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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-21 14:49:40Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-21 14:45:28Z)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 211800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 211445Z NOV 25 – 211800Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. Continuous kinetic data confirming RF deep-strike persistence and significant new IO data regarding the US/RF peace plan maneuvering.


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

STATUS: POKROVSK AXIS: ACTIVE EXPLOITATION. The operational focus remains fixed on the breach west of Mirnohrad. RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) are committed to exploitation, attempting to fix UAF forces and expand the penetration point. KEY TERRAIN (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY): The Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) via Kostiantynivka remains highly vulnerable. Loss of this artery would functionally paralyze UAF operational maneuverability in the Pokrovsk sector. FACT: RF forces continue to utilize non-standard vehicles (Volga/Tikhon variants) for forward logistics and transport west of Mirnohrad.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold weather persists. Visibility and ground conditions continue to favor RF mechanized movement and persistent low-altitude UAV/FPV operations. No change from previous report.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: 40th and 155th OMBR elements are actively engaged, attempting to consolidate fire support points 3-5km west of Mirnohrad. RF C2 remains focused on coordinating ground pressure with synchronized strategic effects (missile build-up and IO). UAF CONTROL MEASURES: Tactical reserves are confirmed to be positioning to establish hard flanks and conduct localized counter-attacks against the penetration. UAF political leadership is engaged in aggressive counter-messaging to manage the diplomatic crisis.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrates the ability to execute simultaneous operational-level attacks (ground assault) and strategic-level political warfare (peace plan amplification) designed to overwhelm UAF decision cycles. Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE):

  1. Immediate Kinetic Objective: Achieve tactical depth (5km penetration) and successfully interdict the Kostiantynivka GLOC within the next 12 hours, forcing tactical collapse or pre-emptive withdrawal from the salient.
  2. Strategic Synchronization: Utilize the resulting perceived military collapse/vulnerability as maximum leverage during the diplomatic pressure window, reinforcing the narrative that UAF has "lost its key partner" and must accept negotiations on RF terms (the "28 points" framework).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF continues its temporary tactical adaptation, substituting high-value armored assets with improvised, attrition-heavy vehicles (Volga/Tikhon). JUDGMENT: This confirms high attrition rates on dedicated combat vehicles but signals RF acceptance of high personnel/equipment loss to maintain operational tempo and political pressure.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Kinetic Preparation: Activity at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base is confirmed to be continuing its surge (SAR score rising), signaling the final stages of preparations for a strategic missile strike wave within the 24-48 hour window. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Friction: UAF replication of deep-strike rail sabotage (Sverdlovsk/Perm) is successfully generating friction in RF deep logistics, forcing the diversion of Federal Security Service (FSB) assets to domestic protective duties.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 (Politico-Military Synchronization) is highly effective. RF C2 is now actively leveraging President Zelensky’s latest address (1447Z/1448Z) to amplify the perceived diplomatic pressure point. Tactical C2, however, remains reliant on attrition-heavy assaults, suggesting a lack of small-unit flexibility.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Ground: UAF forces are holding defensive lines west of Mirnohrad but are under extreme kinetic pressure. The immediate readiness priority is the rapid deployment of specialized assets (EW, counter-Spetsnaz patrols) to secure the Kostiantynivka GLOC. Political/IO Posture (NEW DATA): President Zelensky’s address confirms UAF awareness of the critical diplomatic pressure ("one of the hardest moments") but reiterates resolve and strategic agility ("propose alternatives," "not give the enemy cause"). JUDGMENT: This strong political positioning must be immediately translated into aggressive counter-IO to prevent domestic panic.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: Replication of the deep-strike rail sabotage (Sverdlovsk) is a strategic success that creates long-term RF logistical vulnerability. Strong, resolute political messaging countering the US/RF peace plan leak. Setback: The breach exploitation west of Mirnohrad poses a critical operational threat if UAF forces cannot contain the advance and secure primary GLOCs within the next 6 hours.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The two primary constraints remain:

