Archived operational intelligence briefing
DTG: 212100Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 211500Z NOV 25 – 212100Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. New information strongly confirms RF intent to achieve operational depth and political paralysis simultaneously. The focus remains on the critical Kostiantynivka GLOC and maintaining internal political cohesion.
STATUS: POKROVSK AXIS: ACTIVE EXPLOITATION. The operational breach west of Mirnohrad remains the main effort (ME). UAF forces are engaged in defensive maneuvers to contain the penetration by the 40th/155th OMBR elements. KEY TERRAIN (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY): The Kostiantynivka Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) is currently under maximum threat of Spetsnaz (SpN) interdiction. This road network is the arterial supply for the entire UAF salient defense.
Clear, cold conditions persist, enabling RF ISR/FPV coverage and favorable ground movement for mechanized exploitation forces. No operational change.
RF DISPOSITIONS: RF forces are continuing to press for operational depth and are highly synchronized with strategic-level Information Operations (IO). UAF CONTROL MEASURES: UAF National Command Authority (NCA) has shifted its primary effort in the cognitive domain to internal stabilization and counter-IO. Public messaging confirms a zero-tolerance stance toward political infighting, recognizing it as a critical operational vulnerability being exploited by the enemy.
Capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrates decisive action in synchronizing tactical gains with aggressive political warfare and deep-rear hybrid threats. The enemy is exploiting UAF internal political friction (as evidenced by Zelensky's public address). Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE):
The most significant adaptation is the immediate and highly aggressive use of personalized IO attacks against UAF leadership (Zelensky) following the public address, suggesting RF IO cells are prepared to weaponize any perceived internal UAF weakness instantly.
RF Logistics: Activity at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base confirms preparation for a strategic strike wave (24-48 hours). The impact of UAF deep-strike rail sabotage (Perm/Sverdlovsk) and Lithuanian transit halts is likely being mitigated by increased road transport, increasing the logistical burden but not yet neutralizing the strike capability. UAF Logistics: GLOC security is the singular, non-negotiable logistical requirement for sustainment of the defensive operation.
STRATEGIC C2: EXTREMELY HIGH. RF C2 demonstrates immediate, effective synchronization of kinetic action, strategic messaging (Putin/Security Council), and target acquisition (UAF political fracture points). Tactical C2 remains adequate.
Ground: Forces are critically focused on preventing a kinetic breakthrough on the Pokrovsk axis. Readiness must prioritize rapid response to GLOC interdiction threats. Political/IO Posture (CRITICAL UPDATE): President Zelensky's public address confirms the severity of internal political infighting ("припинити срач") but provides an explicit directive to end internal disputes and maintain unity. The rapid communication with US Vice President Vance indicates high-level diplomatic attempts to manage external political pressure.
Success: UAF NCA’s immediate and forceful political stance against internal division mitigates the primary RF cognitive objective. Setback: Confirmed explosion incident at a TCC in Odesa resulting in a fatality. This is a critical indicator of increased RF hybrid/internal security operations aimed at eroding public confidence in mobilization efforts in the deep rear.
RF Primary Vector (PARALYSIS/ISOLATION): RF IO is escalating the personalized attack against Zelensky, portraying him as isolated ("placed in a sandwich") and cornered by US diplomatic demands. They aim to convince both the Western audience and the UAF population that the war is unwinnable and negotiations (capitulation) are imminent. UAF Counter-IO: Zelensky’s message ("We are not betraying Ukraine") and the immediate call for unity serve as a critical counter-narrative, attempting to seize the initiative in the cognitive domain by addressing internal weaknesses directly.
Morale is severely tested by the combined kinetic (Pokrovsk breach) and diplomatic (US pressure) events. The internal political infighting is confirmed to be the primary domestic vulnerability. Failure to secure the GLOC would validate RF narratives of military collapse.
The immediate dialogue between Zelensky and US VP Vance (J.D. Vance) confirms high-level US engagement, but the nature of the conversation is assessed to be highly focused on the peace proposal and the Pokrovsk crisis. This reinforces the need for UAF diplomatic efforts to stabilize non-US European support.
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - TIME CRITICAL)
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis)
The MDCOA remains the synchronized Strategic Missile Strike Wave (as indicated by 260th GRAU activity) targeting UAF NCA, critical energy nodes, and military reserve assembly areas.
| Timeframe | Event/Decision Point | Triggering Indicator |
|---|---|---|
| 0-4 Hours (J3/J4) | CRITICAL GLOC INTERDICTION WINDOW: SpN initiates kinetic attack/planting of IEDs on Kostiantynivka route. | ELINT/RECON confirms SpN staging 5-10km from GLOC; kinetic engagement on logistic convoys or forward patrol disruption. (DECISION POINT: Immediate commitment of Task Force Raven/Mobile Reserve to GLOC corridor security; Initiate full counter-SpN sweeps.) |
| 24-48 Hours (Air Force/J2) | MDCOA Trigger/Execution Window: SAR/IMINT confirms TEL deployment saturation at the 260th GRAU base; Widespread EW attacks on UAF C2. | SAR score exceeds 35; detection of simultaneous Russian long-range missile launch radar signatures. (DECISION POINT: Execute full AD dispersal protocol (Passive Mode); initiate pre-planned retaliatory targeting protocols on confirmed launch/assembly sites.) |
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence (Pre-Analysis) |
|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL - STRIKE TARGETING | 260th GRAU Cargo Characterization: Specific identification of high-value missile types (Iskander-M / Kinzhal) to confirm the scope and priority of the strike wave. | SAR/IMINT (260th Central Rocket Artillery Base): Persistent high-resolution overhead imagery focused on TEL staging areas and associated service vehicle profiles. (PRIORITY 1) | LOW |
| CRITICAL - HYBRID THREAT | Odesa TCC Incident Analysis: Determine the mechanism and perpetrator of the explosion (RF-directed terrorist act vs. domestic security failure). Identify linkages to wider RF hybrid strategy. | HUMINT/Internal Security Investigation (Odesa): Rapid BDA and forensic analysis of the explosive device and local area intelligence gathering. (PRIORITY 2) | LOW |
| HIGH - TACTICAL INTENT | RF SpN Infiltration Depth: Precise location, composition, and infiltration vector of RF Spetsnaz groups targeting the Kostiantynivka GLOC. | RECON/EW Intercept (Kostiantynivka Corridor): Continuous dedicated drone ISR, ground patrols, and electronic collection of short-burst communications. (PRIORITY 2) | MEDIUM |
J3/J4: EXTREME LOGISTICS FORCE PROTECTION (IMMEDIATE).
J2/SECURITY SERVICES: COUNTER-HYBRID DEFENSE (URGENT).
STRATCOM/J5: UNITY OF COMMAND CAMPAIGN (MAXIMUM EFFORT).
//END SITREP//
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