Sitrep 2025-11-22 14:01:35

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 221500Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 221400Z NOV 25 – 221500Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The Russian Federation (RF) hybrid campaign has successfully transitioned from strategic preparation to acute operational destabilization, evidenced by the activation of anti-government political protests in the National Command Authority (NCA) vicinity, synchronized with renewed kinetic pressure on the critical Kostiantynivka GLOC and preparatory UAV strikes in the South.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Axis	Status	Key Developments (221400Z-221500Z)	Confidence
POKROVSK (Kostiantynivka)	CRITICAL/INTERDICTION HIGH.	FACT: Confirmed RF claim of destroying a Ukrainian NRTC (ground drone) system near Kostiantynivka (12:59Z). JUDGMENT: RF forward elements are actively seeking to disable UAF automated defense and ISR assets securing the M-30 GLOC, validating the immediate physical threat assessment.	HIGH
SOUTHERN AXIS (Odesa/Mykolaiv)	HIGH ALERT/UAV SWARM.	FACT: Multiple UAV groups launched from the Black Sea are inbound toward Odesa/Mykolaiv regions (12:50Z/12:53Z). JUDGMENT: This confirms a pre-strategic strike maneuver to stress Southern AD networks and potentially clear the way for higher-value strategic assets (GRAU) or degrade port/energy infrastructure.	HIGH
Dnipropetrovsk/Donetsk	COUNTER-OFFENSIVE ACTIVE.	FACT: President Zelenskyy confirms UAF counter-offensive actions on the administrative border (12:57Z). JUDGMENT: Commitment of UAF maneuver reserves (possibly Task Force Raven) is confirmed, though the objective (flank security vs. diversionary attack) is unknown.	MEDIUM
SIVERSK (Zvanivka)	CONTESTED/IO PRIORITY.	FACT: RF MoD claims liberation of Zvanovka by the 88th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade (12:35Z). JUDGMENT: RF is committing named brigades to legitimize territorial claims in this secondary sector, fixing UAF 10th OGShBr assets.	MEDIUM

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear and cold conditions persist, favoring RF long-range precision strikes and high-altitude ISR operations. The maritime conditions favor Black Sea UAV launch and targeting.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF forces are optimizing the simultaneous exploitation of the internal political crisis (Kyiv protests against Yermak) and kinetic preparation for the strategic strike (Southern UAV swarms). Pressure remains constant across key axes. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: The NCA is demonstrating simultaneous political engagement (Dutch PM call, negotiation delegation decree) and kinetic response (counter-offensive announcement). The primary risk is C2 overload and decision paralysis due to the dual focus on diplomatic triage and domestic political survival. Confidence: HIGH

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities: RF intelligence services have demonstrated an exceptional ability to convert internal Ukrainian legal developments (NABU warrants) into physical, televised political unrest (Kyiv protest), achieving maximal destabilization effects. They maintain high readiness for multi-domain synchronized attack. Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE):

