Sitrep 2025-11-22 15:05:27

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 221600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 221500Z NOV 25 – 221600Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The Russian Federation (RF) is executing a complex, synchronized multi-domain attack characterized by kinetic AD suppression across two axes, maintained ground pressure at Pokrovsk, and acute political C2 destabilization.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Axis	Status	Key Developments (221500Z-221600Z)	Confidence
POKROVSK (Kostiantynivka)	CRITICAL/EXPLOITATION.	FACT: RF IO (Colonelcassad) confirms Center Grouping forces are actively assaulting Pokrovsk and attempting flanking maneuvers in Dnipropetrovsk region. JUDGMENT: RF is validating the importance of this sector via aggressive information campaigns, confirming maneuver efforts aim to exploit the M-30 GLOC vulnerability.	HIGH
NORTHEAST AXIS (Sumy/Poltava)	HIGH ALERT/UAV SWARM (NEW).	FACT: Multiple UAV groups inbound from Sumy region toward Poltava, specifically Myrhorod (14:04Z, 14:26Z). JUDGMENT: This confirms a two-axis strategic AD suppression strategy (South and Northeast), designed to overload UAF air defense networks ahead of the GRAU strike, likely targeting Myrhorod Air Base infrastructure.	HIGH
SIVERSK (Zvanivka)	CONTESTED/RF IO PRIORITY.	FACT: RF sources (Rybar) amplify claims of Zvanovka liberation and encirclement maneuvers (14:30Z). JUDGMENT: RF continues to fix UAF forces in this secondary sector to prevent redeployment to Pokrovsk. Claims are likely exaggerated tactical progress.	MEDIUM
Deep Rear (UAF)	COUNTER-STRIKE SUSTAINED.	FACT: UAF drone-kamikaze attack confirmed by RF officials in Azarovka village, Bryansk Oblast (14:21Z). JUDGMENT: UAF maintains operational tempo in the strategic depth, forcing RF defensive allocation away from the frontline.	HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions globally favor high-altitude ISR and long-range precision strike, consistent with RF strategic intent.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF has successfully committed strategic resources (GRAU strike preparation) and optimized tactical distraction (dual-axis UAV deployment) while sustaining political destabilization (Kyiv protests). UAF CONTROL MEASURES: The National Command Authority (NCA) is attempting to proactively address the hybrid crisis by announcing a "systemic management restart in the defense sector" (Svyrydenko, 14:24Z). This is a critical C2 restructuring effort responding directly to the Yermak/NABU crisis. Confidence: HIGH

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities: RF demonstrates high synchronization capability in linking kinetic (UAV/Missile), ground (Pokrovsk assault), and political (Kyiv protest) domains. The ability to initiate a second UAV wave targeting the Central/Northeast (Myrhorod) sector is a confirmed operational adaptation. Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE):

Maximize AD Saturation: Overwhelm and exhaust UAF AD capabilities by launching UAV swarms on both Southern (Odesa/Mykolaiv) and Central (Poltava/Myrhorod) axes immediately prior to the GRAU strategic strike.
Capitalize on C2 Transition: Exploit the operational friction and uncertainty inherent in the UAF "systemic management restart" to increase the effectiveness of the GRAU strike and the Kostiantynivka interdiction attempt.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The inclusion of Myrhorod (Poltava Oblast) as a secondary UAV target demonstrates a tactical shift intended to protect potential GRAU strike corridors (potentially utilizing Iranian-supplied assets launched from the Caspian or deeper RF territory) by dispersing UAF AD interceptors geographically.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The impending strategic strike remains the key logistics factor. RF propaganda channels announcing urgent cross-platform C2 migration (14:21Z) may indicate an internal measure to secure communications channels ahead of the massive kinetic operation, reinforcing the readiness status of the 2652th GRAU strike package.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization remains OPTIMAL. UAF C2 effectiveness is in a state of deliberate, high-risk transition due to the announced "systemic management restart." This transition period (Next 6 hours) represents the greatest vulnerability to RF exploitation. Confidence: HIGH

