Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS UPDATE

DTG: 230400Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 230345Z NOV 25 – 230400Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The RF Main Effort (ME) remains the interdiction and severance of the M-30 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) in the POKROVSK Sector. RF exploitation forces are confirmed to be consolidating positions necessary to establish fire control over the GLOC intersection (T-05-15).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Optimal operational environment for high-altitude ISR and strategic missile trajectories. Clear conditions favor RF tactical UAV operations, minimizing atmospheric disruption for the new Slon platform.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: Highly synchronized preparation: tactical consolidation at Pokrovsk (GLOC interdiction) coordinated with strategic strike readiness (Deep Rear). UAF CONTROL MEASURES: J3 authorization for Contingency Fire Plan 7-A is now the critical immediate operational control measure required to stabilize the Pokrovsk sector.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Critical Capability Update: SLON Heavy-Lift UAV The confirmed deployment of the 'Slon' UAV directly addresses the principal weakness of RF exploitation forces: tactical sustainment in a high-attrition, contested zone.

• Immediate Intent: Utilized for rapid resupply of high-value items (HESH ammunition, breaching charges, generator fuel) and accelerated Casevac/Medevac, dramatically reducing the attrition time-to-failure for the forward RF elements west of Mirnohrad.
• Operational Intent (Next 6 Hours): RF will maintain maximum kinetic pressure at Pokrovsk, relying on the enhanced sustainment to repel UAF reserves while simultaneously launching the strategic strike.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The rapid operationalization of the Slon UAV system represents the primary tactical adaptation, demonstrating RF’s capacity to deploy solutions that counter UAF anti-logistics success (e.g., targeting truck convoys). This places the burden of attrition firmly back onto UAF close combat forces.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Strategic: Confirmed readiness at 2652nd GRAU guarantees the strategic strike capacity. Tactical: Improved resilience due to 'Slon' deployment, allowing 40th/155th OMBR to sustain higher combat rates and improve survivability despite localized interdiction fires.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective and synchronized across kinetic, logistics, and information domains. The coordinated messaging campaign (Section 4) reinforces the synchronization required for a national-level strategic strike.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: The loss of contact with TFR and the imminent GLOC severance places UAF in an acute defensive crisis posture. AD units are at maximum readiness for the strategic missile threat. READINESS: Tactical readiness is now critically constrained by C2 confirmation. The absence of TFR status necessitates immediate activation of supporting fire plans to mitigate the risk of tactical encirclement or isolation.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

The failure to gain TFR status and execute the planned engagement before RF consolidation at the M-30 is the primary operational setback (230345Z). This window of opportunity is now closed, requiring a transition from preemption to disruption.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Electronic Warfare Dominance. The strategic priority must shift to aggressively neutralizing the 'Slon' heavy-lift capability. This requires immediate redeployment of available tactical EW assets to jam identified or suspected heavy-lift UAV control frequencies (CR HIGH (2)). CONSTRAINT: Limited time and resource allocation to address both the deep strategic AD requirement and the immediate tactical threat at Pokrovsk.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) are executing a sophisticated strategy designed to project Hyper-Normalization domestically and Geopolitical Alignment internationally, masking the high-risk operational environment.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

RF IO is actively working to suppress domestic friction and maintain morale through the continuous projection of success and stability. The high volume of non-military, positive content (DS Beliefs: Morale Boost 0.196) suggests an effort to mitigate domestic concern prior to any potential mass casualty event associated with the strategic strike.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The aggressive soft power push in the Balkans (Republika Srpska) indicates RF is prioritizing engagement with non-aligned or friendly states to break out of diplomatic isolation. This complements the existing diplomatic pressure exerted via the "Trump Plan" rumors.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Kinetic Synchronization: Strategic missile salvo initiated NLT 230645Z. The primary strike package will target previously identified C2/Energy nodes (Dnipro, Odesa) but will incorporate the Chernihiv region to maximize resource strain on UAF AD.
2. GLOC Attrition Warfare: RF 40th/155th OMBR utilizes resilient logistics (Slon UAV) to repel UAF counter-attacks in the Pokrovsk sector, successfully establishing sustained, permanent interdiction fire control over the M-30 GLOC.
3. Hybrid Attack (Follow-On): A second, high-impact hybrid operation (akin to the Odesa TCC incident) will be launched, synchronized with the air strikes to maximize security force dispersion and psychological impact, likely targeting a mobilization hub in Central or Western Ukraine.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The strategic missile strike successfully degrades multiple redundant C2 nodes, leading to fragmented command authority. This coincides with a successful defense by RF exploitation forces at Pokrovsk, resulting in the encirclement of UAF frontline elements reliant on the severed M-30. Simultaneously, RF IO successfully amplifies international political uncertainty, leading to the public announcement of conditional aid withdrawal by a key Western partner.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Task Force Raven Command: EXECUTE CONTINGENCY FIRE PLAN 7-A (IMMEDIATE ACTION).

   • Action: The J3 Commander must confirm that, due to lapsed C2 reporting, reserve fires are now authorized and directed against the assessed RF consolidation zone (M-30/T-05-15 junction). Commence high-volume, continuous fire missions to deny RF the ability to establish fixed defensive positions and interrupt Slon UAV supply routes.
   • Rationale: Fire superiority is essential to prevent operational isolation. Delaying reserve fires risks permanent GLOC severance.

2. Air Force/AD Command: FULL ABM ALERT AND NORTHERN/CENTRAL SECTOR PROTECTION (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Activate full Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) mode for all high-tier interceptor batteries. Dedicate layered AD protection to the Dnipro C2 hub and extend the immediate high-alert posture to Northern AD sectors (Kyiv/Chernihiv), reflecting the expanded threat geometry.
   • Rationale: The strike is imminent and the target set has broadened. Maximize defense of C2 integrity to avoid the MDCOA scenario.

3. J2/EW Command: DEDICATED COUNTER-SLON EW EFFORT (CRITICAL PRIORITY).

   • Action: All available tactical EW assets en route to Pokrovsk must immediately focus on SIGINT/jamming sweeps across suspected heavy-lift UAV control bands. The objective is to blind, confuse, or force the ditching of Slon payloads, specifically targeting RF sustainment rather than general comms.
   • Rationale: Targeting RF tactical logistics is the most rapid means of degrading the combat effectiveness of the RF exploitation force and forcing high attrition.

//END SITREP//