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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-22 01:04:08Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-21 15:40:02Z)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS UPDATE

DTG: 220130Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 212100Z NOV 25 – 220100Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. Synchronization between kinetic, hybrid, and information operations remains the singular challenge. UAF long-range strike capability is confirmed effective, but requires integration into counter-IO efforts.


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

STATUS: POKROVSK AXIS: ACTIVE EXPLOITATION. The operational breach west of Mirnohrad remains the main effort (ME). Defensive maneuvering focuses on preventing the 40th/155th OMBR from achieving full operational depth. KEY TERRAIN (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY): The Kostiantynivka Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) remains under direct and immediate threat of RF Spetsnaz (SpN) interdiction.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear and cold conditions persist. Favorable for RF ISR/FPV coverage, strategic missile launch, and UAF deep-strike drone operations. No operational change.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF forces are actively utilizing simultaneous long-range UAV strikes (Shahed/Geran) against Southern logistics hubs (Odesa Oblast) while maintaining pressure on the Pokrovsk ME. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: UAF Air Force is tracking active enemy UAV groups in three primary sectors: Zaporizhzhia (Recon/Strike), and Southern Odesa Oblast (Izmail/Orlivka axis). Internal security posture (TCC protection) has been escalated.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrates decisive capacity to strike deep targets while simultaneously executing a complex multi-domain offensive (Kinetic, Hybrid, IO). Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE):

  1. Immediate Kinetic Interdiction (0-6 hours): Secure physical interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC.
  2. Psychological Shock (0-24 hours): Execute the strategic missile strike wave (from 2652th/260th GRAU assets) synchronized with intensified internal security/hybrid attacks (e.g., TCC attacks) to force operational collapse or disadvantageous negotiation.
  3. IO Amplification: Sustain maximum pressure on UAF leadership via "Trump Plan" narratives (TASS) and mocking international support (Macron meme) to foster a sense of isolation and inevitability.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

UAV Concentration Shift (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The current Shahed group track (moving past Izmail toward Novoselskoe/Orlivka) suggests high-value targeting of critical Danube River logistics or military assembly areas near the border, potentially signaling a resource diversion from frontline support to strategic interdiction.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF Logistics (CRITICAL - IMMINENT): SAR data confirming the accelerated reconstitution rate at the 2652th Artillery Armament and Ammunition Base remains the singular indicator of the imminent strategic strike wave (12-24 hours window). UAF Logistics: Critical focus remains on the survivability of the Kostiantynivka GLOC, which is currently assessed as having an approximately 4-hour window before high-probability SpN engagement.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

STRATEGIC C2: RF C2 continues to excel in inter-domain synchronization (Kinetic-IO). Tactical C2 remains adequate, evidenced by sustained pressure west of Mirnohrad.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Ground: Forces are defensively focused but must be ready to commit mobile reserves to internal security (anti-hybrid) and GLOC protection, potentially thinning the immediate Pokrovsk line. Air Defense: AD assets are currently managing active drone raids in Zaporizhzhia and Southern Odesa. Readiness must prioritize transitioning to Anti-Ballistic Mode to mitigate the anticipated strategic missile strike (MDCOA).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success (STRATEGIC): UAF successfully executed a deep-strike mission (UAV/Drone) against targets in the Saratov and Engels region. This strike is significant as the Engels area hosts critical RF strategic aviation assets (Engels-2). This confirms UAF capability to sustain pressure on strategic assets in the deep rear. Setback (TACTICAL/SECURITY): Active and immediate UAV threat is confirmed over critical areas (Zaporizhzhia, Izmail/Orlivka). The confirmed prior TCC attack in Odesa requires maximal internal force protection commitment.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

  1. Air Defense: Immediate need for optimal deployment of high-value interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) to protect C2 and energy infrastructure in anticipation of the strategic missile strike.
  2. Internal Security: Dedicated counter-sabotage/anti-terrorism teams must be deployed to TCCs and mobilization nodes, accepting a temporary diversion of tactical intelligence assets.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Primary Vector (ISOLATION/CORRUPTION): RF IO is intensifying the narrative that UAF political leadership is internally fractured and susceptible to foreign pressure. The TASS report linking Zelensky accepting the "Trump Plan" to an alleged "corruption scandal" (220101Z NOV) is a direct psychological operation aimed at delegating legitimacy and increasing public mistrust. RF Domestic IO: RF internal messaging focuses on the high moral and spiritual support for troops (patriotic concert) and domestic law enforcement crackdowns on corruption related to military personnel (arrests for extorting SMO participants). This aims to portray the RF state as strong and morally justified.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is highly vulnerable to the combined effects of frontline kinetic pressure, internal security breaches (Odesa TCC), and amplified diplomatic/political uncertainty. The successful deep strike on Saratov/Engels provides a critical, immediate counter-narrative for UAF Strategic Communications (STRATCOM).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO is actively attempting to sabotage UAF European support (mocking Macron). The sustained focus on the "US Peace Plan" and the reported US/UAF high-level contacts suggest that diplomatic pressure remains a major operational factor.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

  1. GLOC Interdiction (IMMEDIATE): RF Spetsnaz/DRG elements will attempt high-value kinetic attacks on logistics convoys or critical choke points along the Kostiantynivka GLOC between 220130Z and 220500Z (based on previous assessment and persistent threat).
  2. Targeted Drone Strikes: The current active Shahed/Geran strike group targeting Southern Odesa Oblast (Izmail/Orlivka) and Zaporizhzhia will culminate in kinetic impact or interception by 220330Z. Targets are likely logistics nodes, C2, or critical infrastructure.
  3. IO Amplification: RF media will extensively exploit the "corruption/Trump Plan" narrative via state media and affiliated Telegram channels to force a public reaction.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic Paralysis)

The MDCOA remains the synchronized Strategic Missile Strike Wave (anticipated 220600Z – 221800Z), executed by assets loaded at the 2652th/260th GRAU bases.

