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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-21 14:55:04Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-21 14:49:40Z)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 212000Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 211800Z NOV 25 – 212000Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. Continuous synchronization observed between RF kinetic operations, strategic C2 actions, and aggressive Information Operations (IO).


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

STATUS: POKROVSK AXIS: ACTIVE EXPLOITATION (ESCALATION). RF forces (40th/155th OMBR elements) have consolidated gains west of Mirnohrad. RF MoD reports confirming the "liberation of settlements" suggest successful tactical penetration and consolidation of fire support points 5-8km west of the initial breach. KEY TERRAIN (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY): The Kostiantynivka Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) remains the critical axis. Severance of this GLOC would force a tactical disengagement or operational paralysis within the salient. FACT: RF forces have successfully leveraged the initial breach to claim specific territorial gains. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold weather persists, favoring RF mechanized movement and persistent aerial ISR/FPV operations. No operational change.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF ground forces are now focused on achieving operational depth and fixing UAF reserves near the Kostiantynivka GLOC corridor. Strategic C2 is engaged: Putin conducting an operational meeting with the Security Council signals high-level political endorsement and synchronization of the assault. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: UAF priority is securing the primary GLOC and maintaining operational cohesion amidst heavy kinetic and cognitive pressure. President Zelensky’s immediate messaging confirms focus on internal unity and operational continuity.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrates decisive action in synchronizing tactical gains (Pokrovsk breach) with high-level political signaling (Security Council meeting) and maximized IO pressure (peace plan amplification). Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE):

  1. Immediate Kinetic Objective (0-12 hours): Successful Spetsnaz interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC, coupled with further mechanized expansion of the penetration.
  2. Immediate Strategic Synchronization: Use the claimed tactical success to achieve maximum leverage during the diplomatic window (amplified by US political reports) while positioning the strategic missile strike assets.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

No significant change in tactical adaptation since the shift to attrition-heavy, improvised vehicle utilization (Volga/Tikhon). The primary adaptation is the increased speed and effectiveness of Politico-Military Synchronization (HIGH CONFIDENCE), where tactical successes are immediately converted into strategic/cognitive warfare advantages.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Kinetic Preparation: Activity at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base continues to surge, confirming the imminent strategic strike wave (24-48 hour window). Friction (FACT - New): Lithuanian Railways halting Lukoil transit to Kaliningrad creates a new, external source of strategic logistical friction for the RF, compounding the successful internal rail sabotage campaign (Sverdlovsk/Perm). This validates UAF deep-strike/strategic warfare effectiveness.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

STRATEGIC C2: EXTREMELY HIGH. The coordination between MoD claims of victory, the Putin/Security Council meeting, and the immediate amplification of diplomatic pressure demonstrates highly effective strategic C2 designed to overwhelm UAF political decision-making capacity. Tactical C2 remains adequate but attrition-heavy.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Ground: Forces are fighting defensively against a highly motivated exploiting force (40th/155th OMBR). Readiness priority must shift from simply holding the line to proactive kinetic defense of the logistical arteries (Kostiantynivka GLOC). Political/IO Posture (CRITICAL): President Zelensky's statement regarding the need for national unity and the warning against political infighting ("припинити срач") confirms RF IO is successfully exploiting internal vulnerabilities. UAF political resilience is currently being tested alongside tactical kinetic defense.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: Successful strategic logistics warfare (Sverdlovsk/Perm rail sabotage, bolstered by external pressure via Lithuania's action). Strong presidential messaging calling for unity. Setback: Confirmed RF occupation of settlements west of Mirnohrad (RF MoD claims), validating the breach and increasing the risk of operational breakthrough. The internal political strain is a critical operational setback in the cognitive domain.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

  1. Protected Mobility/EW Assets: The need to protect the GLOC requires immediate allocation of specialized, protected patrols (MRAPs, EW platforms) to prevent Spetsnaz and FPV interdiction.
  2. Interceptor Conservation: Continued severe constraint. AD conservation protocols (Phase III) must be strictly enforced pending the confirmed missile strike wave.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Primary Vector (PARALYSIS): RF IO is synchronizing the Mirnohrad assault with diplomatic pressure (CNN/Trump reports) and the active promotion of internal UAF political instability. The aim is psychological paralysis—convincing key Western partners and the UAF population that Ukraine must accept negotiations now to avoid catastrophic collapse. Crude personal attacks on UAF leadership are intended to erode morale.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is strained due to simultaneous tactical losses and highly visible diplomatic pressure. JUDGMENT: RF IO successfully identifies and exploits the vulnerability of UAF political infighting. Failure to secure the Kostiantynivka GLOC would provide concrete evidence for RF narratives of military collapse, potentially triggering widespread panic.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The international situation is characterized by high volatility. The CNN report regarding potential US interest in a fast resolution reinforces the diplomatic pressure predicted in the previous report. UAF must rapidly engage European and non-US partners to solidify continued commitment against disadvantageous negotiation terms.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Time Sensitive)

