Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 231130Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 231100Z NOV 25 – 231130Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

STATUS: CRITICAL. The RF exploitation phase along the Pokrovsk / Myrnorhad Axis continues unabated. RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) are actively maneuvering to interdict the M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC). Severance of the M-30 remains the single most critical tactical objective for RF, aimed at isolating UAF forward defenses and enabling further operational movement toward Kostiantynivka. Confidence: HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cool conditions persist. Favorable conditions continue to enable high-tempo RF multi-domain operations, including unrestricted VKS/UAV ISR and low-signature maneuver elements (Ulan ATVs). No current weather conditions restrict the imminent strategic missile strike (MLCOA 1).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS (Group "West"): Kinetic pressure is maintained. Logistics surge confirmed at the 2652th Artillery Armament Base indicates RF is prepared to launch the strategic missile package prior to 231300Z to disrupt UAF reserve assembly. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: AD readiness is high. The operational window for committing the counter-penetration force (Plan 7-B) remains dangerously narrow, approaching the 231300Z HARD DEADLINE.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF maintains synchronization across kinetic, hybrid, and informational domains. The immediate threat is the simultaneous kinetic assault on the M-30 GLOC and the strategic missile strike designed to achieve systemic disruption. Intentions:

1. Preemptive Strike: Execute strategic fire mission (2652th GRAU) NLT 231300Z to paralyze C2 and prevent effective UAF reserve deployment (TFR or Plan 7-B).
2. Hybrid Amplification: Leverage the operational crisis to maximize psychological impact via targeted Information Operations (IO) and potential secondary sabotage attempts against mobilization infrastructure. Confidence: HIGH.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The previously identified shift toward low-signature, high-speed integrated mobility (Ulan ATVs/Mangas drones) remains the primary tactical adaptation, exploiting gaps in UAF terrain defense.

New Assessment (EW/RER Support): High-volume, coordinated IO activity (Section 4.1) confirms sustained high morale and internal cohesion within RF specialized units (Akhmat), indicating that supporting EW and RER elements are likely maintaining high operational tempo to facilitate the current exploitation phase.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are optimized for the current exploitation and strategic coercion. The confirmed readiness of the missile package confirms that resources have been successfully shifted to enable the strategic strike despite previous UAF deep strikes. Confidence: HIGH.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in executing synchronized multi-domain operations. The coordinated timing of morale-boosting IO (Detskiy Akhmat, internal Chechen development narratives) with the kinetic timetable confirms centralized control over both hard and soft power elements to maximize operational effect. Confidence: HIGH.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Critical Defensive. UAF is currently pinned between the immediate kinetic threat at Pokrovsk and the operational decision point (Plan 7-B). Readiness is functionally constrained by the inability to confirm the status of Task Force Raven (TFR), demanding a contingency activation.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes: Previous AD successes (69 UAVs downed) provide tactical confidence but do not mitigate the strategic ballistic threat. Setbacks: Continued RF maneuver gains west of Pokrovsk. The ongoing internal security crisis following the Odesa TCC sabotage significantly strains C2 and manpower allocation in the rear.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate commitment order for Plan 7-B. Failure to act before 231300Z risks operational collapse on the M-30 GLOC. CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: Information Gaps (CR 1, CR 4, CR 5) severely limit the effective deployment of counter-measures against RF strategic fires and new maneuver platforms.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (NEW DATA INTEGRATION)

The RF Information Warfare strategy is highly layered and synchronized with the kinetic timetable, focusing heavily on internal cohesion and external projection of power:

