Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS UPDATE

DTG: 220800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 220600Z NOV 25 – 220800Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. Synchronization between kinetic, strategic, and cognitive domains confirms RF adherence to the strategic paralysis timeline (0-24 hours).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

STATUS: POKROVSK AXIS: ACTIVE EXPLOITATION CONTINUES. RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) maintain high-tempo advance supported by Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) saturation fire. NEW INDICATOR (TACTICAL EXPANSION): Pro-RF military sources claim renewed, coordinated offensive actions near Krasnyi Lyman and Siversk. This is assessed as a potential supporting effort or diversionary thrust to draw UAF reserves. KEY TERRAIN: The Kostiantynivka GLOC remains the single most critical tactical vulnerability. Confidence: HIGH (Pokrovsk), MEDIUM (Lyman/Siversk combat status)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold, and stable conditions persist. Favorable for continued high-altitude ISR, guided munitions usage (KAB), and strategic missile launch trajectory (FACT: Previous SITREP). Confidence: HIGH

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: Strategic assets at 2652th GRAU remain in terminal preparation phase for MDCOA execution. Increased ground force activity is noted across the Donetsk front, confirmed by KAB usage at Pokrovsk and claimed advances at Lyman/Siversk. Paratrooper community morale signals potential VDV involvement or high readiness (Dnevnik Desantnika, 2204:01Z). UAF CONTROL MEASURES: Capital defense and AD conservation mandate remain in effect. Priority shifting toward rapid SHORAD deployment in the Dnipro operational rear. Confidence: HIGH

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF executes a multi-domain strategy: Tactical ground breakthrough (KAB support), Strategic kinetic action (MDCOA imminent), and Strategic Information Warfare (IO). Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE):

1. Tactical: Achieve physical severance of the Kostiantynivka GLOC.
2. Operational: Fix UAF reserves through simultaneous pressure (Pokrovsk/Lyman) while executing the strategic strike on logistics/C2 (Dnipropetrovsk/Kyiv).
3. Strategic (Cognitive): Achieve Internal Political Paralysis via coordinated psychological operations (IO). The amplification of Vance’s statements and the Zelensky/Yermak friction rumors are direct attacks on UAF resolve and command cohesion.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

CHANGE: The reported expansion of offensive activity toward the Lyman/Siversk axis (2203:57Z) indicates a potential shift from concentrated exploitation (Pokrovsk only) to a wider effort designed to stretch UAF defensive depth and force early commitment of reserves. CONTINUATION: The precision and timing of RF Information Operations (IO) remain highly effective, maximizing pressure on political C2 during the critical 0-24 hour kinetic window.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The high readiness state at 2652th GRAU (Strategic Missile reconstitution) confirms sustained logistical support for the MDCOA. KAB usage continues to stress RF tactical air assets but demonstrates sustained sortie generation capability. Confidence: HIGH

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is assessed as HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. Synchronization is maintained across ground, deep strike, and cognitive domains, demonstrating cohesive operational planning directed toward achieving strategic paralysis. Confidence: HIGH

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF faces a difficult defensive calculus: high-attrition defense in Donetsk versus urgent rear-area security requirements (Hybrid attacks, MDCOA prep). The potential for renewed attacks in Lyman/Siversk creates a critical resource allocation dilemma for J3/J7. READINESS: UAF remains combat effective but morale is under direct, targeted attack from RF IO (internal political friction, diplomatic doubt).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SETBACK: RF IO has successfully utilized internal Ukrainian political friction (Zelensky/Yermak split rumor) and foreign criticism (Senator Vance quote) to directly attack command cohesion during the critical operational period. SUCCESS: UAF STRATCOM is receiving immediate counter-signals (US Congress sanctions push) that can be leveraged, provided a rapid and definitive counter-narrative is issued.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most acute constraints are:

1. Reserve Allocation: Where to commit reserves—Pokrovsk counter-penetration, or to mitigate a potential Siversk/Lyman breakthrough?
2. AD Coverage: Optimized coverage of Dnipro logistics against the imminent missile threat while maintaining essential defense of C2 nodes in Kyiv.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

CAMPAIGN STATUS: PEAK DESTABILIZATION. RF IO efforts are now focused on simultaneous external and internal collapse narratives.