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF posture is characterized by tactical resilience (continued deep strikes, active counter-offensive) but heightened strategic C2 risk due to the domestic political restructuring. READINESS: Tactical readiness is high. Strategic readiness is dependent on the rapid, seamless, and effective implementation of the announced "systemic management restart." Failure to quickly clarify the new chain of command risks immediate C2 degradation under missile fire.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS: Confirmed UAF deep strike into Bryansk Oblast. Successful diplomatic pushback by UAF/EU/Japan leaders against the immediate implementation of the unconditional "Trump Peace Plan," buying time for the NCA. Successful documentation of 79th Airmobile Brigade's combat effectiveness. CRITICAL SETBACK: The commencement of the dual-axis (South/Northeast) UAV saturation attack simultaneously with the domestic C2 restructuring places the UAF AD network under maximum stress.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid mobilization and deployment of low-cost AD assets (SHORAD/EW) to the Poltava/Myrhorod axis, supplementing the Southern Axis requirement. CONSTRAINT: The political necessity of restructuring the defense management (14:24Z) is consuming top leadership attention at the precise moment requiring maximum focus on operational defense against the imminent GRAU strike. Confidence: HIGH

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The IO focus has shifted from inducing political fracture to exploiting the confirmation of that fracture (via the "management restart" announcement). Primary Narrative: RF and affiliated sources are heavily promoting the "US ultimatum/peace pressure" narrative (Trump deadline, Geneva meeting focus). This is intended to frame the UAF C2 restructuring as a response to external defeat rather than internal anti-corruption or efficiency measures. Counter-IO: The joint statement by EU/Canada/Japan leaders explicitly stating the Trump plan needs revision and that borders cannot be changed by force (14:06Z, 14:08Z) is a major diplomatic counter-IO success, temporarily stabilizing the strategic information domain.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is volatile. While official channels are successfully using the Holodomor remembrance (14:02Z, 14:09Z) to reinforce national resistance, the concurrent confirmation of street protests and a C2 defense restructuring creates internal doubt regarding the government's stability under pressure.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmation of the Geneva meeting on Sunday (23 NOV) involving UAF, EU, and US delegations, coupled with the rejection of the immediate, unconditional Trump plan, ensures that Ukraine has a diplomatic buffer. The key diplomatic objective now shifts to ensuring allies support the newly reorganized UAF defense structure. Confidence: HIGH

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

GRAU Strategic Strike Launch: The missile strike will occur within the established window (NLT 222000Z), utilizing the current dual-axis UAV saturation (South and Northeast) to maximize the probability of penetrating key C2, logistics, and power infrastructure (Kyiv, Odesa, Myrhorod).
C2 Transition Exploitation: RF IO will simultaneously launch a specific campaign targeting the perceived failures or illegitimacy of the new defense management structure announced by Svyrydenko.
Kostiantynivka GLOC Interdiction: Mechanized/Spetsnaz teams will push hard to cut the M-30/T-05-15 road corridor immediately following the first wave of missile impacts, banking on widespread C2 distraction.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability Slightly Decreased by UAF Action)

