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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-23 02:58:46Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-23 02:28:38Z)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS UPDATE

DTG: 230330Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 230230Z NOV 25 – 230330Z NOV 25 (60 Minutes since critical deadline) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH (Threat kinetic projection) // LOW (Friendly C2/Engagement verification)


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The POKROVSK Sector remains the center of gravity. The critical Decision Point (DP) for Task Force Raven (TFR) to initiate engagement (NLT 230300Z) has expired.

AxisStatusKey Developments (230230Z-230330Z)Confidence
POKROVSK (M-30/T-05-15 GLOC)CRITICAL / HIGH PROBABILITY OF INTERDICTION.JUDGMENT: Assuming TFR did not engage NLT 0300Z (due to C2 delay or deployment speed), RF 40th/155th OMBR elements are assessed to have achieved or be within 1 km of the M-30 GLOC, placing the route under direct fire control. RF objective transition: Penetration to Consolidation.HIGH
ODESA REGION (DEEP STRIKE)ACTIVE STRIKE THREAT.FACT: Confirmed RF long-range drone strike targeting railway infrastructure at Artsyz, Odesa Oblast (222208Z). This validates the enemy MLCOA to suppress logistics and AD assets ahead of the anticipated strategic missile salvo.HIGH
CRIMEA/BLACK SEACONTINUOUS STRESS.FACT: UAV activity reported targeting Feodosia (222154Z), indicating RF prioritization of stressing UAF AD networks in proximity to potential missile launch platforms (Black Sea Fleet/2652nd GRAU).MEDIUM

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear and cold conditions persist. No change to assessment: optimal conditions for RF mechanized and persistent ISR/strike capabilities.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF exploitation forces are pressing the objective. The synchronization of the Pokrovsk push with confirmed deep logistics strikes (Artsyz) suggests the RF operational tempo is increasing in line with the strategic missile strike timeline (imminent, previously 12-24 hours from 211801Z). UAF CONTROL MEASURES: The critical failure to confirm C2 integrity in the previous period necessitates the assumption that emergency C2 bypass protocols are now active. Task Force Raven's status is the immediate operational uncertainty.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities: RF demonstrates synchronized kinetic action across tactical (Pokrovsk), deep logistics (Artsyz), and strategic (2652th GRAU preparation) domains. The efficacy of RF FPV/ISR, potentially including MPU-5 derivatives, remains a key enabler for the Pokrovsk attack. Intentions (Immediate, Next 6 Hours):

  1. GLOC Consolidation: Secure the M-30 interdiction, creating a stable, contested salient that forces UAF reserves to commit piecemeal.
  2. Strategic Strike Execution: Initiate the strategic missile salvo (fueled by 2652nd GRAU activity) targeting alternate C2 nodes, energy infrastructure, and forward logistics hubs.
  3. Hybrid Strike Follow-On: Execute the second low-cost hybrid attack (as predicted in previous MLCOA) to capitalize on missile strike confusion and rear-area security dispersion (following Odesa TCC precedent). Confidence: HIGH. The observed kinetic actions directly support the strategic intent.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF FPV forces demonstrate tactical proficiency, leveraging obstacles for successful engagements (221424Z). This confirms RF tactical capability is adapting to local terrain constraints, demanding continuous UAF counter-ISR and tactical EW application.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF strategic logistics preparation (2652th GRAU fueling) has reached a climax. The immediate sustainment for 40th/155th OMBR at Pokrovsk remains active, likely supported by short-haul truck routes established immediately following the initial penetration.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is assessed as synchronized for simultaneous kinetic operations. UAF C2 integrity remains the single highest operational risk and intelligence gap.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF has transitioned from a defensive transition phase to a CRITICAL REACTIVE PHASE. If the M-30 is severed, the operational objective shifts from counter-interdiction to high-risk counter-attack/relief operations. READINESS: UAF readiness is fundamentally constrained by the C2 status. Tactical units must operate under the assumption of C2 compromise or delay, emphasizing decentralized combined arms authorization and initiative.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Setback (IMMINENT/ASSESSED): The lapse of the 0300Z engagement window implies a failure to achieve preemptive counter-interdiction, moving the situation closer to the MDCOA.
  • Success (Logistics Defense): Confirmation that Artsyz was successfully targeted, but damage assessment is required to verify if the strike significantly degraded rail capacity.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: EW DOMINANCE. The sophistication of RF tactical comms (MPU-5 note, 222315Z) necessitates the immediate and prioritized allocation of UAF EW assets to the Pokrovsk sector to blind RF ISR and degrade maneuver C2. CONSTRAINT: High-value AD assets must be preserved for strategic missile defense (as per previous guidance), limiting SHORAD deployment flexibility against tactical UAVs/Shaheds.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO remains focused on destabilizing the internal political situation ("Internal Political Fracture") and undermining international support (Trump peace plan narratives, US ultimatums, European weakness).

NEW OBSERVATION (Socio-Political IO): RF state-aligned and nationalist channels are actively engaging in internal socio-political debates (e.g., migration, religious identity, arrests, 230125Z-0134Z).

