Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 230900Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 230700Z NOV 25 – 230900Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center, UAF General Staff

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis remains centered on the Pokrovsk / Myrnorhad axis (Krasnoarmiysk), where Russian Federation (RF) forces continue exploitation maneuvers targeting UAF C2 and interdiction fire capability. RF propaganda regarding the capture of UAF personnel near Krasnoarmiysk (21 Nov) reinforces the assessment of persistent tactical gaps that must be immediately addressed by counter-penetration forces (Plan 7-A/7-B).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cool conditions persist across the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia sectors. This operational environment favors continued RF ISR synchronization (UAV/VKS) and rapid deployment of lightweight mechanized/robotic assets (UGVs).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF forces are showing technological adaptability, heavily integrating Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) like the NRTC "Kurier" for demining, engineer support, and potential direct fire roles in the Zaporizhzhia sector (Orikhiv direction). This indicates a focus on minimizing personnel risk in complex maneuver/engineer roles. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: The primary control measure remains achieving commitment of the counter-penetration force (Plan 7-A/7-B) to stabilize the M-30 GLOC before the 231300Z TFR redline.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF has confirmed robust, rapidly developing capabilities in multi-domain robotics (UGV/UAV). They can apply kinetic pressure across two operational sectors (Pokrovsk breach and Zaporizhzhia fixation) while simultaneously managing an intense, globally synchronized information campaign. Intentions:

1. Tactical (Pokrovsk): Achieve irreversible operational advantage on the M-30 GLOC, forcing UAF units to fight from unfavorable, unprepared positions.
2. Technological (Immediate Adaptation): Integrate UGVs into tactical operations (demining/assault support, confirmed near Orikhiv), increasing RF operational tempo in previously constrained (mined) areas.
3. Information (Cognitive Shaping): Sustain the strategic IO pressure concerning external abandonment, while reinforcing a narrative of RF technological superiority and operational inevitability (propaganda showcasing successful UAV strikes and UGV development). Confidence: HIGH.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The most significant adaptation is the verified use and rapid development cycle of the NRTC "Kurier" UGV system for demining and combat module testing (flamethrower systems). This reduces the vulnerability of RF engineer/assault teams and suggests an increasing reliance on remote systems for breach exploitation.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain capable of sustaining high-tempo mechanized assault at Pokrovsk. The UAF GRES strike has created a strategic strain on RF AD resources, potentially allowing greater latitude for UAF deep-strike assets, but no observed immediate impact on frontline supply routes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in blending technological integration (UGV development/deployment) with operational strategy (Pokrovsk exploitation) and information warfare tempo. The coordination suggests strong central control over multiple domains.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive posture is strained by simultaneous kinetic and cognitive threats. The successful UAF deep strike (GRES) provides valuable leverage. READINESS: All available ground ISR assets must be focused on identifying RF UGV deployment corridors, especially near potential mechanized breaching points, as UGV presence fundamentally alters the complexity of close-quarters combat (CQC) and counter-penetration tasks.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: Continued high-volume attrition on RF personnel (GS AFU claim 920 RF losses for the day) is essential for maintaining morale and validating UAF resistance. The strategic strike on the GRES remains key. Setback: The unresolved status of TFR and the approaching 231300Z decision point is the largest current operational risk.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Confirmation or replacement of TFR assets is the overriding priority. NEW CONSTRAINT: Immediate need for counter-UAV/counter-UGV protocols and associated resources (Electronic Warfare assets, anti-material rifles, CQC counter-robotics training) for counter-penetration forces designated for the Pokrovsk axis.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Strategic IO Synthesis: The core narrative remains "Negotiation Mandated by the West." While RF sources report former President Trump claiming the US proposal is not final and that Ukraine can "fight on," this messaging is layered on the original (and highly damaging) reports of the US/EU/Ukraine Geneva meeting discussing a "peace plan" (221641Z). This ambiguity is intentional: RF aims to sow doubt about Western resolve while shifting the responsibility for continuing the conflict onto Kyiv. RF Tactical/Technological IO: Extensive circulation of videos showing RF UAV dominance (Vostok Group, Критик) and the advanced UGV development ("Kurier") is aimed at demoralizing UAF soldiers by portraying RF technological inevitability.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF domestic morale is benefiting from the General Staff's high casualty claims (920) and the strategic GRES strike. However, the relentless RF narrative of Western betrayal and military collapse requires immediate, high-level counter-messaging by UAF NCA and STRATCOM.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF IO campaign successfully weaponized the Geneva meeting, ensuring that the primary diplomatic concern is now managing the fallout from the perceived pressure for territorial concessions, irrespective of the factual content of the US proposal.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Pokrovsk Operational Severance (M-30 Interdiction): RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) will increase interdiction fires on known UAF reserve maneuver corridors (towards M-30) to preempt the 231300Z counter-penetration initiation. This may involve localized, heavy UGV deployment for reconnaissance or fire support.
2. Sustained Kinetic-IO Synchronization: RF will simultaneously amplify tactical success (UAV footage, POW narratives) while TASS/RT maintains maximum volume on the diplomatic "surrender" track, aiming to disrupt UAF C2 focus before the reserve commitment.
3. Zaporizhzhia UGV Maneuver: RF Vostok Group will likely use newly integrated UGV assets (Kurier) to de-mine or clear obstacles ahead of localized infantry/mechanized assaults near Stepnohirsk, demonstrating capability and increasing fixing power.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The failure to confirm the operational commitment of a decisive counter-penetration force (Plan 7-A or 7-B) by 231300Z allows RF forces to rapidly exploit the breach depth, enabling RF 40th/155th OMBR to bypass strongpoints and establish entrenched fire control, potentially forcing a tactical collapse of UAF defenses at Myrnorhad and surrounding GLOCs. This tactical failure, amplified by RF IO, risks immediate strategic loss of confidence among key Western allies.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: TFR CONTINGENCY EXECUTION (URGENT - 231300Z HARD DEADLINE).

   • Action: Transition from preparation to EXECUTION readiness for Plan 7-B (Secondary Reserve Force). If TFR status is not confirmed by 231300Z, Plan 7-B must initiate counter-penetration operations on the M-30 axis regardless of readiness gaps.
   • Rationale: Preventing the operational severance of the M-30 GLOC is non-negotiable. Time is the most critical constraint.

2. STRATCOM: COUNTER-IO FOR TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY (IMMEDIATE ACTION).

   • Action: While sustaining the GRES success narrative, immediately introduce a counter-narrative addressing RF technological claims (UGV/UAV). Highlight existing UAF capabilities to degrade or neutralize these systems (e.g., EW capabilities, anti-material use against UGVs). Frame RF reliance on robots as proof of high RF casualties and reluctance to risk personnel.
   • Rationale: Direct combat exposure to RF UGVs may cause immediate tactical demoralization; the cognitive domain must neutralize this threat before physical encounters peak.

3. AD Command: RESERVE FORCE AD UMBRELLA (PRIORITY ACTION).

   • Action: Reposition at least one high-value AD system (e.g., Patriot or NASAMS battery) to cover the primary staging and maneuver areas of the designated counter-penetration force (Plan 7-A/7-B) west of Pokrovsk to deny RF VKS interference during the decisive maneuver phase.
   • Rationale: The concentration of reserve assets presents a high-value target for VKS interdiction. Protect the asset that determines the outcome of the Pokrovsk exploitation.

//END SITREP//