Maximize C2 Collapse: Use the internal protest against C2 leadership (Yermak) as immediate cover for the GRAU strategic strike, maximizing the chance of a disorganized AD response.
Pre-Strike AD Suppression: Utilize continuous low-value targets (Black Sea UAVs) to deplete or reveal the positions of high-value UAF AD assets in the South, anticipating that these AD assets will be crucial for the protection of key C2 and port infrastructure.
Kinetic Interdiction: Execute the physical cutting of the Kostiantynivka GLOC during the peak of strategic strike chaos.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed targeting of the Ukrainian NRTC near Kostiantynivka indicates that RF Spetsnaz are actively engaging in the suppression of robotic/automated defense systems before committing manned mechanized elements. This aims to blind UAF tactical response capabilities during the critical interdiction phase.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The impending 2652th GRAU strategic missile strike is the dominant logistics factor. Continued UAF deep strikes (Belgorod confirmation, 12:45Z) impose cost but do not delay the imminent strategic strike. Fuel and munitions for the GRAU package are assessed as ready.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization remains OPTIMAL. The immediate, visible translation of the NABU crisis into a Kyiv street protest demonstrates direct linkage between RF information assets and potentially activated deep-cover assets or IO-manipulated civilian groups.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF posture is characterized by tactical resilience at the frontline (confirmed counter-offensive engagement) but extreme political fragility in the deep rear C2 structure. READINESS: Operational readiness remains high, but strategic decision-making readiness is severely degraded by the internal political crisis. The dual strain of preparing a negotiation delegation and defending the homeland during an imminent kinetic strike is a severe constraint.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS: Confirmed launch of counter-offensive actions (Dnipropetrovsk/Donetsk border). Successful sustainment of counter-logistics pressure (Belgorod drone strikes). Positive diplomatic engagement with the Netherlands provides necessary strategic messaging stability. CRITICAL SETBACK: Confirmed anti-C2 leadership protests in Kyiv (12:36Z), demonstrating the RF's success in hybrid warfare and directly eroding NCA authority at a critical time. Loss of an advanced robotic defense system near the Kostiantynivka GLOC.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid commitment of additional, short-range AD systems to the Southern Axis to counter the UAV swarms without depleting the high-value strategic AD assets required for the GRAU strike. CONSTRAINT: Political necessity requires the NCA to focus on forming a negotiation delegation (12:47Z), diverting strategic attention away from the defense planning required for the GRAU strike and the Kostiantynivka GLOC. Confidence: HIGH

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Narrative	Key Development/DTG	Intent/Analysis	Confidence
C2 Illegitimacy / Street Action	Kyiv Protest reported against Yermak (12:36Z).	CRITICAL SUCCESS: RF successfully externalized the internal political crisis, demonstrating a breakdown in governmental control and amplifying the narrative that the current leadership must be removed.	HIGH
US Ultimatum/Peace Pressure	The Guardian narrative amplified (12:39Z).	Sustained Strategic IO. Maintains external psychological pressure on the NCA just as they announce diplomatic delegation formation, forcing the perception of submission to external demands.	HIGH
Tactical Success/Attrition	Zvanovka liberation claim (12:35Z); POW execution allegations (12:41Z).	Operational IO to fix UAF forces and Atrocity IO to create emotional distraction and reinforce the "existential conflict" narrative.	HIGH

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is facing a critical destabilization point. The confirmed street protests in Kyiv (12:36Z) provide concrete visual evidence of internal fracture, which will undermine cohesion far more rapidly than external combat losses, particularly as the strategic missile threat looms.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Zelenskyy’s announcement of a negotiation delegation (12:47Z) and the positive call with the Dutch PM (12:32Z) are necessary counter-IO efforts, but the focus must shift to ensuring international partners are fully aware that the internal political turmoil is a direct, orchestrated RF hybrid attack, not a genuine collapse of the unified government. Confidence: HIGH

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

GRAU Strategic Strike Launch: Missile launch will occur within the window (NLT 222000Z), targeting Kyiv/Central C2 infrastructure and critical power distribution hubs, immediately following or simultaneous with the climax of the Southern UAV swarm.
IO Paralysis Apex: RF IO will use the kinetic strike (missile impacts) and the Kyiv street protests (Yermak demands) in a coordinated media blitz to amplify the narrative that "Ukraine is collapsing from within and without."
Kostiantynivka GLOC Push: RF forward elements (Spetsnaz reinforced by light mechanized infantry) will attempt physical interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC NLT 222200Z, relying on the success of the pre-attack (NRTC destruction) and the tactical distraction caused by the strategic missile strike.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability Increased)

