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Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-23 06:28:38Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-23 05:58:38Z)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - POKROVSK EXPLOITATION & ZAPORIZHZHIA KINETIC ALERT

DTG: 231100Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 230900Z NOV 25 – 231100Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational tempo remains critically high around the Pokrovsk / Myrnorhad axis. RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) are actively capitalizing on the kinetic shock zone. RF Information Operations (IO) are simultaneously generating tactical psychological pressure by reporting UAF surrenders near Dimitrov (west of Myrnorhad). The M-30 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) remains compromised, severely impeding UAF counter-penetration logistics.

AxisStatusKey Developments (230900Z-231100Z)Confidence
POKROVSK / MYRNORHADEXPLOITATION PHASE - CRITICAL.FACT/JUDGMENT: RF IO claims UAF surrender near Dimitrov due to lack of supplies (TASS). This confirms RF forces are close to or inside the critical operational depth necessary to compromise UAF C2 and logistics.HIGH
ZAPORIZHZHIA OBLASTHIGH KINETIC ALERT - IMMINENT.FACT: UAF Oblast Military Administration (OBA) reports immediate air raid cancellation followed by an immediate reinstatement (230221Z-230223Z). JUDGMENT: This confirms active RF strike deployment (likely drone/missile package) aimed at C2 or infrastructure targets.HIGH
RF DEEP REARUAF DEEP STRIKE MAINTAINED.FACT: Confirmed reports of explosions in Krasnodar Krai (ASTRA, 230227Z). JUDGMENT: UAF maintains strike reach and capability to target high-value RF infrastructure outside the immediate conflict zone, providing a critical counter-pressure capability.MEDIUM

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, dry conditions persist. This facilitates continued RF ISR operations (UAV/VKS) and maintains the viability of VKS Close Air Support (CAS) essential for the 40th/155th OMBR advance.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF forces are exhibiting high coordination between kinetic exploitation, deep strike readiness (Zaporizhzhia), and immediate tactical IO (Dimitrov surrender claims). UAF CONTROL MEASURES: The effectiveness of decentralized C2 (Plan 7-A counter-fires) is now paramount, given the tactical IO pressure and the ongoing intelligence gap concerning Task Force Raven (TFR) status.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF has demonstrated the ability to execute simultaneous operations across multiple domains: high-tempo ground exploitation, imminent strategic strike, and intense hybrid warfare/IO designed to maximize political and societal pressure. Intentions:

  1. Tactical: Sever the M-30/Kostiantynivka GLOC and degrade UAF cohesion in the Pokrovsk sector.
  2. Operational: Force UAF to commit strategic reserves prematurely to contain the breach.
  3. Strategic (Hybrid): Use Western proxies (Kellogg/TASS reporting) to amplify narratives of inevitable territorial loss, the need for elections, and internal corruption (Washington Post report), thereby undermining NCA stability during the peak kinetic crisis. Confidence: HIGH. This synchronized approach confirms the analysis of coordinated paralysis from the previous Daily Report.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The immediate dissemination of surrender propaganda (Dimitrov/TASS) while mechanized forces are maneuvering represents a tactical shift toward kinetic shock follow-up. This aims to deny UAF commanders the critical decision time required to stabilize the line or launch effective counter-penetration fires.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF strategic missile stocks (2652th GRAU identified previously) are highly active and are now believed to be deployed for the imminent Zaporizhzhia strike. Tactical logistics are robust enough to support the 40th/155th OMBR exploitation.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, evidenced by the tight synchronization of ground forces (Pokrovsk), strike assets (Zaporizhzhia alert), and information dissemination (TASS/Kellogg/Dimitrov IO).


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: The defense is fighting a multi-domain battle while managing the consequences of hybrid attacks (Odesa TCC). The priority is preventing a rout at Pokrovsk and minimizing damage from the anticipated Zaporizhzhia strike. READINESS: UAF deep strike capability remains operational (Confirmed Krasnodar Krai explosions). This capability is vital for imposing cost on the RF rear.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback: RF IO concerning UAF surrenders (Dimitrov) suggests the exploitation efforts are achieving psychological effects, compounding the physical setback of the M-30 compromise. Success: Confirmed successful targeting of the Russian rear (Krasnodar Krai) validates the importance of UAF asymmetrical strike capabilities (UAV/Deep Fire).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: The resolution of Task Force Raven (TFR) status remains the single highest priority constraint on UAF counter-penetration planning (Plan 7-A). CONSTRAINT: AD resource allocation for the imminent Zaporizhzhia strike must be finalized immediately, prioritizing protection of operational C2 nodes over secondary energy infrastructure, if a choice must be made.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Strategic IO Synthesis: RF is executing a highly sophisticated strategy centered on forcing internal fracture and magnifying Western diplomatic pressure.