• External (TASS/Vance): RF uses high-profile US political dissent (Vance quote) to fuel narratives of Western abandonment and inevitability of Ukrainian defeat. (Goal: Undermine Allied resolve).
• Internal (Solovyev/C2 Friction): RF actively disseminates rumors of severe internal political strife (Zelensky/Yermak unfollow) specifically targeting the legitimacy and cohesion of the National Command Authority (NCA) during the MDCOA preparation phase. (Goal: Induce panic/collapse of domestic trust). Confidence: HIGH

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale remains stressed by the Odesa TCC terror attack and compounded by the strategic IO aimed at command instability. UAF STRATCOM must immediately counter the diplomatic friction narrative.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The report of a push for reinforced US sanctions (РБК-Україна, 2203:55Z) is a strong positive signal that must be amplified immediately to counter the TASS narrative based on Senator Vance's critique. Confidence: HIGH

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Kinetic Synchronization: Continued high-tempo KAB strikes in Donetsk (Pokrovsk) and likely preparatory fire activity in the Lyman/Siversk sectors to sustain multi-axis pressure.
2. Deep Reconnaissance (Terminal): Final deep UAV (Shahed/Orlan) runs targeting Category 1 infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kyiv.
3. GLOC Interdiction: Spetsnaz/DRG attempt kinetic severance of the Kostiantynivka GLOC between 220800Z and 221000Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic Paralysis & Multi-Front Breach)

The synchronized Strategic Missile Strike Wave (anticipated 220600Z – 221800Z) targeting C2 nodes and key logistics. This strike will be synchronized with a decisive ground push to sever the Kostiantynivka GLOC and exploit any success or reserve diversion caused by the supporting operations in the Lyman/Siversk sector. The strike is designed to maximize confusion alongside sustained IO attacks on the NCA.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J7: IMMEDIATE ISR SWEEP OF NORTHERN AXES.

   • Action: Immediately dedicate ISR assets (MALE UAVs, dedicated EW reconnaissance) to the Krasnyi Lyman and Siversk operational areas. Verify the severity and composition of the claimed RF advance NLT 221000Z.
   • Rationale: Prevent operational surprise. If the Lyman/Siversk action is a serious threat, UAF reserves must be partitioned immediately; if it is a diversion, all available reserves must be dedicated to countering the Pokrovsk exploitation and securing the Kostiantynivka GLOC.

2. STRATCOM/NCA: URGENT COGNITIVE COUNTER-STRIKE.

   • Action: NCA must deliver a high-impact, public communication within the next four hours (NLT 221200Z). The message must explicitly address the rumored internal friction (Zelensky/Yermak) by demonstrating unified command and decisively counter the narrative of diplomatic failure (Vance quote) by highlighting the sanctions push in the US Congress.
   • Rationale: RF is actively weaponizing C2 vulnerabilities. A rapid, clear, and unified response is the only way to defeat the psychological objective of the synchronized paralysis campaign.

3. J7/AIR FORCE: DEFENSE OF DNIPRO LOGISTICS (REITERATION).

   • Action: Confirm that the planned redeployment of mobile SHORAD assets (Terrahawk/MANPADS) to protect critical logistical nodes (rail hubs, energy infrastructure) in the Dnipropetrovsk/Pavlohrad sector is complete and operational. Prioritize protection of identified Category 1 targets.
   • Rationale: The MDCOA is imminent. The Dnipro region is key to maintaining operational sustainment in the East. Defeating the strike package here is paramount.

4. J3: GLOC SECURITY (TASK FORCE RAVEN).

   • Action: Task Force Raven must maintain maximum pressure and high-tempo defensive fire sweeps around the Kostiantynivka GLOC and its associated bypass routes until the strategic missile threat has passed. Reinforce engineer IED detection teams.
   • Rationale: Prevent the RF ground forces from achieving their tactical objective (severance) while the strategic strike is underway.

//END SITREP//