Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 231000Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 230900Z NOV 25 – 231000Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis remains focused on the Pokrovsk / Myrnorhad axis (Krasnoarmiysk). Russian Federation (RF) forces continue shaping operations, reinforcing the intent to achieve operational severance of the M-30 GLOC. RF propaganda confirms active information shaping around Kostiantynivka (220723Z), suggesting this is the RF long-term objective necessary for tactical success in the Pokrovsk sector.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cool conditions persist. The weather continues to favor high-tempo RF multi-domain operations (UAV/VKS/fast mobility).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS:

• Technology Deployment: RF Group "West" has received new tactical all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) designated "Ulan" (230603Z). This is a critical development alongside the identified UGV/Mangas drone systems, signaling increased RF focus on rapid, low-signature maneuverability for assault groups in complex terrain.
• VKS Sustainment: New deliveries of Su-30SM2 multi-role fighters (222024Z) ensure high-end VKS capacity is sustained. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: The successful interception of 69 hostile UAVs overnight (230627Z) indicates effective AD application against mass saturation attacks. However, the operational control measure remains the timely commitment of the counter-penetration force (Plan 7-A/7-B) before the 231300Z TFR redline.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF is simultaneously deploying advanced conventional assets (Su-30SM2), novel low-signature maneuver platforms (Ulan ATV), and sustaining hybrid operations across two kinetic axes (Pokrovsk, Northern fixation) while overwhelming UAF AD with massed UAV strikes. Intentions:

1. Tactical (Pokrovsk): Exploit the 231300Z deadline window to preemptively interdict M-30, securing the line of communication before UAF reserves can be committed.
2. Multi-Domain (Immediate Adaptation): Fully integrate lightweight mobility platforms (Ulan/Mangas) into forward assault units to increase speed and reduce signature during the exploitation phase.
3. Information (Cognitive Shaping): Maximize psychological pressure on NCA and the domestic population using the "Territorial Concession" narrative and aggressive reporting on punitive mobilization measures in Ukraine. Confidence: HIGH.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The most significant adaptation is the verified, rapid deployment of the Ulan Tactical ATV to the Group "West" (operating in the Pokrovsk general area) and the confirmation of large-scale Mangas Hexacopter use for front-line logistics (201709Z). This technological mix supports rapid, low-profile infiltration and sustainment required for exploitation maneuvers.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are focused on maintaining high readiness for VKS/AD (Su-30SM2 deliveries) and enabling maneuver via new specialized ground vehicles (Ulan). While UAF strategic strikes (GRES) cause strategic strain, there is no immediate evidence of frontline supply disruption.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrated effective synchronization of the recent mass UAV saturation attack. Their immediate pivot to leveraging high-impact IO narratives (Peace Plan, punitive mobilization) demonstrates high tempo and responsive control over the information domain. Confidence: HIGH.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive posture remains highly volatile. The strategic advantage gained by the GRES strike is offset by the ongoing tactical breach at Pokrovsk and the intensified RF IO campaign regarding Western support and mobilization issues. READINESS: UAF Air Defense readiness is validated by the successful interception of 69 UAVs. However, the readiness of the counter-penetration force (Plan 7-A/7-B) remains compromised by the unresolved TFR status.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: Major operational success in mitigating the overnight mass UAV attack (69 enemy systems downed). DShV reporting high monthly attrition figures (230619Z) helps sustain morale. Setback: The looming deadline of 231300Z without confirmation of the decisive reserve force (TFR) remains the primary operational setback and risk multiplier.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate decision and commitment of Plan 7-B if TFR status remains unknown past 231300Z. NEW CONSTRAINT: UAF forces must rapidly develop and implement counter-Ulan/counter-Mangas TTPs to neutralize the RF advantage in lightweight, rapid mobility and logistics.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Strategic IO Synthesis: RF channels (TASS, Colonelcassad) are maximizing the narrative of "Inevitable Territorial Concession" (230608Z), citing external sources (WP, US officials) to suggest President Zelensky is being forced toward compromise in exchange for security guarantees. This is the primary attempt to fracture NCA cohesion and public support. RF Domestic/Mobilization IO: RF sources are actively amplifying a video clip of a UAF Company Commander suggesting punitive measures (account/property blockage) for draft dodgers (230509Z). This is a focused effort to undermine UAF mobilization efforts and create internal dissent.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF domestic morale is being tested by the synchronized political-military pressure. Publicizing the successful defense against the 69 UAV attack and the continued international support (8 Northern countries commitment, 230532Z) is essential for maintaining psychological cohesion against the intensified "betrayal" narrative.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF IO campaign successfully leveraged the perceived shift in US posture (Trump plan, US/RF quick meeting reports) to amplify pressure on Kyiv. UAF STRATCOM must immediately stabilize the narrative regarding territorial integrity. Confidence: HIGH.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Interdiction and Shaping: RF forces will initiate heavy preparatory fires and deep reconnaissance (using Kurier UGV, Ulan ATV, and FPV drones) aimed at suppressing UAF positions along the M-30/T-05-15 corridors, ensuring the routes are clear for mechanized penetration post-231300Z.
2. Strategic Missile Follow-up: Following the mass UAV saturation (69 intercepts), RF C2 will likely launch a reduced-scope, high-value missile package (Cruise/Ballistic, CRITICAL CR 5) targeting C2 nodes or key infrastructure west of Pokrovsk to disrupt the assembly of Plan 7-B.
3. Sustained Hybrid Attack: RF intelligence services will continue the psychological offensive, potentially coinciding with the missile strike to maximize impact and disrupt UAF decision-making regarding the reserve commitment.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF forces achieve tactical success by penetrating past the M-30 GLOC perimeter before the counter-penetration force (Plan 7-A/7-B) can effectively engage and organize a continuous defensive line. RF forces establish entrenched positions, necessitating costly and time-consuming UAF counter-attacks. This forces NCA to confront the diplomatic/territorial pressure from a position of renewed military weakness, severely impacting Western military aid commitments.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: COMMIT PLAN 7-B (URGENT - 231300Z HARD DEADLINE).

   • Action: Immediately transition the secondary reserve force (Plan 7-B) from preparation to combat execution readiness. If TFR status is not definitively confirmed by 231300Z, Plan 7-B must initiate counter-penetration operations on the M-30 axis.
   • Rationale: Preventing GLOC severance is paramount; the operational risk of waiting for TFR confirmation now outweighs the risk of committing a slightly less prepared Plan 7-B force.

2. STRATCOM/NCA: DIPLOMATIC STABILITY MESSAGE (IMMEDIATE ACTION).

   • Action: NCA must issue a direct, high-level statement refuting the "territorial concession" and US/RF meeting narratives immediately. Simultaneously, use the UAF Air Force success (69 UAVs) to aggressively counter RF IO claiming technological and operational inevitability.
   • Rationale: Requires maximum effort to stabilize the domestic political and morale situation under synchronized hybrid attack.

3. J2/Targeting Cell: COUNTER-MOBILITY AND LOGISTICS INTERDICTION (PRIORITY ACTION).

   • Action: Disseminate new targeting profiles for Ulan ATVs and Mangas logistics drones. Re-task forward-deployed artillery and FPV units specifically to target confirmed RF lightweight logistical and maneuver platforms, denying RF the advantage of speed and low signature in the breach zone.
   • Rationale: Neutralizing RF’s new mobility platforms disrupts their exploitation capacity.

//END SITREP//