Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 231100Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 230900Z NOV 25 – 231100Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Status: CRITICAL DETERIORATION. The primary RF effort remains focused on the Pokrovsk / Myrnorhad Axis (Krasnoarmiysk), currently assessed as an RF Exploitation Phase. RF maneuver elements (specifically 40th and 155th OMBR) are committed to achieving the operational objective of severing the M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC), with the tactical goal of reaching Kostiantynivka.

Key Terrain Risk: The vulnerability of the M-30 corridor remains paramount, representing the decisive operational hinge point. Confidence: HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cool conditions persist across the Pokrovsk sector. This favorable weather window continues to facilitate high-tempo RF multi-domain operations, particularly:

1. Unrestricted VKS/UAV reconnaissance and strike capacity.
2. High-speed, low-signature maneuverability for newly deployed lightweight platforms (Ulan ATV).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS (Group "West"):

• Maneuver Focus: Confirmed integration of Ulan Tactical ATVs and Mangas Hexacopters into forward assault units, increasing infiltration speed and logistical reach in complex terrain west of Pokrovsk.
• Reserve Readiness: SAR data confirms high logistics activity at the 2652th Artillery Armament Base, signaling the strategic missile strike package is assembled and ready for immediate launch.
• Recruitment/EW: RF "Akhmat" units are actively recruiting RER (Radio Electronic Reconnaissance) and REB (Radio Electronic Warfare) specialists, indicating sustained RF intent to maintain dominance in the EW domain.

UAF CONTROL MEASURES:

• Air Defense (AD): Successful large-scale interception (69 hostile UAVs downed) confirms high AD readiness and effective TTPs against saturation attacks.
• Critical Deadline: The unresolved status of Task Force Raven (TFR) and the 231300Z HARD DEADLINE for committing the counter-penetration force (Plan 7-A/7-B) remains the single most critical decision point impacting the battle for the M-30 GLOC.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF maintains the capacity for synchronized multi-domain pressure: high-tempo ground exploitation (40th/155th OMBR), imminent strategic missile strike, and acute internal hybrid warfare (Odesa TCC attack). Intentions:

1. Kinetic Synchronization (Immediate): Exploit the operational window before UAF reserves are committed (pre-231300Z) by launching the strategic missile strike to disrupt C2 and assembly areas, while simultaneously pushing mechanized forces to cut the M-30.
2. Hybrid Escalation: Compound the internal crisis (Odesa TCC incident) with further targeted sabotage against mobilization infrastructure to induce internal paralysis and factional friction within the NCA.
3. IO Warfare: Maintain maximum psychological pressure using the "Inevitable Territorial Concession" narrative and aggressive anti-Western political messaging (e.g., Mironov's threats on asset seizure). Confidence: HIGH.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary adaptation is the shift in RF maneuver doctrine toward low-signature, high-speed, integrated mobility using Ulan ATVs and Mangas drones, specifically intended for exploiting gaps and flanking operations through broken terrain where heavy armor may be restricted. This requires immediate UAF counter-TTP development.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are focused on sustaining the current high-tempo exploitation and fueling the strategic strike. The confirmation of the missile strike package assembly at 2652th GRAU overrides any perceived strategic vulnerability caused by the UAF deep strike on the Shaturskaya GRES, indicating RF is prioritizing immediate strategic coercion. Confidence: HIGH.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrates high effectiveness in hybrid synchronization. The immediate follow-up to the Pokrovsk breach with the Odesa TCC sabotage and the synchronized IO campaign confirms a coordinated, multi-axis command structure operating at a high tempo. Confidence: HIGH.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive posture is critical. While UAF AD readiness is high, overall force readiness is constrained by the lingering uncertainty regarding the TFR's operational status and location (CRITICAL CR 1). The successful prosecution of deep strikes (Slavyansk-na-Kubani) provides limited strategic offset to the immediate tactical crisis at Pokrovsk.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Successful interception of 69 RF UAVs (230627Z).
• Confirmed successful kinetic strike on strategic infrastructure (Slavyansk-na-Kubani). Setbacks:
• The continued RF exploitation west of Pokrovsk by 40th/155th OMBR.
• The RF hybrid success demonstrated by the fatal Odesa TCC explosion, escalating internal security concerns.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate decision on reserve force commitment (Plan 7-B). Delay past 231300Z risks operational failure on the M-30 axis. CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: Lack of immediate, effective counter-TTPs for the specialized RF lightweight mobility platforms (Ulan/Mangas).