Successful RF penetration and sustainment of the Kostiantynivka GLOC cut, coinciding with C2 fragmentation caused by a direct hit on a primary/secondary NCA C2 node during the GRAU strike. This combination would force uncoordinated withdrawal of UAF mechanized forces from Pokrovsk, exposing them to catastrophic encirclement by the RF 40th/155th OMBR elements NLT 231200Z.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Timeframe	Event/Decision Point	Triggering Indicator
0-1 Hour (STRATCOM)	Political Counter-Messaging: NCA issues a public statement acknowledging the legitimacy of anti-corruption efforts (NABU) while explicitly condemning RF attempts to weaponize domestic legal actions to destabilize military C2 during wartime.	RF amplification of Kyiv anti-Yermak protest continues NLT 221600Z. (DECISION POINT: Public decoupling of military C2 from political legal disputes.)
1-3 Hours (Air Force/JOC)	Southern AD Deployment: JOC authorizes the immediate repositioning of mobile Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) batteries (e.g., Gepard, Avenger equivalents) to the Odesa/Mykolaiv axis to manage the UAV swarm threat, preserving high-value AD interceptors (Patriot/NASAMS) for the strategic ballistic threat.	UAV swarm sustains intensity/number near critical infrastructure NLT 221800Z. (DECISION POINT: JOC AD resource allocation shift.)
3-8 Hours (J3/JOC)	Counter-Offensive Objective Confirmation: J3 receives and confirms the objectives and resource requirements of the reported counter-offensive (Dnipropetrovsk/Donetsk border) to ensure it directly supports the Pokrovsk defense.	UAF maneuver elements report first contact/RF reaction NLT 222000Z. (DECISION POINT: J3 commitment of follow-on support fires/logistics to the counter-offensive.)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Collection Requirement (CR)	Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - HYBRID C2 (1)	Protest Coordination Assessment: Determine the coordination mechanism (RF deep cover asset, IO group, or genuine spontaneous protest) used to mobilize the anti-Yermak demonstration in Kyiv.	HUMINT/OSINT/SIGINT: Focused collection on internal political communications and social media to identify key agitators, funding, and command linkage for the Kyiv protest. (PRIORITY 1 - C2 STABILITY)	LOW
CRITICAL - KINETIC THREAT (2)	RF GLOC Force Interception Timeline: Estimate the exact time RF mechanized/Spetsnaz elements will attempt to cross the M-30 highway corridor near Kostiantynivka.	IMINT/UAV: Continuous high-resolution ISR sweeps of the 5km zone around the GLOC, focusing on thermal signatures and small vehicle movement indicative of rapid assault teams. (PRIORITY 1 - GLOC DEFENSE)	MEDIUM
HIGH - OPERATIONAL STATUS (3)	Counter-Offensive Status: Specific composition and immediate objective of the UAF forces engaged in the counter-offensive on the Dnipropetrovsk/Donetsk border.	BLUFOR C2/IMINT: Direct C2 reporting from the deployed unit to J3; confirm the unit's position and current effect on RF flanking maneuvers. (PRIORITY 2 - RESOURCE ALLOCATION)	MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

CINC/STRATCOM: IMMEDIATE PUBLIC DECOUPLING AND COMMAND AFFIRMATION (CRITICAL - 1 HOUR).
- Action: The President/CINC must issue a statement (potentially video-recorded) that explicitly separates the ongoing legal and political controversies (NABU, protests) from the military chain of command and warfighting effort. A simultaneous public assurance of CINC/Commander-in-Chief cooperation must be issued.
- Rationale: Neutralizing the political contagion is essential to maintain C2 integrity ahead of the GRAU strike and prevent the political crisis from affecting frontline reserve deployment orders.
JOC/Air Force: BLACK SEA UAV/SHORAD PRIORITIZATION (IMMEDIATE - 3 HOURS).
- Action: Immediately transition the defensive posture in Odesa and Mykolaiv from passive defense to Active UAV Annihilation. Prioritize the use of low-cost, high-volume SHORAD and Electronic Warfare (EW) assets against the inbound UAV swarms to preserve the limited stocks of high-value interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) solely for the incoming strategic ballistic/cruise threat.
- Rationale: The UAV swarm is likely a deliberate RF attempt to bait UAF into depleting strategic AD resources.
J3/JOC: KOSTIANTYNIVKA GLOC REDUNDANCY AND HARDENING (IMMEDIATE - 4 HOURS).
- Action: In light of the NRTC loss, immediately deploy redundant human ISR and electronic warfare teams to replace the automated loss near the GLOC. Simultaneously, Task Force Raven (or equivalent mobile reserve) must be put on 10-minute reaction status to immediately repel any attempt to physically interdict the M-30/T-05-15 road.
- Rationale: Protecting this GLOC is the tactical center of gravity for the Pokrovsk operation; its loss leads directly to the MDCOA.

//END SITREP//

Situation Report