Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - POKROVSK CRISIS & RF HOMELAND STRIKES

DTG: 230700Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 230500Z NOV 25 – 230700Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Pokrovsk / Myrnorhad axis, where RF forces are attempting to secure the M-30 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC). RF claims of destroying UAF C2/UAV assets near Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk) reinforce the assessment that RF priorities include blinding UAF counter-penetration fires.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions persist in Donbas, favoring continued RF ISR and VKS support for the Pokrovsk exploitation. Deep strike operations over RF territory were successful despite RF Air Defense claims (75 UAV intercepts).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF forces are exhibiting high synchronization between front-line exploitation, localized pressure in Zaporizhzhia, and high-volume Information Operations (IO) designed to maximize the political impact of perceived US diplomatic shifts. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: The successful deep strike on Moscow Oblast validates UAF asymmetric strategy. The priority remains stabilizing the M-30 axis before the 231300Z decision point concerning Task Force Raven (TFR) status.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF has demonstrated the ability to absorb strategic strikes on its homeland while simultaneously pressing the exploitation phase at Pokrovsk and maintaining intense IO focused on political fracture. Intentions:

1. Tactical: Achieve fire control over the M-30 GLOC and suppress UAF UAV/fire coordination capability near Krasnoarmiysk.
2. Strategic (Hybrid): Leverage real and perceived US diplomatic maneuvers (Geneva delegation reports, Kellogg/Rubio comments) to create an immediate political crisis for the Ukrainian National Command Authority (NCA), suggesting imminent Western abandonment and forced peace terms.
3. Operational (Zaporizhzhia): Maintain kinetic pressure (drone strikes, flanking maneuvers near Stepnohirsk) to fix UAF reserves in the south, preventing their redeployment to the critical Pokrovsk sector. Confidence: HIGH.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift of kinetic focus in the Pokrovsk sector to high-value assets (C2/UAV hubs) confirms a sophisticated effort to achieve operational paralysis by denial of intelligence and fire support, rather than solely brute force mechanized assault.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The UAF deep strike targeting the Shaturskaya GRES (Moscow Oblast) directly impacts RF domestic energy security. This successful strike acts as a strategic attrition factor, diverting RF AD and counter-UAV resources away from the immediate frontline/rear logistics. RF AD claims of 75 intercepts are likely intended to obscure the severity of the GRES attack damage.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating front-line exploitation (Pokrovsk) with diplomatic IO narratives. However, the successful UAF deep penetration of the Moscow Oblast AD bubble suggests RF strategic C2 is being challenged by resource allocation requirements (Homeland AD vs. Frontline Support).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF is currently managing a dual crisis: physical breach at Pokrovsk and cognitive crisis imposed by RF hybrid operations regarding peace negotiations. The successful deep strike capability is critical leverage. READINESS: Air Defense resources previously allocated for the anticipated Zaporizhzhia strategic missile threat (now cancelled/delayed) should be immediately assessed for reallocation to the Pokrovsk sector or reserve protection duties, while maintaining coverage of critical Kyiv/C2 nodes.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: The confirmed, high-impact UAV strike on the Shaturskaya GRES (Moscow Oblast) forcing airport closures is a major strategic success, offering immediate material for counter-IO. Setback: The lack of status resolution for Task Force Raven (TFR) continues to severely impede the execution of Plan 7-A counter-penetration protocols.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: TFR Status Resolution (Redline 231300Z). Failure to locate TFR within the next six hours necessitates immediate implementation of the contingency reserve plan. CONSTRAINT: The RF IO campaign (TASS, Piatnashka Brigade claims of UAF surrender, lack of mobilized forces) necessitates dedicating immediate STRATCOM resources to frontline unit communication to mitigate psychological effects.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Strategic IO Synthesis (Political Paralysis): RF has achieved critical mass in deploying the "US Peace Plan" narrative, leveraging reports of a US negotiating delegation to Geneva ahead of a proposed Trump/Zelenskyy meeting. This aims to:

1. Undermine Sovereignty: Suggest that major territorial concessions are being decided by external powers (Washington/Geneva).
2. Maximize Fissure: Compound the domestic political friction addressed by the UAF NCA in the previous reporting period.
3. Tactical IO: Concurrent TASS messages amplify UAF operational weakness (lack of mobilization, high surrender rates, abandonment of soldiers near Kupyansk).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The success of the Moscow strike provides a crucial morale boost opportunity. If STRATCOM fails to leverage this success, the overwhelming negative flow regarding Western diplomatic pressure and frontline attrition claims risks severe demoralization, both domestically and within frontline units.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO is successfully defining the narrative that the US is actively pushing for a negotiated settlement involving Russian demands (Kellogg comments). UAF STRATCOM must immediately counter the perception that the Geneva meeting and US delegation represent pressure for surrender, rather than securing Ukrainian interests.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Pokrovsk Operational Severance: RF 40th/155th OMBR will attempt to fully neutralize UAF fire support capability in the immediate tactical rear (Krasnoarmiysk area) and establish direct observation/fire control over the M-30 GLOC, delaying the counter-penetration force commitment.
2. Zaporizhzhia Sustained Pressure: RF 35th Army (Vostok Group) will escalate UAV and localized assaults (Stepnohirsk/Prymorske) to fix UAF 1st Echelon defenses, confirming the strategic missile strike was not essential for fixing reserves.
3. IO Synchronization Peak: TASS/RT will flood global and domestic channels with content framing the US delegation to Geneva as the beginning of the "Ukrainian surrender process," timed to coincide with RF tactical success near Pokrovsk.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Failure to commit a counter-penetration force (due to TFR status failure) allows the 40th/155th OMBR to exploit the breach deep enough to force a major UAF operational retreat, possibly compelling UAF commanders to abandon planned defensive positions around Kostiantynivka and Myrnorhad. This retreat would be amplified by the RF information campaign, leading to a temporary collapse of Western diplomatic confidence.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: EXECUTE TFR CONTINGENCY (URGENT - 231300Z HARD DEADLINE).

   • Action: Immediately prepare and stage the designated secondary reserve force (Plan 7-B) for deployment. If TFR status is not confirmed by the 231300Z redline, the secondary force MUST initiate counter-penetration operations on the M-30 axis.
   • Rationale: The time risk for the entire Donbas defensive posture is too high to wait for TFR. A delayed, less-ready counter-force is superior to a non-existent one.

2. STRATCOM: SHATURA GRES COUNTER-IO (IMMEDIATE ACTION).

   • Action: Immediately leverage the confirmed success of the Shatura GRES strike and the resulting airport closures. Frame the narrative as: "Despite RF tactical pressure, Ukraine possesses the capacity to impose strategic costs on the aggressor's homeland, proving our resolve and strength in the face of political threats."
   • Rationale: This narrative directly counters the RF political IO regarding inevitable surrender and Western abandonment, stabilizing both internal and diplomatic cohesion.

3. AD Command: ZAPORIZHZHIA RESOURCE REALLOCATION (PRIORITY ACTION).

   • Action: Due to the cancellation of the strategic strike alert, immediately assess high-value AD assets (Patriot/SAMP-T) previously tasked for Zaporizhzhia C2 defense. If possible, reposition one Patriot battery to cover the critical reserve staging areas west of Pokrovsk to mitigate potential RF VKS interdiction of Plan 7-B.
   • Rationale: Utilizing momentarily freed-up resources to protect the decisive counter-penetration force deployment shifts risk mitigation to the current critical axis.

//END SITREP//