  1. GLOC Severance (TACTICAL PRIORITY): RF Spetsnaz and dedicated sabotage groups (DRG) will execute the interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC between 212000Z and 220200Z. This high-risk/high-reward operation is designed to coincide with the RF Security Council meeting to provide immediate political leverage.
  2. Consolidation and Fixing: The 40th/155th OMBR will attempt to consolidate captured settlements and establish forward fire bases (artillery/ATGM) to fix UAF tactical reserves and prevent counter-penetration operations.
  3. Strategic C2 Finalization: Putin’s Security Council meeting will conclude with directives maximizing the propaganda advantage derived from tactical gains and diplomatic pressure.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis)

The MDCOA remains the execution of a Strategic Missile Strike Wave targeting UAF National Command Authority (NCA), AD nodes, and critical energy/rail infrastructure, synchronized to follow the successful RF ground interdiction.

  • Trigger: Confirmation of sustained (T>6 hours) disruption of the Kostiantynivka GLOC, forcing UAF units in the salient onto emergency rations/ammunition.
  • Objective: Force UAF to accept RF diplomatic terms while the ability to sustain kinetic resistance is temporarily crippled.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

TimeframeEvent/Decision PointTriggering Indicator
0-4 Hours (J3/J4)CRITICAL GLOC INTERDICTION WINDOW: SpN initiates kinetic attack/planting of IEDs on Kostiantynivka route.ELINT/RECON confirms SpN staging 5-10km from GLOC; kinetic engagement on logistic convoys or forward patrol disruption. (DECISION POINT: Immediate commitment of Task Force Raven/Mobile Reserve to GLOC corridor security; Initiate counter-SpN sweeps.)
12-36 Hours (Air Force/J2)MDCOA Trigger/Execution Window: SAR/IMINT confirms TEL deployment saturation at the 260th GRAU base; Widespread EW attacks on UAF C2.SAR score exceeds 35; detection of simultaneous Russian long-range missile launch radar signatures. (DECISION POINT: Execute full AD dispersal protocol (Passive Mode); initiate pre-planned retaliatory targeting protocols on confirmed launch/assembly sites.)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - STRIKE TARGETING260th GRAU Cargo Characterization: Specific identification of high-value missile types (Iskander-M / Kinzhal) to confirm the scope and priority of the strike wave.SAR/IMINT (260th Central Rocket Artillery Base): Persistent high-resolution overhead imagery focused on TEL staging areas and associated service vehicle profiles. (PRIORITY 1)LOW
CRITICAL - TACTICAL INTENTRF SpN Infiltration Depth: Precise location, composition (size/equipment), and infiltration vector of RF Spetsnaz groups targeting the Kostiantynivka GLOC.RECON/HUMINT/EW Intercept (Kostiantynivka Corridor): Continuous dedicated drone ISR, ground patrols, and electronic collection of short-burst communications (UHF/VHF) along the route. (PRIORITY 2)MEDIUM
HIGH - STRATEGIC C2Putin Security Council Output: Details and tone of directives issued following the Security Council meeting on Ukraine.OSINT/HUMINT (Moscow): Monitoring of official RF media releases and unofficial diplomatic channels for specific RF demands or escalation threats. (PRIORITY 3)HIGH

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. J3/J4: IMMEDIATE KINETIC GLOC DEFENSE (GO/NO-GO).

    • Action: Task Force Raven (Mobile Reserve/EW) must be deployed immediately (NLT 212100Z NOV 25) to conduct high-speed, proactive clearing operations on the Kostiantynivka GLOC (15km radius of the penetration). Task Force must be equipped with dedicated anti-drone EW capabilities to counter FPV surveillance and IED placement.
    • Rationale: The time-critical nature of the MLCOA requires pre-emptive action. Preventing GLOC severance is the singular kinetic objective needed to avoid the MDCOA trigger.
  2. J5/STRATCOM: INTERNAL UNITY CAMPAIGN (URGENT).

    • Action: Launch a highly aggressive, focused counter-IO campaign echoing President Zelensky’s call for national unity and immediate cessation of internal political conflict. This campaign must directly name RF IO attempts to sow division. Message: "Unity is our last line of defense against both bombs and lies."
    • Rationale: To prevent RF from achieving cognitive paralysis of the UAF decision cycle, which is synchronized with tactical kinetic pressure.
  3. AIR FORCE/J4: AD SYSTEM REPOSITIONING (PREPARATORY).

    • Action: Initiate pre-planned, phased dispersal and emissions control (EMCON) measures for all critical command-and-control (C2) and Air Defense assets (Patriot/NASAMS batteries). Ensure mobile AD fire teams (Gepard, MANPADS) are prepositioned around critical GLOC choke points and reserve assembly areas.
    • Rationale: Preparing for the confirmed strategic missile strike wave (24-48 hours) while securing the immediate tactical logistical flow.

//END SITREP//

Previous (2025-11-21 14:49:40Z)

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