Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 221400Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 221300Z NOV 25 – 221400Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The Russian Federation (RF) has achieved an acute breakthrough in the hybrid domain, exploiting high-profile domestic legal action (NABU warrants) to compound the threat of the strategic missile strike (2652nd GRAU). The primary risk has shifted from external pressure (Ultimatum) to internal political paralysis.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear and cold. The environmental conditions continue to favor RF deep strike and synchronized hybrid operations. No significant change.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF forces are pivoting all available informational assets to exploit the NABU crisis, confirming the prioritization of political destabilization over kinetic advances in the immediate reporting window. Kinetic pressure remains constant at Pokrovsk and Siversk. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: NCA attention is now severely fractured between managing the foreign ultimatum narrative and the new, explosive domestic corruption crisis. Operational focus risks being lost entirely in political triage. Confidence: HIGH

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities: RF demonstrates an exceptional ability to synchronize its IO efforts with actionable domestic intelligence/events, instantly weaponizing internal Ukrainian political disputes (corruption probes) to undermine leadership legitimacy. Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE):

1. Induce Acute C2 Paralysis (Primary Effort): Use the NABU warrants and associated corruption claims (Medvedev commentary, 12:27Z) to delegitimize the President and his appointed negotiation team (Yermak), thus preventing a unified response to the imminent strategic missile strike (GRAU) and delaying critical reserve deployments to Pokrovsk.
2. Sustain Kinetic Fixation: Continue aggressive action at Siversk (Zvanovka/Platonivka) to fix UAF 10th OGShBr elements and tie up ISR assets.
3. Prepare for Strategic Strike: Maintain high readiness for the 2652nd GRAU strike, exploiting the political chaos as the optimum launch window.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

CRITICAL ADAPTATION: The enemy has shifted from fabricating external threats (Ultimatum) to exploiting legitimate internal vulnerabilities (NABU probe). This is a faster, higher-yield form of hybrid warfare, placing direct stress on the rule of law and the legitimacy of the military high command during an active penetration phase (Pokrovsk).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The 2652th GRAU strategic missile threat timeline remains critical (expected 222000Z–230600Z). The confirmed fire at the Valuyki fuel depot suggests UAF counter-logistics capabilities are active, but this does not mitigate the inbound strategic threat.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization is OPTIMAL. The immediate, coordinated amplification of the NABU news across state media and political channels (Medvedev) confirms an integrated C2 structure prepared to leverage opportunistic hybrid targets.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Kinetically engaged forces (Pokrovsk/Kostiantynivka) are demonstrating tactical resilience, successfully repelling localized RF forward elements near the GLOC. READINESS: Strategic readiness is now critically degraded by the dual political crises (Ultimatum IO + NABU corruption IO). The risk of key command personnel being isolated or politically targeted during the GRAU strike window has increased substantially.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS: Confirmed neutralization of RF element near Kostiantynivka. Successful deep strike on RF logistics in Valuyki, Belgorod. Successful intelligence operation regarding release of Ukrainians from Belarus (12:17Z) provides a positive IO counter-point. CRITICAL SETBACK: The NABU corruption probe announcement is the most severe political setback in this reporting period, offering the RF a potent, factual vulnerability to weaponize against the NCA.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, unified messaging from the Ministry of Defense/Commander-in-Chief that isolates military operations and command chains from the ongoing domestic political/legal investigation. CONSTRAINT: Political leadership is now constrained by self-preservation and internal scrutiny, highly increasing the probability of delays in critical operational decisions (e.g., reserve commitment). Confidence: HIGH

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is likely to suffer a sharp decline. The NABU issue, unlike external peace rumors, targets core domestic issues (corruption, accountability) and threatens to undermine the unified national resistance narrative at a time when strategic kinetic threat (GRAU strike) is imminent.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Polish President Nawrocki's statement (12:03Z) refusing strategic concessions provides a necessary, if localized, counter-narrative to the ultimatum IO. The focus of diplomatic efforts must now include damage control regarding the perception of political instability and corruption in Kyiv. Confidence: HIGH

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Strategic Strike Launch: RF will launch the strategic missile strike package (2652th GRAU) targeting C2 nodes and energy infrastructure within the 6-hour window (NLT 222000Z).
2. Hybrid Overload: RF will sustain and dramatically intensify the IO campaign utilizing the NABU crisis, ensuring continuous media coverage and internal political division throughout the kinetic strike period.
3. Kostiantynivka Interdiction Attempt: RF mechanized/Spetsnaz elements near Kostiantynivka will attempt to physically interdict the GLOC, likely under the cover of the main missile strike (to suppress counter-battery/QRF response) NLT 222200Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - RISK INCREASED)

The convergence of internal political fragmentation (NABU crisis preventing cohesive NCA response) and the successful execution of the GRAU strike (degrading backup C2 and power) leads to localized UAF operational failure at Pokrovsk. RF 40th/155th OMBR forces successfully capitalize on this failure, cutting the Kostiantynivka GLOC and forcing the premature withdrawal or encirclement of defending UAF forces NLT 231200Z.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. NCA/CINC: SHIELD MILITARY C2 FROM POLITICAL CRISIS (CRITICAL - 2 HOURS).

   • Action: The Commander-in-Chief must issue a unified, non-political directive to all operational and tactical commands, explicitly stating that ongoing legal or political actions have zero impact on military objectives, chain of command, or reserve deployment schedules.
   • Rationale: Preventing political crisis contagion from reaching kinetic decision-making is now the single most important task. This message must be immediate to counter the RF's IO advantage.

2. J3/JOC: DETER AND DEFEND KOSTIANTYNIVKA GLOC (IMMEDIATE - 4 HOURS).

   • Action: Immediately transition the Kostiantynivka GLOC defense to Aggressive Interdiction Status. All forces deployed to secure the GLOC must utilize continuous, overlapping surveillance (UAS/Thermal) and be authorized to engage any unidentified personnel or vehicles within 7km of the M-30/T-05-15 road with maximum suppressive fire (preemptive fire authorization required).
   • Rationale: The confirmation of kinetic engagement near the GLOC means the window for preventing operational paralysis at Pokrovsk is closing rapidly.

3. J2/AF C2: REINFORCE AIR DEFENSE OF KYIV/C2 HUBS.

   • Action: Immediately re-task all mobile, high-value AD systems (NASAMS/Patriot/SAMP-T) that are currently positioned in Lviv/West to relocate eastward toward the Kyiv/Dnipropetrovsk region. This repositioning must be completed NLT 230200Z.
   • Rationale: The confirmed GRAU threat, coupled with the critical NCA vulnerability exposed by the NABU crisis, dictates that maximal AD resources must protect the National Command Authority structure against the imminent strategic strike.

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