  • Vector 1 (Political Fissure): TASS broadcasts Western sources (Kellogg, Washington Post) emphasizing necessary territorial concessions, elections (implying illegitimacy of wartime government), and corruption scandals to erode domestic faith in UAF NCA leadership.
  • Vector 2 (Tactical Demoralization): TASS claims of UAF soldier surrenders near Dimitrov are designed to directly demoralize frontline units and hinder reserve deployment.
  • Vector 3 (Internal Stability Projection): High volume of Kremlin/MVD internal security/economic reports (AI, Tax, Police/Crime) signals to the RF domestic audience that the regime is functional, focused on the future, and internally secure, contrasting the image of fractured Ukraine.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal pressure on the UAF NCA is being deliberately exacerbated by RF IO. While domestic resilience (FPV funding) remains strong, the combination of kinetic losses (Pokrovsk), confirmed hybrid terrorism (Odesa TCC), and amplified rumors of Western abandonment creates a severe test of strategic patience.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO is actively attempting to shape the diplomatic environment by leveraging figures like Kellogg to suggest US pressure for immediate settlement terms involving territorial concessions. This IO must be immediately countered by UAF STRATCOM.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

  1. Zaporizhzhia Strike Execution: RF will launch the anticipated combined drone/missile strike targeting a critical UAF Operational C2 hub or energy transmission node in Zaporizhzhia Oblast within the next two hours, leveraging the current high alert status.
  2. Pokrovsk Operational Severance: RF 40th/155th OMBR will succeed in establishing direct fire control over the M-30 GLOC, delaying Plan 7-A deployment by at least four hours and forcing UAF units to utilize heavily exposed secondary routes.
  3. IO Amplification: RF state media will flood channels with "Peace Plan" content, timed to coincide with the Zaporizhzhia strike and the ground exploitation success, maximizing national shock.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

A successful RF kinetic strike on the Zaporizhzhia regional C2 hub results in temporary command paralysis. Simultaneously, the inability to locate and deploy Task Force Raven (TFR) allows the 40th/155th OMBR to bypass isolated UAF defensive positions and reach an objective that threatens the logistical depth of the entire Donbas defensive posture.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

TimeframeEvent/Decision PointTriggering Indicator
NLT 231200Z (AD Command)Zaporizhzhia AD Execution: Confirmation of high-value AD assets (Patriot/SAMP-T) successfully tracking and engaging the primary RF strike package.Confirmed intercept success against high-speed missile (e.g., Kinzhal) or mass drone saturation mitigation.
NLT 231300Z (J3/Reserve Command)TFR Status Resolution (Redline): Decision to substitute TFR with a less-ready reserve force OR commit decentralized fire support against the 40th/155th OMBR even without TFR coordination.Failure of dedicated ISR (UAV/IMINT) to confirm TFR location and readiness by 231300Z.
Immediate (STRATCOM)Counter-IO Launch: Rapid launch of a counter-narrative campaign leveraging UAF deep strike success (Krasnodar) and national unity messaging.TASS or major RF channel reports reaching critical mass on "Peace Plan" or "Corruption" themes.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL (1)Task Force Raven (TFR) Status: Location, operational readiness, and estimated time of engagement (ETE) near the Pokrovsk exploitation zone. (Remains paramount).IMMEDIATE UAV/EW ISR: Continuous high-resolution search for TFR signature/movement along authorized maneuver corridors toward the M-30.LOW
HIGH (2)Zaporizhzhia Strike Damage Assessment: Confirmation of which critical infrastructure (C2 vs. Energy) was prioritized by the anticipated RF kinetic strike.IMINT/HUMINT: Rapid post-strike assessment (within 30 minutes of impact) focusing on damage to the Zaporizhzhia Regional Command Center and main power grid substation.HIGH
HIGH (3)RF Troop Morale/Impact of Deep Strikes: Assessment of the immediate effect of UAF strikes (e.g., Krasnodar) on RF logistical staff and troop morale.SIGINT/HUMINT: Monitoring Russian domestic channels and rear-area communications for evidence of fear, panic, or operational disruption following the Krasnodar event.MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. J3/Reserve Command: TFR REDLINE ACTION AND RESERVE SUBSTITUTION (CRITICAL ACTION).

    • Action: If TFR status is not resolved by 231300Z, J3 must execute the contingency plan (Plan 7-B) using the designated secondary reserve force (e.g., 3rd Assault Brigade elements) or the most readily available artillery group to initiate suppressive fire on the 40th/155th OMBR exploitation axis. The risk of delayed reaction outweighs the risk of utilizing a less-ready unit.
    • Rationale: The MDCOA is triggered by C2 failure and lack of counter-penetration fires. Initiating fire support is the minimum required action to slow the exploitation regardless of TFR status.
  2. AD Command: ZAPORIZHZHIA CRITICAL ASSET PROTECTION (IMMEDIATE ACTION).

    • Action: Prioritize the protection of the confirmed regional UAF C2 center in Zaporizhzhia Oblast over secondary civilian energy targets for the duration of the current kinetic alert. Maintain Patriot/SAMP-T systems in Anti-Ballistic Mode as previously recommended.
    • Rationale: C2 disruption (MDCOA trigger) is a greater threat to operational stability than temporary power loss during the Pokrovsk crisis.
  3. STRATCOM: LAUNCH COUNTER-IO USING KRASNODAR SUCCESS (URGENT).

    • Action: Immediately leverage the confirmed explosions in Krasnodar Krai (ASTRA report) to counter the RF narrative of Ukrainian weakness and Western abandonment. Frame the narrative as: "While Russia demands surrender, Ukraine strikes back at the heart of their logistics, proving our capacity to fight for every inch."
    • Rationale: Countering the perception of strategic futility is vital to maintaining domestic political and military cohesion while the frontline stabilizers (Pokrovsk/Zaporizhzhia).

//END SITREP//

Previous (2025-11-23 05:58:38Z)

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