Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS UPDATE

DTG: 230430Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 230400Z NOV 25 – 230430Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis at POKROVSK persists. RF exploitation elements (40th/155th OMBR) have likely achieved tactical penetration deep enough to place the M-30 GLOC junction (T-05-15) under sustained, high-volume interdiction fire, effectively denying UAF use. The key terrain objective has shifted from capturing ground to achieving functional supply line severance.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, stable conditions persist, favoring RF deep ISR and optimized flight conditions for the heavy-lift 'Slon' UAV, thus maximizing RF sustainment resilience.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF forces are synchronized, maintaining tactical momentum at Pokrovsk while strategically prepared for the deep strike. The heavy focus of high-quality assets (e.g., Somali Battalion UAV operators) on the Pokrovsk direction is confirmed via open-source propaganda, validating the assessment of the ME location. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: The critical decision point is the immediate activation of pre-planned reserve fire (Plan 7-A) due to the lapse in C2 reporting from TFR.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability Confirmation: SLON Heavy-Lift UAV New intelligence confirms field testing of the "Slon" UAV carrying 84kg payload over 10km (NerV/Groznye Ptitsy reporting). This validates the assessment that RF has rapidly deployed a capability specifically designed to neutralize UAF anti-logistics strategy.

• Tactical Intent: RF continues to utilize FPV and ISR assets aggressively at Pokrovsk (Somali reports) to destroy UAF fighting positions and suppress UAF reserves attempting to relieve TFR or restore M-30 access.
• Strategic Intent: Execute a highly coordinated operation: M-30 severance (operational paralysis) combined with a mass kinetic strike (strategic paralysis), reinforced by a persistent hybrid threat (internal instability).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed deployment and operational utility of the Slon UAV is the key adaptation. This system shortens RF attrition cycles, allowing forward assault units to maintain higher combat rates in contested terrain without reliance on traditional, vulnerable vehicle convoys.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Strategic: Confirmed readiness at 2652nd GRAU guarantees the strategic strike capacity. Tactical: Significantly improved resilience in the penetration zone due to the Slon capability. RF is prioritizing rapid, autonomous delivery of crucial supplies (ammunition, fuel) directly to the forward combat elements.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective and synchronized. The constant stream of combat propaganda (Somali Battalion) aligned with domestic normalization IO demonstrates centralized control over kinetic and cognitive domains.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF is in a severe defensive posture, facing the imminent possibility of operational isolation for units relying on the M-30 GLOC, combined with an impending strategic aerial assault. READINESS: C2 Integrity is the most critical constraint. The absence of TFR status risks a cascading failure in the Pokrovsk sector if supporting fires (Plan 7-A) are not immediately and aggressively applied. AD readiness is high but faces the dilemma of protecting C2 centers versus energy infrastructure.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

The successful UAV strike on Slavyansk-na-Kubani remains a positive pressure point on RF deep logistics. However, this is significantly outweighed by the loss of operational C2 concerning TFR and the imminent physical severance of the M-30.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate Counter-UAV/EW Targeting of SLON. The threat posed by the heavy-lift UAV necessitates dedicating tactical EW assets (CR HIGH (2)) to specific frequency bands associated with heavy-lift platforms, shifting focus away from general communications jamming. CONSTRAINT: The limited number of high-tier AD interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) imposes a hard constraint on simultaneous protection of multiple strategic C2/Energy targets against the anticipated mass salvo.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) are in the Pre-Strike Normalization Phase. The goal is to project unwavering domestic prosperity and military superiority while preparing the domestic population for potential escalation.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

RF IO activity is calibrated to boost domestic morale (DS Belief 0.2956) and project internal stability prior to the strategic strike, which often carries the risk of civilian or prestige losses that need to be mitigated in advance.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The persistent focus on internal political friction (from previous reports) combined with IO efforts to amplify instability rumors (e.g., "Peace Plan") indicates RF is actively leveraging perceived UAF political vulnerability to influence foreign aid decisions.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Kinetic Strike Initiation (NLT 230645Z): RF strategic missile salvo will launch, utilizing the full strike package from 2652nd GRAU, focused on fragmenting UAF C2 nodes (Dnipro/Kyiv) and essential energy infrastructure, maximizing strain on UAF AD resources.
2. GLOC Consolidation: RF 40th/155th OMBR, sustained by Slon UAV logistics, will repel UAF counter-attacks/reserve forces and establish fixed interdiction control over the M-30 GLOC, preventing UAF resupply and maneuver west of Mirnohrad.
3. Coordinated Hybrid Attack: RF intelligence services will execute a follow-on hybrid attack (CR HIGH (3) target) synchronized with the air strikes, likely targeting a second critical mobilization center or HVC-MI in Central Ukraine to maximize internal security force dispersion.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF achieves effective strategic paralysis through the successful degradation of two or more critical C2 nodes via the missile strike, preventing timely high-level decision-making. Simultaneously, the inability to regain C2 contact with TFR and the delay in implementing aggressive reserve fire (Plan 7-A) allows RF exploitation forces at Pokrovsk to execute a localized encirclement of UAF elements, creating a catastrophic tactical defeat that coincides with high national casualties from the air strikes.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Task Force Raven Command: EXECUTE CONTINGENCY FIRE PLAN 7-A (IMMEDIATE ACTION: 230430Z).

   • Action: Immediate confirmation of reserve fire authorization against the RF consolidation zone at M-30/T-05-15. Use counter-battery and saturation fires to deny RF the ability to establish static forward logistical nodes necessary for Slon UAV offload points.
   • Rationale: Preventing RF from normalizing control over the GLOC requires kinetic disruption now. Relying on TFR status confirmation is a failure condition; aggressive fire must preempt RF defensive preparations.

2. Air Force/AD Command: HIGH-TIER INTERCEPTOR ALLOCATION (URGENT).

   • Action: Transition all critical long-range AD systems (Patriot/SAMP-T) to full Anti-Ballistic Missile mode. Prioritize layered defense for the Dnipro and Kyiv C2 hubs. AD must actively deconflict interceptor allocation to ensure coverage of C2 and strategic nodes over dispersed energy targets.
   • Rationale: The threat timeline is confirmed (NLT 230645Z). Preserving C2 integrity is non-negotiable to prevent MDCOA.

3. J2/EW Command: DEDICATED COUNTER-SLON EW EFFORT (CRITICAL PRIORITY).

   • Action: Immediately task and deploy EW assets entering the Pokrovsk sector exclusively for active jamming sweeps of suspected heavy-lift UAV frequencies (CR HIGH (2)). Objective is not area denial but specific neutralization of the Slon's C2/data-link, forcing asset loss and degrading 40th/155th OMBR sustainment capability.
   • Rationale: The Slon UAV is the key enabler for the RF exploitation forces. Eliminating this capability rapidly increases RF attrition and halts their operational momentum at the GLOC.

//END SITREP//