Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS UPDATE

DTG: 230400Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 221600Z NOV 25 – 222359Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM. While the predicted GRAU strike phase appears to have concluded (All-Clear issued), specific Post-Strike Damage Assessment (PSDA) data remains limited, inhibiting immediate confirmation of RF kinetic success and UAF C2 integrity.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist, continuing to favor high-altitude ISR for RF PSDA and ongoing RF mechanized exploitation efforts in the Donetsk area.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF forces have transitioned from the 'Strike Phase' to the 'Exploitation Phase,' concentrating on maximizing ground gains near Pokrovsk while monitoring UAF internal C2 response. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: UAF transitioned into emergency defense posture as predicted. The effectiveness of the recently announced "systemic management restart in the defense sector" is now being tested under kinetic and hybrid stress. Confidence: HIGH

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities: Confirmed capability to synchronize strategic kinetics (GRAU strike) with operational maneuver (Pokrovsk assault). Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE):

1. Exploit C2 Confusion: RF seeks to verify the severity of the strike's impact on UAF command and control infrastructure.
2. Achieve Ground Objective: Immediately capitalize on the assumed confusion by committing remaining reserves to interdict the Kostiantynivka GLOC, seeking to isolate UAF defenders west of Pokrovsk.
3. Amplify Failure Narrative: Use Information Operations to exaggerate PSDA, focusing on perceived UAF AD failures and C2 instability resulting from the "management restart."

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed cessation of the immediate air threat (via all-clear signals) indicates the RF completed its initial kinetic fire mission or deemed the saturation ineffective for the immediate period. This places 100% of the operational threat focus back onto the Pokrovsk ground assault and associated Spetsnaz infiltration.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are fully committed to the Pokrovsk axis exploitation. Logistical movement supporting the 40th/155th OMBR (ammunition and fuel) is expected to surge immediately to maintain momentum through the daylight hours (NLT 230600Z).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective. UAF C2 effectiveness is in the Critical Test Phase. The seamless integration of tactical AD response with the strategic C2 "restart" is the key indicator of resilience. Confidence: HIGH

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF posture is defensive and reactive, currently in the crucial phase of assessing the immediate impact of the strategic strike and maintaining front line cohesion at Pokrovsk. READINESS: Tactical readiness relies heavily on local commander initiative and the resilience of dispersed C2 nodes (if primary nodes were struck). The political necessity of the C2 restructuring must not translate into tactical delay.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

The successful issuance of the all-clear signal, implying that the AD network functioned effectively enough to mitigate the threat, constitutes a preliminary success in the kinetic domain. CRITICAL SETBACK: The true extent of infrastructure and military C2 damage from the GRAU strike remains unknown, representing the immediate highest risk.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, rapid PSDA and damage mitigation (power/communications repair) in Kyiv, Odesa, and Poltava. CONSTRAINT: Allocation of limited ISR assets must prioritize rapid PSDA over traditional frontline intelligence gathering for the next 4 hours. Confidence: HIGH

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) will shift instantly to the PSDA narrative:

• Focus: Claims of successful destruction of key C2 hubs, energy infrastructure, and, specifically, Myrhorod Air Base assets.
• Goal: To amplify the perceived internal weakness caused by the "systemic management restart" by linking kinetic success directly to political dysfunction.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment will be highly fragile, awaiting official confirmation of damage levels and the response plan. Official messaging regarding the integrity of the new defense management structure is paramount to maintaining domestic cohesion.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Focus shifts to the upcoming Geneva meeting (Sunday, 23 NOV). Allies will require immediate, verifiable evidence that the UAF C2 structure remains intact and capable of executing defense plans despite the strike. Confidence: HIGH

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Interdiction Commitment: RF mechanized forces and Spetsnaz will launch their decisive, coordinated push to physically cut the M-30/T-05-15 Kostiantynivka GLOC, assuming optimal post-strike C2 disruption.
2. Immediate IO Surge: RF PSYOPS will release fabricated or exaggerated video/imagery evidence of strike damage (C2 nodes, power facilities) to maximize internal panic and challenge the legitimacy of the new UAF defense leadership.
3. Tactical Pause (Air): RF will enforce a temporary stand-down in strategic kinetic strikes (missiles) to allow for internal PSDA and reconstitution of the next strike package.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Achieving GLOC Severance: RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) successfully occupy and hold a critical segment of the M-30 highway NLT 230800Z, isolating UAF combat units west of Pokrovsk. If the UAF C2 restructuring is delayed or fractured by the strike, Task Force Raven reserves will not be able to deploy effectively, leading to localized operational collapse in the sector.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/JOC: GLOC DEFENSE COUNTER-INTERDICTION LAUNCH (CRITICAL - 4 HOURS).

   • Action: Immediately transition Task Force Raven (or designated reserve) from prepositioning status to active counter-interdiction deployment. Do not wait for confirmation of physical GLOC severance; intercept RF maneuver elements prior to them reaching the M-30/T-05-15 road.
   • Rationale: The RF MLCOA post-strike is GLOC interdiction. Preemptive maneuver is the only way to avoid the MDCOA of encirclement.

2. J2/Air Force: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND C2 REDUNDANCY CHECK (IMMEDIATE - 2 HOURS).

   • Action: Execute the pre-planned checklist for C2 redundancy activation. All C2 nodes that suffered a communications outage or physical damage must immediately shift operations to hardened, alternate sites. Dispersed air defense units must report status via backup SATCOM channels immediately.
   • Rationale: Validating C2 integrity immediately counteracts the primary RF hybrid threat (exploitation of confusion).

3. STRATCOM/NCA: DEFENSE MANAGEMENT AFFIRMATION (URGENT - 6 HOURS).

   • Action: Issue a public, joint statement from the Commander-in-Chief and the head of the new defense management structure (Svyrydenko) confirming that the AD response was successful and coordinated and that the chain of command remains effective. Use verified PSDA information to counter RF disinformation immediately.
   • Rationale: Controlling the post-strike narrative is essential to stabilizing domestic sentiment and reassuring international partners ahead of the Geneva meeting.

//END SITREP//