Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 221200Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 221100Z NOV 25 – 221200Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. RF continues to successfully synchronize kinetic pressure and strategic deception, simultaneously leveraging high-level diplomatic activity to exacerbate UAF internal political friction.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear and cold. No change from the previous report. The environment continues to favor RF synchronized deep strike/hybrid operations, particularly if they are preparing to employ chemical allegations as pretext.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF forces have successfully tied down UAF resources on secondary axes (Siversk, Zaporizhzhia) while dedicating IO resources to justify future escalation on the primary axis (Pokrovsk). UAF CONTROL MEASURES: NCA attention is highly fragmented between tactical crisis management at Pokrovsk and high-stakes diplomatic consultations in Switzerland. The composition of the Yermak delegation indicates significant political resources are currently unavailable for full focus on the kinetic battle. Confidence: HIGH

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities: RF demonstrates synchronized multi-domain capability (Kinetic, IO, Diplomatic leverage). The ability to instantly link fabricated chemical weapon claims to the critical Pokrovsk AO suggests highly effective tactical IO coordination. Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE):

1. Forced Concentration (Zaporizhzhia): The confirmed threat to Stepnohirsk is intended to force the commitment of UAF operational reserves away from Pokrovsk, easing the RF exploitation phase there.
2. Establish Pretext for Escalation (Pokrovsk): The Chemical Weapons fabrication (11:03) is a decisive signaling mechanism. It is highly likely this narrative will precede the strategic missile strike (predicted within 12-24 hours) or the introduction of heavier thermobaric weapons.
3. Induce Strategic Paralysis: Exploit the high-level diplomatic meeting in Switzerland to amplify internal Ukrainian political disputes (Trump Plan rejection, corruption allegations 11:04) and degrade the domestic legitimacy of UAF leadership.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift in the Zaporizhzhia AO from purely informational claims (Haychur) to confirmed maneuver targeting Stepnohirsk's western flank (DeepState 11:04) represents a lethal adaptation. The RF is now using informational deception to obscure the location of the real secondary maneuver.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The intelligence from the previous report regarding the 2652th GRAU base (imminent strategic missile strike) remains valid and highly critical. The escalating IO pretexts (Chemical Weapons) reinforce the readiness assessment.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains EXCELLENT. Synchronization between tactical maneuver (Zaporizhzhia) and strategic IO (Chemical Weapons pretext, diplomatic amplification) is seamless and simultaneous.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF forces are tactically engaged and responding to confirmed threats (Stepnohirsk). However, the strategic posture is heavily compromised by the concentration of leadership resources on the Switzerland consultation. READINESS: Tactical readiness (e.g., C-UAS, localized defense) remains high in active theaters (e.g., Separate Presidential Brigade fundraising 11:16), but overall strategic readiness is degraded by the competing high-stakes diplomatic and kinetic demands.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS: Minor IO success in securing the transfer of 31 civilians from Belarus (11:13) and successful presidential announcement of "Winter Support" payments (11:19). CRITICAL SETBACK: NCA attention is critically divided. The high political cost of the Trump Peace Plan negotiations directly compromises the ability of the NCA to focus 100% on the immediate Pokrovsk/GRAU strike threat.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid redeployment and insertion of anti-tank and C-UAS teams to defend the western approach to Stepnohirsk to prevent encirclement. CONSTRAINT: Political leadership time (NCA) is consumed by external diplomatic negotiations, delaying critical tactical decision-making regarding operational reserve commitment. Confidence: HIGH

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal political discord is escalating and highly visible (Nahornyak's rejection of the Trump Plan 11:29). This fragmentation, combined with severe frontline pressure (Pokrovsk) and rear-area hybrid attacks (Odesa TCC, previous report), poses a significant risk to national cohesion.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The formal establishment of the negotiation delegation indicates a full commitment to managing the diplomatic risk posed by the US Peace Plan. However, the requirement to negotiate parameter modifications (11:12) confirms the plan's current proposals are detrimental to Ukrainian strategic interests. Confidence: HIGH

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Shifted Focus (Zaporizhzhia): RF ground forces (35th Army Groupings - 11:16) will intensify attempts to cut off Stepnohirsk from the west (validated by DeepState), aiming to secure a rapid operational gain in the south that forces UAF reserve commitment.
2. IO Pretext Complete: The Chemical Weapons fabrication will be amplified across state media (NLT 221500Z) to legitimize the imminent strategic missile strike package (from 2652th GRAU).
3. Pokrovsk GLOC Pressure: RF SpN/DRG groups maintain intense localized pressure on the Kostiantynivka GLOC to disrupt reserve deployment paths to the breach point.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - REINFORCED)

RF launches the strategic missile strike targeting primary C2 nodes and critical infrastructure (energy/TCCs). The high political workload of the NCA, distracted by the Switzerland talks, prevents timely, coordinated C2 recovery and Air Defense response. This operational delay enables the RF 40th/155th OMBR to achieve deep penetration (10-15km) west of Mirnohrad, rendering the Pokrovsk salient untenable.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/JOC: TACTICAL RESERVE RUSH TO STEPNOHIRSK (CRITICAL - 2 HOURS).

   • Action: Immediately divert the nearest available operational reserve element (at minimum, a reinforced company/battalion tactical group) designated for the Southern Operational Zone to reinforce the Stepnohirsk western approaches.
   • Rationale: The threat to Stepnohirsk is confirmed and kinetic. Preventing encirclement and forcing RF into a costly frontal assault is necessary to stabilize the southern sector and avoid drawing deeper reserves needed for Pokrovsk.

2. NCA/J2: C2 AND DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION (URGENT).

   • Action: Establish a completely isolated, redundant, and secure communications pathway for the Yermak delegation in Switzerland. Strictly prohibit the use of any military C2 infrastructure (Starlink, encrypted radio nets) for political consultation.
   • Rationale: Mitigate the MDCOA risk. Prevent RF EW/SIGINT from targeting or interfering with the high-value diplomatic talks, and ensure the kinetic response C2 chain remains uncompromised by political complexity.

3. STRATCOM/J2: PREEMPTIVE IO STRIKE (HIGH).

   • Action: Combine the response to the fabricated chemical weapons claim (11:03) with a strong, unified message countering the RF claims of political fragmentation (11:04, 11:29). The messaging must emphasize UAF political unity on the goal (rejection of non-sovereign peace terms) and link the RF propaganda directly to the imminent kinetic strike threat.
   • Action: Publicly acknowledge and commend the Verkhovna Rada's statement against the Trump Plan to demonstrate national unity and undercut the RF fragmentation narrative.
   • Rationale: Minimize the cognitive damage caused by the diplomatic distraction and neutralize the pretext for escalation NLT 221500Z.

//END SITREP//