Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS UPDATE

DTG: 230345Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 230330Z NOV 25 – 230345Z NOV 25 PREPARED FOR: J2/J3 Operations Center

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The POKROVSK Sector remains the Main Effort (ME). The immediate operational environment is characterized by RF exploitation forces consolidating positions necessary to sever the M-30 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes. Clear, cold conditions favor persistent RF ISR and high-altitude flight trajectories, optimal for both strategic missile launches and tactical UAV operations (including the newly confirmed heavy-lift capabilities).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF is synchronizing tactical consolidation (Pokrovsk) with strategic preparation (2652nd GRAU readiness and expanded deep interdiction - Chernihiv). UAF CONTROL MEASURES: The critical failure to meet the 0300Z TFR engagement deadline necessitates immediate contingency fire authorization (See Section 7, Rec 1).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CRITICAL TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT: SLON (ELEPHANT) HEAVY-LIFT UAV FACT: RF forces have successfully tested and confirmed deployment of the 'Slon' heavy-lift UAV (Payload capacity up to 90kg, 15-17km range). (Source: Groznie Ptitsi, 2020733Z).

• Impact Assessment: This capability directly addresses RF tactical logistics vulnerabilities in contested zones, enabling rapid, short-haul delivery of critical supplies (ammunition, generators) and, critically, battlefield MEDEVAC, increasing the combat endurance and resilience of RF exploitation forces (40th/155th OMBR) at Pokrovsk.

Intentions (Immediate, Next 6 Hours):

1. Strategic Strike Execution: Initiate the strategic missile salvo (confirmed readiness at 2652nd GRAU) across primary targets (Dnipro, Odesa) and secondary targets (Chernihiv).
2. GLOC Hardening via Sustainment: Utilize new heavy-lift UAVs to ensure sustained tactical logistics flow to forces interdicting the M-30 GLOC, preventing UAF reserve fires from starving the penetration force. Confidence: HIGH.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The adoption of the Slon UAV indicates a rapid operationalization of high-payload tactical drones, prioritizing logistics sustainment and casualty evacuation at the tactical edge. This reflects RF recognition of UAF success in targeting traditional truck-based logistics near the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF strategic logistics preparation (2652th GRAU fueling) is confirmed and the strategic strike is imminent. Tactical sustainment at Pokrovsk is now assessed as higher resilience due to the deployment of the Slon heavy-lift platform.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is assessed as highly synchronized, demonstrated by the coordinated timing of the Pokrovsk push, deep logistics strikes (Artsyz), and expanded strikes (Chernihiv), coupled with IO synchronization (Putin visit, AD propaganda).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF is positioned in a reactive posture under acute time pressure. If the M-30 GLOC is severed and TFR status remains unknown, local units face a severe resupply and reinforcement deficit. READINESS: Tactical readiness is high, but the lack of C2 confirmation for TFR and the immediate threat of strategic missile attacks demand maximum decentralized initiative.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (IMMINENT): Non-engagement of RF elements at the M-30 by TFR (as of 0300Z NLT) is the primary operational setback, allowing RF exploitation forces critical time to consolidate.
• Setback (New Threat): The confirmed operational readiness of the RF Slon heavy-lift UAV increases the difficulty and required attrition rate for UAF counter-attacks in the Pokrovsk sector.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: COUNTER-UAS / TACTICAL EW. The new Slon platform, operating alongside tactical FPV and ISR assets, necessitates an extreme prioritization of tactical EW jamming capabilities focused on disrupting high-payload and long-range UAV command links and navigation systems in the Pokrovsk area of operations. CONSTRAINT: UAF resources remain split between kinetic defense of the M-30 and pre-positioning AD assets for the imminent strategic missile defense.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) are actively reinforcing narratives designed to induce Strategic Paralysis and Domestic Fatigue.

• International Support Undermining: RF IO (Slutsky, 221546Z) is amplifying reports of the imminent "Trump Plan" discussion in Europe, projecting Western uncertainty and preparing the domestic audience for a negotiated settlement perceived as favorable to Russia.
• Domestic Focus (Normalcy Projection): RF state media heavily emphasizes internal stability, economic growth, and cultural events (entrepreneur awards, budgeting, cultural centers). Assessment: This IO vector is designed to project a strong, stable Russia capable of weathering the conflict, contrasting sharply with RF narratives of Ukrainian collapse.
• Tactical Triumphalism: RF channels are pushing fabricated tactical victories (claimed Kupyansk "liberation," civilian evacuation near Pokrovsk) to demoralize UAF forces and justify the high-tempo offensive.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

RF IO is feeding the "Internal Political Fracture" vulnerability. Commentary (230135Z) suggesting the war will inevitably end in a political "dogovorniachok" (deal) is designed to sow cynicism among UAF supporters and political uncertainty within the UAF National Command Authority.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The explicit framing of the "Trump Plan" as forcing an emergency EU summit suggests RF IO is successfully exploiting anticipated fissures in Western solidarity, raising the risk of conditional aid moving forward.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Synchronized Strike: RF initiates the full strategic missile salvo within the next 3 hours (NLT 230645Z). Targets will include key C2 nodes (Dnipro), energy infrastructure, and confirmed logistics hubs (Odesa, Chernihiv).
2. GLOC Denial/Hasty Defense: RF 40th/155th OMBR elements solidify control over the M-30 and T-05-15 intersection, utilizing the Slon UAV system for resilient forward logistics and MEDEVAC, maximizing the cost of any UAF counter-attack.
3. Hybrid Follow-On: Execution of a second, high-impact hybrid attack (following the Odesa TCC precedent), synchronized with the air strikes to maximize security force dispersion and psychological impact.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The strategic strike achieves deep disruption of redundant UAF C2 infrastructure, leading to localized command failure. Concurrently, RF forces successfully repel UAF reserves attempting a counter-attack at Pokrovsk due to RF tactical resilience (Slon UAV sustainment), resulting in the stable severance of the M-30 and the operational isolation of forces west of the salient.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Task Force Raven Command: EXECUTE CONTINGENCY FIRE PLAN 7-A (URGENT - IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Absent TFR status verification by 230345Z, the Commander must authorize immediate, high-volume, pre-allocated reserve indirect fires (Artillery/MLRS) against the assessed RF consolidation zone (M-30/T-05-15 junction).
   • Rationale: The adversary has gained critical time and tactical sustainment (Slon UAV). Area denial is now the primary objective to prevent RF from establishing permanent fire control over the GLOC.

2. Air Force/AD Command: IMPLEMENT AD DISPERSAL PROTOCOL BRAVO AND NORTHERN ALERT (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Fully activate AD Dispersal Protocol BRAVO. Due to the confirmed strikes in Chernihiv, extend the high-alert, Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) ready posture to Northern AD sectors that protect Kyiv C2 and logistics hubs.
   • Rationale: The threat area for the strategic salvo has demonstrably expanded beyond the South/East. Full national AD readiness is required.

3. J2/EW Command: DEDICATED EW COUNTER-SLON/MPU-5 EFFORT (CRITICAL PRIORITY).

   • Action: Repurpose tactical EW assets already en route to Pokrovsk to specifically target suspected frequencies used by RF heavy-lift UAVs ('Slon') and advanced tactical comms (MPU-5 derivatives). EW must prioritize blinding RF logistics and MEDEVAC capabilities near the M-30 consolidation points.
   • Rationale: Degrading RF ability to resupply and evacuate casualties is the most effective way to slow down their consolidation effort and increase attrition on the exploitation force.

//END SITREP//