  • Impact on UAF: This indicates that the RF IO apparatus is not solely focused on Ukraine but is managing internal morale by projecting strength through domestic security crackdowns, reinforcing the "Russia Strong" narrative while Ukraine is portrayed as collapsing.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The coordinated kinetic and IO pressure campaign (Pokrovsk, TCC attack, missile threat) is designed to force a perception of widespread security failure. Immediate, verified C2 stability and visible military success at Pokrovsk are required to stabilize domestic morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO is successfully amplifying narratives suggesting US conditions on aid (221103Z) and Western dissent (Trump plan debate). UAF failure at Pokrovsk or a successful strategic missile strike will immediately amplify these narratives, undermining the diplomatic stance ahead of key international engagements.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

  1. Strategic Strike Initiation: RF will launch the strategic missile package (Kinzhal/Kalibr/Iskander) targeting the Dnipro/Odesa C2/Energy/Logistics clusters. This strike will be synchronized with the peak RF tactical consolidation efforts at Pokrovsk (T+3 to T+6 hours).
  2. GLOC Hardening: RF 40th/155th OMBR will rapidly establish hasty defenses and minefields across the M-30 and T-05-15, making a UAF counter-attack exponentially more costly.
  3. Hybrid Strike 2.0: A second hybrid attack will be executed (likely targeting a TCC or rail choke point in Kyiv or Lviv) to disperse UAF resources and maximize psychological impact during the strategic missile strike.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Strategic Isolation achieved. The combination of successful missile strikes (disrupting primary and redundant C2) and GLOC severance at Pokrovsk leads to the catastrophic operational outcome: UAF forces west of the salient face localized supply failure, necessitating an uncoordinated and high-attrition retrograde or encirclement.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

TimeframeEvent/Decision PointTriggering Indicator
T + 0 Min (J3/J2)C2 Integrity / TFR Status Confirmation (URGENT): Receive immediate status report from TFR (Engagement Y/N; Location; Casualties).Failure to receive TFR report NLT 230345Z. (DECISION POINT: J3 Commander authorizes immediate activation of Contingency Fire Plan 7-A (Suppression of M-30 Corridor) using pre-allocated reserve fires, regardless of TFR status.)
T + 2 Hours (Air Force/AD Command)Strategic Missile Warning: Confirmed launch signature (SAR/SIGINT/IR) from 2652nd GRAU or Black Sea launch platforms.Detection of missile signature NLT 230530Z. (DECISION POINT: Air Force Commander implements AD dispersal Protocol BRAVO, prioritizing protection of high-value C2 and energy infrastructure with all available high-tier interceptors.)
T + 6 Hours (J2/Security Services)Post-Strike Situation Assessment: Verification of structural integrity of redundant C2 nodes and logistics hubs (Dnipro/Odesa).Structural failure reports or complete comms blackout in target regions. (DECISION POINT: Security Services Commander must utilize UAV reconnaissance teams to physically verify C2 node status and deploy tactical liaison teams to affected regions.)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL (1)Task Force Raven (TFR) Status: Has TFR engaged? Are they maneuvering? Are EW assets functional?UAV/Tactical ISR: Continuous monitoring (max priority) of the 5km radius around the M-30/T-05-15 junction to locate TFR and RF maneuver elements. Requires explicit order to focus ISR solely on this 5km box.LOW
HIGH (2)RF Strategic Missile Manifest: Confirmation of missile type (Kinzhal vs. Kalibr) being readied at 2652th GRAU.IMINT/SIGINT (Strategic): Prioritized effort to acquire high-resolution SAR or thermal signatures of outbound cargo/missile type at 2652th GRAU, informing AD posture (ABM vs. Cruise defense).MEDIUM
HIGH (3)Artsyz Damage Assessment: Extent of damage to the railway junction/logistics node in Odesa Oblast.UAV/HUMINT (Local): Immediate post-strike aerial reconnaissance and embedded HUMINT reports to determine if the rail line is interdicted, enabling rapid logistics planning adjustment.LOW

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. J3/Task Force Raven Command: EXECUTE CONTINGENCY FIRE PLAN 7-A (IMMEDIATE - 0345Z DEADLINE).

    • Action: Absent TFR status verification by 0345Z, the Commander must authorize the immediate and widespread use of non-TFR (reserve) indirect fires against the assessed RF consolidation zone (M-30/T-05-15 junction). Do not wait for localized TFR reports; assume RF success and initiate area denial.
    • Rationale: Preventing RF from digging in outweighs the risk of friendly fire if TFR is maneuvering. Area denial ensures the GLOC cannot be used immediately, buying time for TFR or reinforcement.
  2. Air Force/AD Command: IMPLEMENT AD DISPERSAL PROTOCOL BRAVO (IMMEDIATE PREP).

    • Action: Immediately place all Patriot and SAMP-T batteries on highest alert status, confirmed in Anti-Ballistic Mode (as previously recommended), prepared for imminent strategic launches from 2652nd GRAU/Black Sea. Cease all non-critical engagement requests using high-tier interceptors until the threat wave has passed.
    • Rationale: The confluence of intelligence suggests the strategic strike window is open. Preserving high-value interceptors for C2/Energy protection is paramount.
  3. J2/EW Command: DEDICATED EW SUPPORT FOR POKROVSK (CRITICAL PRIORITY).

    • Action: Reposition the most capable UAF tactical EW assets immediately to positions supporting TFR's likely line of counter-attack. The primary task is to saturate the operational environment with counter-ISR jamming, specifically targeting frequency bands utilized by suspected advanced RF tactical systems (e.g., MPU-5 derivatives) to blind RF fires/FPV.
    • Rationale: Overcoming RF tactical ISR and FPV effectiveness is essential to mitigating the "Dandelion" improvised armor advantage and allowing TFR to maneuver successfully.

//END SITREP//

Previous (2025-11-23 02:28:38Z)

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