Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS UPDATE

DTG: 220630Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 220600Z NOV 25 – 220630Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. All indicators (ground exploitation, deep UAV activity, and synchronized IO) confirm the RF strategic paralysis campaign remains on the execution timeline (0-24 hours).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

STATUS: POKROVSK AXIS: ACTIVE EXPLOITATION INTENSIFYING. RF ground forces (40th/155th OMBR) are supported by high-tempo Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) strikes in the Donetsk region (FACT: UAF Air Force report). This saturation fire is designed to suppress UAF tactical reserves and enable the westward mechanized exploitation. KEY TERRAIN: The Kostiantynivka GLOC remains under imminent threat of kinetic interdiction by RF Spetsnaz/DRG elements. Confidence: HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold, and stable conditions persist. Favorable for continued high-altitude ISR, guided munitions usage (KAB), and long-range UAV operations (FACT: Prev. SITREP/Current UAV report). No friction added to RF offensive tempo. Confidence: HIGH

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: Confirmed shift in kinetic focus to pre-strike reconnaissance and suppression. Strategic missile assets at 2652th GRAU are in the terminal preparation phase for deployment/launch. NEW INDICATOR: Enemy UAV activity detected in the Pavlohrad district, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, indicating pre-MDCOA target verification or harassment in the operational rear (FACT: UAF Air Force report). UAF CONTROL MEASURES: Capital defense protocols remain heightened (Kyiv traffic restrictions). AD assets are operating under a conservation mandate. Confidence: HIGH

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF is executing a synchronized, multi-domain attack:

1. Tactical Air Support: Use of KABs to support breakthrough exploitation in Donetsk.
2. Operational Deep Strike: Employment of UAVs in the Dnipropetrovsk rear to test defenses or confirm high-value targets.
3. Strategic Kinetic Action: Strategic missile strike (MDCOA) remains fueled and imminent (2652th GRAU). Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): The immediate intention is to achieve Tactical Breakthrough and Strategic Decapitation/Paralysis. The UAV presence near Pavlohrad suggests infrastructure and key logistical nodes (potential rail hubs/industrial sites) in the Dnipro axis are prioritized targets alongside Kyiv C2.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

CHANGE: Shift in kinetic focus: The use of KABs over Donetsk provides close air support for the mechanized push, which is tactically more dangerous than unguided fire. Furthermore, the UAV activity in Dnipropetrovsk represents a specific tactical adaptation to prioritize a key logistical region for the impending missile strike.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The high activity at 2652th GRAU confirms readiness for the MDCOA. Logistics sustain the Pokrovsk exploitation (KAB usage requires high sortie rate). Confidence: HIGH

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective, successfully synchronizing KAB/ground exploitation, deep UAV reconnaissance, and the ongoing psychological campaign (FACT: TASS reports are maintained alongside kinetic actions). Confidence: HIGH

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF forces in the Pokrovsk sector are engaged in high-attrition defense under heavy air attack (KAB). Rear area security (TCCs, capital defense) is elevated but remains vulnerable to internal sabotage. READINESS: Deployment of new SHORAD assets (Terrahawk) is a critical capability improvement, but integration and optimized placement against the new UAV vector (Dnipropetrovsk) are immediate requirements.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SETBACK: The immediate threat from RF air power (KAB) significantly limits UAF tactical movement and counter-penetration efforts in Donetsk. SUCCESS: Deep strike capability remains intact (Slavyansk-na-Kubani).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint is the necessity to rapidly re-task mobile SHORAD assets to cover the Dnipropetrovsk/Pavlohrad threat corridor without compromising defense of Kyiv C2 and the ABM sites protecting high-value assets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

CAMPAIGN STATUS: PHASE III (DISTRACTION/NORMALIZATION). RF IO has entered a phase characterized by saturating the airwaves with low-relevance domestic stories (courier fraud, cloned calves) concurrent with strategic military preparation (FACT: TASS reports).

• Purpose: This serves two functions: 1) Normalizing RF domestic media during high-intensity operations, masking the strategic nature of the imminent strike; 2) Diverting global attention while the primary narratives (Political Weakness, Domestic Terror) continue to undermine Ukrainian morale. Confidence: HIGH

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment remains fragile due to compounded terror incidents (Ternopil/Odesa TCC). The strategic goal of RF IO is to ensure that when the MDCOA hits, domestic trust in the NCA collapses. The ongoing political "srach" remains a critical self-inflicted vulnerability.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO continues to weaponize rumors of diplomatic friction (Trump Plan) to amplify the feeling of abandonment, which the NCA must decisively counter.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Kinetic Synchronization: Continued high-tempo KAB strikes in Donetsk region to suppress UAF fire support and accelerate the mechanized exploitation towards Kostiantynivka.
2. Deep Reconnaissance: Increased UAV activity (Shahed/Orlan) in the Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Poltava regions, confirming coordinates for the MDCOA package.
3. GLOC Interdiction: Spetsnaz/DRG attempt kinetic severance of the Kostiantynivka GLOC between 220630Z and 220900Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic Paralysis)

The synchronized Strategic Missile Strike Wave (anticipated 220600Z – 221800Z) remains the MDCOA. Targets will likely include critical C2 nodes in Kyiv and high-value energy/logistical infrastructure in the Dnipropetrovsk region (based on current UAV activity), synchronized with a final mechanized push to secure the Kostiantynivka/Pokrovsk axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. AIR FORCE/J7: IMMEDIATE SHORAD REDEPLOYMENT TO DNI AXIS.

   • Action: Immediately re-task highly mobile SHORAD systems (e.g., Terrahawk Paladin, designated MANPADS teams) to establish a forward screen protecting critical logistical nodes and high-value energy infrastructure within the Dnipropetrovsk/Pavlohrad Operational Area.
   • Rationale: The confirmed UAV presence indicates this area is a high-priority target for the MDCOA. Utilize SHORAD/MANPADS to defeat tactical reconnaissance and harassing drones, thus conserving high-value ABM interceptors for the anticipated ballistic and cruise missile threat wave.

2. J3/AIR FORCE: COUNTER-KAB AIR DEFENSE PROTOCOLS.

   • Action: Implement aggressive electronic warfare (EW) jamming profiles (UAF-EW assets) focused on degrading the guidance systems of launched KABs along the Pokrovsk Axis. Increase fighter patrols authorized for high-speed intercept to disrupt the launch platforms.
   • Rationale: Reduce the efficacy of heavy KAB strikes that are enabling RF mechanized exploitation and severely degrading defensive positions.

3. J3/J4: DEFENSIVE FIRE FOR GLOC SECURITY (CONTINUED).

   • Action: Task Force Raven must maintain aggressive, pre-emptive fire sweeps in the 5km vicinity of the Kostiantynivka GLOC (NLT 220700Z). Reinforce the route with dedicated engineer and EOD teams focused on IED interdiction.
   • Rationale: Prevent physical severance of the main operational supply route during the critical 0-2 hour window.

4. STRATCOM/NCA: IMMEDIATE NATIONAL UNITY ADDRESS (D-IO Countermeasure).

   • Action: NCA must deliver an urgent, televised address within the next four hours. The address must directly address the domestic political disputes and the TASS diplomatic fiction, refocusing the public narrative on unified resistance against state terrorism and military aggression.
   • Rationale: Counter the synchronized RF IO designed to achieve psychological collapse and prevent internal political fracturing before the strategic missile strike hits.

//END SITREP//