  • Trigger: Successful sustained interdiction (T>6 hours) of the Kostiantynivka GLOC, or perception of tactical success west of Mirnohrad.
  • Objective: Overwhelm UAF Air Defense and achieve mass disruption of C2 and national power grid, forcing immediate capitulation under maximum duress.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

TimeframeEvent/Decision PointTriggering Indicator
0-4 Hours (J3/J4)CRITICAL GLOC INTERDICTION WINDOW: SpN initiates kinetic action on Kostiantynivka route.Confirmed ELINT/RECON activity within 5km of the route; loss of contact with forward GLOC security patrols. (DECISION POINT: Immediate commitment of Task Force Raven/Mobile Reserve for search-and-destroy missions along GLOC corridor; Initiate emergency routing for all priority convoys.)
0-2 Hours (Air Force/J2)UAV Strike Resolution: Air defense intercepts or ground impacts in Zaporizhzhia/Izmail corridor.Confirmation of BDA or successful downing of active UAV groups. (DECISION POINT: Initiate Passive Mode on high-value AD systems in preparation for MDCOA; Reallocate short-range AD to critical deep-rear TCC/mobilization targets.)
12-24 Hours (Air Force/J2)MDCOA Trigger/Execution Window: SAR/IMINT confirms TEL dispersal from 2652th GRAU; Detection of Russian long-range missile launch radar signatures.SAR score continues to rise above 25; detection of simultaneous ballistic/cruise missile launches. (DECISION POINT: Execute full AD dispersal protocol (Passive Mode); initiate pre-planned retaliatory targeting protocols on confirmed launch/assembly sites, leveraging Saratov/Engels strike capability.)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - STRIKE TARGETING (1)2652th GRAU Cargo Characterization: Specific identification of missile types (Kinzhal/Iskander/Kalibr) to optimize AD asset deployment and prioritization.SAR/IMINT (2652th Artillery Armament Base): Persistent high-resolution overhead imagery focused on TEL staging areas and associated service vehicle profiles. (PRIORITY 1)LOW
CRITICAL - HYBRID THREAT (2)Odesa TCC Incident Forensics: Determine the mechanism and perpetrator of the explosion (IED vs. internal agent/drone) to rapidly implement effective counter-sabotage protocols for all TCCs.HUMINT/Internal Security Investigation (Odesa): Rapid BDA and forensic analysis; increased local HUMINT gathering around Tier 2/3 city mobilization points. (PRIORITY 2)LOW
HIGH - TACTICAL INTENT (3)RF SpN Infiltration Depth: Precise location and intended targeting segments of RF Spetsnaz groups operating in the Kostiantynivka GLOC rear area.RECON/EW Intercept (Kostiantynivka Corridor): Continuous dedicated drone ISR coverage and ground patrols focusing on short-burst RF communications and thermal signatures. (PRIORITY 2)MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. J3/J4: IMMEDIATE LOGISTICS SECURITY (GLOC RED STATUS).

    • Action: Task Force Raven (Mobile Reserve) must be deployed immediately to conduct aggressive counter-Spetsnaz sweeps along the Kostiantynivka GLOC (M-30/T-05-15 route). Utilize armored route clearance packages ahead of all priority convoys. Establish EW denial zones over critical choke points.
    • Rationale: GLOC failure remains the highest kinetic risk that could precipitate the MDCOA.
  2. AIR FORCE/J2: AD TRANSITION PROTOCOL (URGENT).

    • Action: Immediately transition high-value Air Defense assets (Patriot/SAMP-T) to Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Mode and prioritize defense of National Command Authority (NCA) and strategic energy infrastructure ahead of the anticipated strategic strike (12-24 hour window). Utilize lower-value short-range AD for drone engagement in active sectors (Zaporizhzhia, Odesa).
    • Rationale: The threat from the 2652th GRAU stockpile supersedes current residual drone threats; AD assets must be positioned for strategic defense.
  3. STRATCOM/J5: COUNTER-NARRATIVE EXECUTION (MAXIMUM EFFORT).

    • Action: Immediately leverage the confirmed successful deep strike on Saratov/Engels (strategic target) to create a powerful, nationally broadcast counter-narrative. Frame this success as UAF resilience and effectiveness, directly countering the RF narrative of isolation, military failure, and political instability ("Trump Plan" rumors). Amplify President Zelensky’s unity message.
    • Rationale: Proactive counter-IO using confirmed success is necessary to stabilize morale and prevent cognitive paralysis caused by hybrid threats and diplomatic pressure.
  4. J2/SECURITY SERVICES: TCC HARDENING (IMMEDIATE).

    • Action: Implement Force Protection Condition DELTA (Highest Alert) for all TCCs and critical mobilization centers in Tier 2/3 cities (Kyiv, Dnipro, Odesa, Lviv). Focus resources on anti-IED measures, perimeter hardening, and strict access control, assuming follow-on hybrid attacks are imminent.
    • Rationale: Prevent further disruption of mobilization efforts and societal panic following the Odesa incident.

//END SITREP//

Previous (2025-11-21 15:40:02Z)

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