Failure of C2 Transition Synchronization: The newly announced defense management structure fails to integrate effectively with frontline JOCs during the kinetic strike. This leads to slow, inconsistent deployment of reserves (Task Force Raven) to the Kostiantynivka GLOC, allowing RF 40th/155th OMBR to physically hold the GLOC cut and set conditions for the encirclement of UAF Pokrovsk defenders NLT 231200Z.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Timeframe	Event/Decision Point	Triggering Indicator
0-1 Hour (JOC/Air Force)	Northeast AD Reprioritization: JOC orders immediate SHORAD/EW redeployment/activation to protect Myrhorod critical assets and the Poltava/Central AD corridor, preserving high-value interceptors.	UAV swarm track prediction confirms Myrhorod or key infrastructure as the primary target NLT 221700Z. (DECISION POINT: JOC AD resource allocation shift to dual-axis defense.)
1-3 Hours (NCA/C2)	C2 Structure Clarification: NCA issues a detailed, televised update clarifying the new chain of command and responsibilities in the defense sector, linking it to operational goals, not political maneuvering.	RF IO campaign specifically targeting the 'illegitimacy' of the new management structure increases NLT 221800Z. (DECISION POINT: STRATCOM C2 affirmation.)
3-6 Hours (J3/Task Force Raven)	GLOC Reserve Hard Commit: J3 authorizes Task Force Raven (or equivalent mobile reserve) to move from 10-minute readiness to immediate preemptive positioning within 3km of the Kostiantynivka GLOC M-30/T-05-15, prepared to launch counter-interdiction operations.	RF long-range fires (e.g., TOS-1A, heavy artillery) surge near Kostiantynivka NLT 222000Z. (DECISION POINT: J3 commitment of the strategic ground reserve.)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Collection Requirement (CR)	Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - KINETIC THREAT (1)	GRAU Target Confirmation/Launch Origin: Verify if the missile launch originated from the 2652th or 260th base, and confirm the specific composition (Ballistic vs. Cruise/Hypersonic) to refine AD ROE.	ELINT/GEOINT: Continuous radar surveillance and satellite monitoring of 2652th GRAU and known launch sites in Southern RF to detect launch signatures and trajectories. (PRIORITY 1 - AD RESPONSE)	MEDIUM
CRITICAL - C2 INTEGRITY (2)	Effectiveness of Defense Management Restart: Assess whether the defense sector restructuring is being immediately accepted and implemented by regional and tactical commanders.	HUMINT/Internal SIGINT/C2 Traffic Analysis: Monitor internal secure communications channels for latency, deviation, or confusion regarding the new C2 directives. (PRIORITY 1 - C2 STABILITY)	LOW
HIGH - NE AXIS INTENT (3)	Myrhorod Target Confirmation: Determine if the UAV target set in the Poltava region is primarily the Myrhorod Air Base (military) or critical energy infrastructure (civilian).	ISR/UAV/EW: High-altitude ISR focused on the Poltava-Myrhorod corridor track, combined with EW detection of potential target illumination or guidance signals. (PRIORITY 2 - AD ALLOCATION)	MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

JOC/Air Force: DUAL-AXIS AD DEFENSE PLAN EXECUTION (CRITICAL - 1 HOUR).
- Action: Immediately transition to the pre-planned dual-axis AD defense posture. Move low-cost SHORAD assets to protect Myrhorod (Poltava) critical infrastructure and air base assets. Strictly enforce ROE to reserve Patriot/SAMP-T interceptors for ballistic or high-value cruise missiles impacting primary C2 nodes (Kyiv/Odesa) only.
- Rationale: The expansion of the UAV threat to the Northeast is a clear saturation effort. Preserving strategic interceptors while managing the low-value drone threat is paramount.
CINC/NCA: IMMEDIATE C2 RESTRUCTURE AFFIRMATION (CRITICAL - 3 HOURS).
- Action: The head of the newly defined defense management structure (Svyrydenko or equivalent designated official) must immediately issue a clear, joint directive with the Commander-in-Chief affirming the new chain of command and outlining specific responsibilities for the next 24 hours (i.e., defense against the GRAU strike and Pokrovsk defense).
- Rationale: Minimizing the window of C2 ambiguity during the physical kinetic strike is the most effective defense against the RF hybrid threat. Confusion at the top enables the MDCOA.
J3/JOC: GLOC DEFENSE PREEMPTIVE DEPLOYMENT (URGENT - 3 HOURS).
- Action: Advance Task Force Raven (or designated mobile reserve) to their designated forward operating base (FOB) near but not on the M-30/T-05-15 Kostiantynivka GLOC. Implement aggressive, continuous deep observation (IMINT/UAV) of the 5-10km interdiction zone and authorize preemptive artillery suppression fires on assessed RF Spetsnaz staging areas.
- Rationale: The tactical threat to the GLOC is confirmed and imminent. Prepositioning the reserve guarantees an immediate counter-reaction time, preventing RF elements from establishing a physical, sustained interdiction.

//END SITREP//

Situation Report