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF campaign is designed for maximal psychological impact and political fracture:

• Territorial Coercion: Amplification of the "Inevitable Territorial Concession" and "Peace Plan" narratives, citing external sources (WP, US officials), aiming to undermine the NCA’s resolve and legitimize future RF military gains.
• Internal Mobilization Sabotage: Aggressive use of video clips suggesting punitive mobilization measures (e.g., property blockage) to incite domestic dissent and sabotage UAF manpower efforts.
• Morale Injection (RF Domestic): Chechen/Akhmat-linked channels are focused on hyper-local morale boosting (dentistry, children’s letters) and aggressive, hyper-nationalist political rhetoric (Mironov’s anti-Western threats), attempting to project confidence and internal strength. Confidence: HIGH.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is highly vulnerable to the kinetic-political synchronization. The Odesa TCC attack represents a successful RF psychological operations effort aimed at creating rear-area insecurity and compounding the political distrust fueled by the "territorial concession" rumors.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO successfully exploits perceived divisions and shifts in Western posture. NCA must immediately clarify diplomatic intent and reaffirm the non-negotiability of territorial integrity to counter the narrative amplified by RF channels.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Decisive Fire Strike: RF forces will launch the anticipated strategic missile package (sourced from 2652th/260th GRAU stocks) targeting key operational C2 centers and infrastructure along the projected counter-penetration axis (west of Pokrovsk) to preempt UAF reserve engagement.
2. GLOC Severance Attempt: 40th/155th OMBR, utilizing Ulan/Mangas platforms for tactical logistics and rapid maneuvering, will conduct a concerted thrust to physically interdict the M-30 GLOC before the 231300Z deadline.
3. Follow-on Hybrid Attack: RF deep agents will attempt to execute a secondary, high-impact sabotage operation against a critical mobilization node (TCC) in a major city (e.g., Kyiv, Dnipro) to maximize internal disruption coinciding with the kinetic strike.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF succeeds in maintaining tactical momentum through the Pokrovsk breach and exploits the M-30 GLOC severance, leading to the operational encirclement or bypass of UAF forward defenses. This forces the UAF General Staff to commit substantial operational reserves (Plan 7-B) into a contested and potentially fractured battlespace, incurring catastrophic losses. Critically, successful RF entrenchment on the M-30 axis validates the RF IO narrative of military inevitability, severely compromising future political support and Western aid commitments.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: EXECUTE PLAN 7-B (EMERGENCY ACTION).

   • Action: Absent immediate, definitive confirmation of TFR operational readiness by 231300Z, Plan 7-B must be committed to the Pokrovsk axis.
   • Rationale: The time-critical risk of GLOC severance (MDCOA) is operationally unacceptable. Commitment of Plan 7-B, even if slightly suboptimal, prevents RF from establishing an irreversible tactical advantage on the M-30.

2. J2/Security Services: RAISE INTERNAL FORCE PROTECTION AND COUNTER-SABOTAGE (IMMEDIATE ACTION).

   • Action: Raise Force Protection Condition (FPCON) to DELTA for all Territorial Command Centers (TCCs) and critical mobilization infrastructure in Odesa, Dnipro, and Kyiv. Deploy aggressive counter-sabotage/EOD teams to TCC perimeters.
   • Rationale: Anticipate MLCOA 3 (Follow-on Hybrid Attack). Immediate hardening is necessary to deny RF further psychological and operational success in disrupting mobilization.

3. STRATCOM/NCA: STABILIZE POLITICAL NARRATIVE (IMMEDIATE ACTION).

   • Action: The National Command Authority must issue an immediate, high-visibility statement reaffirming territorial integrity and refuting the "concession" rumors. Synchronize this release with highly publicized media coverage of UAF kinetic successes (69 UAV intercepts, Slavyansk-na-Kubani strike).
   • Rationale: Counter the synchronized RF IO campaign designed to induce political fracture and domestic paralysis (MLCOA 3).

4. J2/Targeting Cell: ANTI-MOBILITY TTP DISSEMINATION (PRIORITY ACTION).

   • Action: Immediately disseminate preliminary targeting profiles and identified EW vulnerabilities for the Ulan ATV and Mangas drone systems to all forward-deployed FPV, dedicated reconnaissance, and artillery units in Group "West" operational sectors.
   • Rationale: Neutralizing RF’s new lightweight mobility platforms is critical to slowing the exploitation phase and protecting the M-30 GLOC.

//END SITREP//