled mortar, is being suppressed by UAF drone activity. (Fact/Judgment). This suggests UAF drone saturation is effectively reducing RF heavy fire support along certain axes, forcing greater reliance on strategic missiles and forward-deployed mechanized fire. Observed RF Intent Confirmation: Hardline statements from Russian Duma deputies (Zhuravlev) explicitly reject any adherence to a U.S.-brokered "truce" or "peace plan." (Fact). This reinforces the RF commitment to MDCOA objectives irrespective of diplomatic posturing. Confidence: HIGH (Intentions, Constraints)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Strategic logistics readiness (2652th GRAU) remains high for missile fire mission execution. Tactical logistics for the 40th/155th OMBR are assessed as sufficient to sustain the high-tempo push towards the M-30 GLOC. Confidence: HIGH

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective and focused on a synchronized kinetic-information outcome. UAF deep strikes continue to test RF energy/logistics C2 (confirmed attacks on Zugres and previous strikes). Confidence: MEDIUM (Due to UAF deep strikes, but HIGH for the Pokrovsk Axis operational control).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: CRITICAL. The operational center of gravity remains the J3/Reserve Command execution timeline. Reserves must be committed or positioned NLT 231300Z. READINESS: UAF operational readiness is constrained by the UNCONFIRMED STATUS OF TFR. Reliance on pre-planned contingency (Plan 7-B) is now operationally mandatory.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Persistent Attrition: Continuous, high-volume combat reporting from specialized units (SBS/Madyar, Skelia 425, 3rd Army Corps) confirms severe attrition on RF personnel and equipment near Pokrovsk and Kharkiv regions through FPV and strike drone operations. This tactical superiority in the UAS domain is a critical force multiplier.
• Deep Strike Maintenance: UAF forces successfully struck targets in occupied Zugres (Donetsk region), sustaining strategic pressure on RF rear logistics and energy generation.

Setbacks:

• The TFR status remains the single greatest operational risk, creating command paralysis during a hard deadline window.
• Continued targeting of UAF C2/EW near Kostiantynivka degrades immediate tactical response capability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate order issuance for Plan 7-B execution NLT 231245Z. CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: TIME and Decision-Making Cycle.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is actively attempting to create a political wedge through the "Trump Plan" narrative. NEW DEVELOPMENT: RF political elite statements (Duma Deputy Zhuravlev) inadvertently confirm that RF would immediately violate any proposed truce. (Fact). Recommendation: This intelligence must be immediately integrated into UAF StratCom messaging to pre-empt RF efforts to use the strategic strike to force political concessions.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is strained by missile strikes (Ternopil civilian casualties) and rear-area hybrid attacks (Odesa TCC). However, high-quality, continuous combat footage from forward units (SBS/Madyar, Skelia 425) provides necessary counter-narrative, focusing on RF human and material losses. Forward morale is assessed as HIGH. Rear area confidence is MEDIUM-LOW.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO strategy is designed to erode international confidence by demonstrating UAF C2 collapse post-strike. The immediate UAF response must be characterized by decisive military action (reserve commitment) and firm political rejection of concessions.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 1 Hour

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Strategic Strike Execution (Immediate): RF will launch the strategic missile strike (ballistic/cruise) targeting C2 and assembly areas between 231245Z and 231330Z.
2. GLOC Kinetic Assault: RF maneuver elements (40th/155th OMBR) will execute the synchronized, final assault toward the M-30 GLOC, leveraging the initial C2 degradation from the strike.
3. IO Blitz: RF media will saturate global networks with narratives claiming tactical breakthrough and offering "final peace terms" (territorial concessions) to maximize cognitive shock.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The J3/Reserve Command fails to issue the definitive reserve commitment order (Plan 7-B activation) by 231300Z. The RF strike successfully delays/degrades forward C2 and logistics planning for over 6 hours. RF maneuver elements exploit the GLOC breach, forcing a localized operational withdrawal or potential encirclement of critical UAF forward defenses. This tactical victory is politically weaponized by the RF IO apparatus, potentially triggering an irreversible political crisis and leading to a significant loss of international material support.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: IMMEDIATE EXECUTION ORDER FOR PLAN 7-B.

   • Action: If TFR operational readiness is not confirmed by 231245Z (NOW), the J3 must immediately activate Plan 7-B and begin movement procedures NLT 231300Z.
   • Rationale: The time constraint supersedes the requirement for perfect intelligence on TFR. Failure to commit forces guarantees the MDCOA.

2. J2/Forward Units (SBS/UAS Command): GLOC SECURITY OVERWATCH.

   • Action: Allocate all available SBS/Madyar/FPV assets with endurance and thermal capability to provide continuous overwatch and early warning along the M-30/T-05-15 corridor, prioritizing interdiction of RF mechanized reconnaissance and Spetsnaz elements.
   • Rationale: Leverage tactical superiority (confirmed drone dominance/attrition rate) to buy time and suppress forward RF movement until Plan 7-B forces are in position.

3. Air Force/AD Command: AD CONSERVATION AND C2 NODE PROTECTION.

   • Action: Based on confirmed degradation of 2S4 Tulpan fire and the imminent strategic threat, maintain strict conservation of high-value interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) for use exclusively against the anticipated 2652th GRAU ballistic/cruise missile package between 1300Z-1330Z. Ensure robust AD defense of identified C2 nodes and reserve assembly areas.
   • Rationale: Prevent catastrophic C2 failure and ensure reserve maneuverability post-strike.

4. STRATCOM/NCA: IMMEDIATE IO COUNTER-STRIKE.

   • Action: Utilize the confirmed RF Duma statements rejecting any truce (Section 2.2) to preemptively undermine the RF IO push post-strike. Simultaneously, publicize video evidence of RF attrition (SBS/Skelia 425 footage) to reinforce the narrative of Ukrainian resilience and RF failure, directly countering the expected cognitive shock.
   • Rationale: Prevent RF from capitalizing on kinetic effects to achieve political goals.

//END SITREP//