Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - CRITICAL DEFENSE STABILIZATION

DTG: 230900Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 230700Z NOV 25 – 230900Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains on preventing RF forces from establishing a tactical salient and consolidating control over the severed M-30 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) axis near Pokrovsk. Kinetic pressure is maintained across the deep operational rear, particularly targeting areas crucial for UAF reserve staging and mobilization.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, dry conditions persist, enabling continuous RF ISR (Slon/Orlan) and VKS fixed-wing CAS operations necessary for sustaining the Pokrovsk breach exploitation.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF forces are maintaining high tempo in the penetration zone, confirming their intent to achieve a rapid operational gain following the kinetic strike. RF C2 appears resilient and centralized in coordinating these multi-domain efforts. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: J3 must urgently confirm decentralized C2 protocols for Plan 7-A counter-fires. Mobile C2 platforms must assume priority over static positions. Force Protection Condition (FPCON) for all Territorial Command Centers (TCCs) remains critical due to confirmed sabotage intent.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF maintains overwhelming kinetic superiority through heavy air ordnance (FAB-3000) and highly accurate tactical UAV deployment (Confirmed FPV effectiveness near Dvurechensk previously). Intentions: The primary military intent is to physically sever UAF supply axes and force a localized collapse at Pokrovsk. This operational goal is synchronized with the strategic intent of inducing national paralysis via hybrid attacks (Odesa TCC) and information campaigns (Peace Plan IO/Mobilization critiques). Strategic Stability (RF Internal): TASS reporting on a 2025 maximum of "terrorist crimes" indicates heightened internal security pressure within the Russian Federation, potentially diverting security/FSB resources domestically, but also fueling the Kremlin's aggressive narrative of external threat.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

No new major tactical adaptations in the last two hours, but the commitment to the synchronized FAB-ground assault at Pokrovsk represents a continued shift toward overwhelming kinetic shock to bypass attrition warfare.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF strategic missile stocks remain at high readiness (2652nd GRAU monitoring continues). Tactical logistics within the Pokrovsk breach zone are maintained via heavy-lift UAV (Slon) and short supply lines.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrates high effectiveness in planning and execution across multiple domains (strategic strike, ground exploitation, IO). The ability to instantly follow a FAB-3000 strike with mechanized advance indicates a pre-staged, high-readiness C2 architecture.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive posture at Pokrovsk requires immediate reinforcement and fire support to mitigate the 40th/155th OMBR penetration. READINESS: FPV Counter-Capability: New intelligence confirms the UAF civilian-military FPV procurement pipeline remains highly robust (Sternenko fund reports 180 to 1,600 FPV units procured daily). This provides a critical, decentralized tactical advantage necessary for interdicting RF armored exploitation elements in the Pokrovsk zone. C2 VULNERABILITY: The confirmed RF IO targeting of mobilization (Lviv evasion incident) underscores the vulnerability of TCCs and rear-area security, reinforcing the need for FPCON DELTA previously recommended.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback: Continuation of the breach exploitation at Pokrovsk remains the primary operational setback. Success: UAF deep strike operations (Slavyansk-na-Kubani previously confirmed) and the sustained, high-volume domestic procurement of FPV drones demonstrate maintained deep strike capability and societal resilience.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Resolution of Task Force Raven (TFR) status. The effectiveness of Plan 7-A (counter-penetration) hinges on the readiness and location of this mobile reserve. CONSTRAINT: The dilemma of allocating high-value AD assets (strategic rear) versus deploying tactical AD (Pokrovsk CAS denial) remains acute.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO Focus: RF is utilizing specific, emotionally charged tactical events (Lviv draft evasion video) to project an image of UAF societal fatigue and mobilization failure. This supports the larger strategic narrative that Ukraine is fracturing internally. UAF Counter-Narrative: UAF STRATCOM must prioritize the robust narrative of national resolve and unity. Key IO vectors include:

1. Amplifying the FPV procurement data (Sternenko) as evidence of public investment and military capability.
2. Utilizing statements of defiance from combat units (e.g., IFG's "total destruction/no concessions" rhetoric) to counter "capitulation" narratives.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF public sentiment shows resilience, integrating national commemoration days (Holodomor, Day of Dignity and Freedom) with the ongoing fight, effectively linking historical struggle to current resistance. Domestic morale is being strongly reinforced by successful civil society projects (FPV funding), counterbalancing the demoralizing effects of the Pokrovsk setback and rear-area sabotage.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

No significant updates in the past two hours. The diplomatic line of communication established with US VP Vance and the positive rhetoric from UK political figures (Johnson) must be secured and maintained.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. RF Consolidates M-30 Control: RF 40th/155th OMBR, supported by VKS CAS, will succeed in establishing forward fire control over a critical segment of the M-30 GLOC, delaying and complicating UAF logistics and the deployment of Plan 7-A reserves.
2. Increased Deep Drone Strikes (Zaporizhzhia): Consistent with D-S projections, RF will initiate a wave of strike drone attacks targeting C2 or energy infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia Oblast to exploit UAF AD resource constraints.
3. Spetsnaz Interdiction: RF SpN groups will attempt immediate, localized sabotage (mines, ambushes) on UAF secondary maneuver routes leading into the Pokrovsk sector to further isolate the forward defense.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The combination of successful M-30 severance, persistent VKS denial of UAF reserve deployment, and confusion caused by C2 damage prevents UAF counter-penetration fires (Plan 7-A) from effectively engaging the RF exploitation force. RF secures a permanent foothold west of Mirnohrad, forcing UAF to divert strategic reserves intended for other sectors (e.g., Donbas defense) to contain the breach.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Reserve Command: IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF FPV STOCKS TO POKROVSK SECTOR (CRITICAL ACTION).

   • Action: Leverage the robust civilian-funded FPV pipeline. Prioritize the transfer of bulk FPV stocks and experienced drone strike teams (like the Ivan Franko Group/Phoenix units mentioned in intelligence) to units engaging the 40th/155th OMBR immediately.
   • Rationale: FPVs are the most effective immediate counter-mobility asset against mechanized exploitation, especially where fixed-wing CAS denies UAF maneuver. Use them to target the RF logistics tail and supporting armor.

2. J2/Security Services: COUNTER-SABOTAGE DEPLOYMENT & TCC HARDENING (URGENT).

   • Action: Maintain FPCON DELTA for all TCCs and mobilization centers. Deploy dedicated security detachments capable of immediate counter-IED/counter-sabotage response. Review and harden transit routes for mobilization personnel to mitigate the hybrid threat vector (Odesa TCC, Lviv evasion IO).
   • Rationale: Preventing internal paralysis is necessary to sustain the overall war effort while frontline units stabilize the Pokrovsk crisis.

3. AD Command: PRIORITIZE CAS DENIAL OVER STRATEGIC AD IF TFR STATUS UNKNOWN (RISK MANAGEMENT).

   • Action: If TFR status remains unknown NLT 231100Z, accept managed risk on a non-critical strategic C2 node to redeploy a short-range, high-density tactical AD asset (e.g., Gepard battery) to the Pokrovsk sector to deny fixed-wing (FAB) strikes.
   • Rationale: Further FAB strikes represent the MDCOA trigger. Mitigating fixed-wing CAS threat is a higher operational priority than protecting a single, secondary deep rear node.

//END SITREP//