Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS UPDATE

DTG: 230230Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 230200Z NOV 25 – 230230Z NOV 25 (30 Minutes) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH (Kinetic assessment) // LOW (Friendly C2 execution verification). The situation at Pokrovsk remains critical, defined by the speed of friendly force response to the RF penetration.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The critical axis remains the POKROVSK Sector, specifically the immediate vicinity of the M-30 (GLOC) and T-05-15 road junction.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist. Visibility and maneuverability remain optimal for RF mechanized elements and ISR assets. No mitigating environmental factors favor the defense.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF exploitation forces are executing penetration along the assessed axis, supported by persistent reconnaissance. Pro-RF social media chatter (230131Z) indicates localized high morale/focus on the Pokrovsk axis, confirming RF intent to maximize the operational window. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: Execution of the C2 migration protocol remains the priority. The defensive task is held by Task Force Raven, whose deployment and fire initiation status is pending verification. Confidence: HIGH (RF persistence); LOW (UAF C2/Task Force Raven execution verification).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities: RF continues to demonstrate synchronized tactical kinetic action (Pokrovsk) and strategic IO/Hybrid pressure. The adaptation of improvised armor ("Dandelion") enhances RF close combat survivability. Intentions (Immediate, Next 1 Hour):

1. GLOC Seizure/Interdiction: Achieve physical control of the M-30/T-05-15 NLT 230400Z.
2. C2 Node Identification: Persistent probing (SIGINT/UAV) to locate and target newly activated UAF C2 redundancy nodes, exploiting the current information gap.
3. Information Saturation: Amplify demoralizing narratives linking the Pokrovsk attack to political failure (supported by new IO traffic targeting UAF leadership and Western aid). (Confidence: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

No new tactical changes identified in the reporting period (0200Z-0230Z). The prior identification of improvised counter-FPV armor ("Dandelion") remains the key tactical challenge for UAF FPV/drone teams supporting Task Force Raven.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics supporting the 40th/155th OMBR exploitation remain active, drawing from the previously assessed high surge rate. UAF continues deep strike pressure (Slavyansk-na-Kubani confirmed previously), but this has not yet deterred the immediate tactical push at Pokrovsk.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is assessed as effective and synchronized across the strategic kinetic strike (now transitioning to C2 probing) and ground exploitation (Pokrovsk). UAF C2 effectiveness remains the Highest Intelligence Gap (CRITICAL).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF is in a critical transition phase from reactive defense (PSDA) to active counter-interdiction. If Task Force Raven has not engaged by 230300Z, the posture shifts to reactive counter-attack, which dramatically increases attrition risk. READINESS: Readiness is constrained by the unverified status of the command and control network. Tactical units may be prepared, but their ability to synchronize combined arms fire and reserves relies on immediate C2 confirmation.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback Risk (CRITICAL): The lack of confirmation of Task Force Raven engagement within the initial operational window (NLT 230300Z) constitutes a high-probability tactical setback, moving the situation closer to the MDCOA.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Verification of sufficient tactical EW support deployed with Task Force Raven to nullify RF tactical ISR/FPV guidance, mitigating the threat posed by the "Dandelion" improvised armor. CONSTRAINT: Urgent need for low-cost SHORAD deployment to protect rear-area logistics and TCCs against anticipated hybrid follow-on attacks (post-Odesa).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO output remains highly coordinated, focusing on:

1. Validation of Defeat: Pro-RF channels are generating content (230224Z) emphasizing RF presence near Pokrovsk ("приезжай в Покровск, у меня гранат лично тебе вручу") aimed at convincing local populations and frontline troops that the front is collapsing.
2. Discredit Leadership/Aid: New reports amplifying scandals involving Danish funding for a film about President Zelensky (230302Z) are designed to undermine international support and reinforce the "corrupt leadership" narrative previously seen (Odesa TCC attack, political internal disputes).
3. Moral Failure: General political mockery and demoralization narratives ("За что скакали дурачье?") target domestic coherence immediately following the kinetic strike/hybrid threat. Confidence: HIGH. The IO posture directly supports the ground objective at Pokrovsk.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is currently under maximum pressure, requiring immediate, visible military success at Pokrovsk and verified C2 stability to counter the coordinated IO/kinetic campaign.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO focus on discrediting Western aid (Danish scandal) suggests the enemy views international confidence as a critical center of gravity. UAF operational stability in the next 12 hours is necessary to preserve leverage ahead of diplomatic contact (e.g., US VP Vance engagement).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 2 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Interdiction: RF mechanized forces (40th/155th OMBR) will reach the M-30/T-05-15, establishing direct fire control over the GLOC, effectively isolating UAF brigades further west.
2. C2 Probing Escalation: If UAF C2 integrity remains unverified, RF SIGINT/UAV activity will intensify across known/suspected alternate C2 node locations (e.g., bunker systems, urban rear areas).
3. Follow-on Hybrid Attack: A second, low-cost hybrid attack (IED/sabotage/terror) targeting another soft mobilization target (TCC or critical municipal administration) in a different city (e.g., Kyiv or Lviv) to disperse UAF security assets and increase national alarm.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Strategic Isolation: Task Force Raven's counter-interdiction fails due to suppressed ISR (RF counter-FPV effectiveness) and delayed C2 authorization/support. RF successfully establishes a deep, secure salient, compelling UAF forces to execute a costly, high-attrition retrograde operation or face localized encirclement west of Pokrovsk, jeopardizing the integrity of the entire Donetsk axis supply chain.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Task Force Raven: IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT AND FIRE INITIATION (EXTREME URGENCY - 0245Z DEADLINE).

   • Action: Task Force Raven Commander must confirm commitment of all available indirect fire assets (Artillery/GMLRS) to suppress RF maneuver elements (40th/155th OMBR) approaching the M-30. Simultaneously, confirm EW asset functionality and tactical positioning to shield the friendly counter-interdiction force.
   • Rationale: Time is exhausted. Preventing GLOC severance outweighs concerns regarding GMLRS expenditure or localized attrition. The coordinated use of fire and EW is essential to overwhelm the observed RF adaptive tactics (improvised armor).

2. JOC/J2: C2 REDUNDANCY MANDATE (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: JOC must immediately revert to pre-arranged emergency C2 bypass protocols if C2 integrity is not confirmed by 230245Z. This includes activation of hardened radio nets and immediate physical dispatch of liaison officers to Task Force Raven and high-value AD assets.
   • Rationale: The current reliance on assumed C2 functionality is an unacceptable operational risk that validates the enemy's MLCOA of confusion and paralysis.

3. J3/Force Protection: REAR AREA HARDENING (URGENT).

   • Action: Implement Force Protection Condition DELTA at all regional TCCs, mobilization centers, and rail chokepoints not currently under the Delta condition. Allocate local SHORAD/anti-drone teams immediately to these sites, prioritizing asset protection over conservation.
   • Rationale: The previous Odesa TCC attack and ongoing RF IO/hybrid threat require preemptive hardening to mitigate the MLCOA of a follow-on hybrid strike aimed at maximal national demoralization.

//END SITREP//