• Internal Morale Injection (Akhmat Focus): Pro-RF channels are saturated with hyper-local (Chechen development, housing) and hyper-patriotic content ("Detskiy Akhmat" movement, celebrating commanders). This high-volume IO is designed to galvanize the domestic RF support base, project unshakable internal strength, and directly boost the morale of RF units deployed in critical sectors (e.g., Akhmat EW/RER teams).
• Narrative Synchronization (Pre-Strike Activity): The high volume of generic, repetitive supportive comments (analyzed as potential bot activity or organized flooding) in the hours leading up to the 231300Z deadline suggests a coordinated effort to create a digital "surge" of support, possibly intended to coincide with the anticipated strategic missile launch.
• Political Destabilization: Messaging continues to aggressively target UAF political legitimacy, focusing on "corruption" and "imminent collapse" to undermine the NCA’s position during the operational crisis. Confidence: HIGH.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment in Ukraine remains fragile, severely impacted by the Odesa TCC attack and RF amplification of "territorial concession" rumors. The synchronized IO activity by RF aims to achieve psychological paralysis by overwhelming the Ukrainian public with kinetic disaster, political uncertainty, and RF projected dominance.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO continues to exploit perceived fissures in Western support (e.g., "US Peace Plan" rumors). Immediate, strong counter-messaging from the NCA is required to deny RF success in delegitimizing Ukrainian territorial claims.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Strategic Strike Execution: RF will execute the strategic missile strike (sourced from 2652th/260th GRAU) targeting C2/assembly areas NLT 231300Z.
2. M-30 Severance: Immediately following the fire strike, 40th/155th OMBR forces, utilizing low-signature platforms, will execute the final thrust to interdict and hold the M-30 GLOC corridor.
3. IO/Hybrid Maximization: RF deep assets will attempt a secondary, high-impact hybrid attack against a TCC or mobilization asset in a major rear-area city (Kyiv/Dnipro), synchronized with the kinetic/fire attacks, supported by maximum IO output.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF fire missions successfully suppress or delay UAF reserve commitment (Plan 7-B), leading to the operational severance of the M-30 GLOC. RF forces quickly entrench and establish anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities along the M-30 corridor, fundamentally destabilizing the operational geometry in the entire sector and potentially forcing a wider UAF withdrawal. This military defeat immediately validates the RF IO narrative ("Inevitable Concession"), threatening vital Western political and military support for Ukraine.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: IMMEDIATE RESERVE COMMITMENT DECISION (231300Z EXECUTION).

   • Action: If TFR operational readiness cannot be definitively confirmed and location identified by 231200Z, the J3 must issue a PRE-EXECUTION ORDER for Plan 7-B activation at 231300Z.
   • Rationale: Preventing GLOC severance (MDCOA) outweighs the risk of committing a slightly sub-optimal reserve force. Time is exhausted.

2. J2/Security Services: IMMEDIATE INTERNAL FORCE PROTECTION ESCALATION.

   • Action: Immediately raise Force Protection Condition (FPCON) to DELTA for all TCCs and critical mobilization infrastructure in high-risk zones (Odesa, Dnipro, Kyiv). Implement immediate physical security measures against vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) and small UAS/drone attacks.
   • Rationale: MLCOA 3 (Follow-on Hybrid Attack) is highly probable, synchronized with the kinetic strike. Maximum hardening is required to prevent systemic mobilization paralysis.

3. Air Force/AD Command: BALLISTIC DEFENSE OPTIMIZATION (IMMEDIATE ACTION).

   • Action: Confirm all available Patriot/SAMP-T batteries are operating in Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Mode and focused on protecting designated strategic C2 nodes and critical infrastructure along the counter-penetration axis. Prioritize conservation of high-value interceptors; accept higher attrition risk for non-critical targets (e.g., Shaheds).
   • Rationale: Counter the imminent strategic strike (MLCOA 1) originating from 2652th GRAU.

4. STRATCOM/NCA: IMMEDIATE IO COUNTER-STRIKE.

   • Action: Launch a coordinated IO counter-campaign simultaneously with the Plan 7-B commitment. Focus on high-impact visuals of UAF professionalism (AD successes, deep strikes) and issue a resolute, unambiguous statement from the NCA reaffirming non-negotiable territorial integrity, specifically refuting the concession rumors amplified by RF IO.
   • Rationale: Directly counter the RF synchronized IO/hybrid effort aimed at political fracture and domestic demoralization.

//END SITREP//