  1. Air Defense Munitions: Continued need to conserve high-value AD interceptors (Patriot/NASAMS) in anticipation of the confirmed strategic missile wave.
  2. GLOC Security: Insufficient protected mobility assets (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected - MRAPs, specialized EW vehicles) dedicated to continuous patrolling of secondary and tertiary routes feeding the Pokrovsk salient.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Primary Vector (ESCALATION): RF IO channels (e.g., НгП раZVедка) are now explicitly referencing the "28 points" peace plan, attempting to force the narrative that Ukraine faces a binary choice: accept disadvantageous terms or lose critical Western support. They are simultaneously attacking the credibility and resilience of the UAF leadership. UAF Counter-Narrative: UAF STRATCOM must immediately amplify the messaging of "resolute resilience" and "proposing alternatives" to prevent the domestic audience from internalizing the RF binary choice narrative.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is strained by the kinetic pressure (Mirnohrad) and the diplomatic maneuvering. JUDGMENT: If the Kostiantynivka GLOC is severed, RF IO will immediately leverage this tactical success to trigger operational panic, portraying the breach as an irreversible defeat.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The international focus is on the leaked peace plan. UAF strategy must now be to rapidly engage key partners (US State Dept, EU capitals) to provide clarity on the UAF counter-proposals referenced by President Zelensky (1447Z), ensuring partners view Kyiv as actively seeking resolution but maintaining non-negotiable red lines.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Synchronized Effort)

  1. GLOC Interdiction (TACTICAL PRIORITY): RF Spetsnaz (SpN) will initiate an operation to interdict the Kostiantynivka GLOC between 211900Z and 220600Z. This will involve high-speed ambushes utilizing FPV/UAV support and Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) against logistics convoys. (Assessment: Critical Threat - J3 Decision Window Open).
  2. IO Paralysis: RF media will release fabricated or highly misleading details about the "28 points" plan, coinciding with a final consolidation attempt by the 40th/155th OMBR west of Mirnohrad.
  3. Strategic Missile Staging: Loading operations at the 260th GRAU base will reach maximum capacity, confirming the strike wave for the 22-23 November window.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic Synchronization)

The MDCOA remains the execution of a Strategic Missile Strike Wave targeting UAF National Command Authority (NCA) and key AD/C2 nodes, synchronized to follow a successful RF tactical penetration and logistical interdiction.

  • Trigger: Successful severing of the Kostiantynivka GLOC for >8 hours AND achievement of 5km tactical depth west of Mirnohrad.
  • Objective: Immediate military paralysis and forced acceptance of the RF diplomatic ultimatum during a window of maximum vulnerability.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

TimeframeEvent/Decision PointTriggering Indicator
0-6 Hours (J3/J4)Kostiantynivka GLOC Interdiction: SpN ambush/IED attack successfully severs the GLOC for >6 hours.Confirmed kinetic engagement on the Kostiantynivka road leading to >50% disruption of essential resupply convoys. (DECISION POINT: Immediate commitment of motorized infantry and specialized EW patrols (Task Force Raven) to clear and secure the GLOC flanks; Initiate logistics shift to tertiary routes.)
12-36 Hours (Air Force/J2)MDCOA Trigger/Execution Window: Full alert across all AD systems; RF Ballistic/Cruise missile launch detected; C2 nodes under heavy EW attack.ELINT confirms simultaneous, widespread jamming of UAF C2 and radar frequencies and heightened activity at the 260th GRAU base (SAR Score >40). (DECISION POINT: Execute pre-planned counter-strike protocols on confirmed missile assembly/launch sites; full AD passive mode activation and dispersal of critical C2 personnel.)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - STRIKE TARGETING260th GRAU Cargo Characterization: Identification of specific missile types (Iskander-M vs. Kh-101) to predict target sets (Counter-Force vs. Counter-Value/Energy).SAR/IMINT (260th Central Rocket Artillery Base): High-resolution overhead imagery focusing on loading platforms and associated vehicle profiles (especially transporter-erector-launchers - TELs). (PRIORITY 1)LOW
CRITICAL - TACTICAL INTENTRF SpN Deployment on GLOC: Exact positioning and strength of RF Spetsnaz forces targeting the Kostiantynivka GLOC.HUMINT/RECON/EW Intercept (Kostiantynivka Corridor): Continuous aerial ISR and signal intelligence collection along the main and secondary GLOCs to detect SpN communication bursts or staging areas. (PRIORITY 2)MEDIUM
HIGH - ADAPTATIONRF Improvised Vehicle Profile: Detailed BDA and vulnerability analysis of improvised assault/logistics vehicles (Volga, Tikhon).IMINT/TACTICAL RECON (Pokrovsk Axis): Capture or detailed imagery of modified vehicles to analyze armor, crew disposition, and potential weak points for FPV/ATGM targeting. (PRIORITY 3)LOW

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. J3/J4: IMMEDIATE KINETIC RESPONSE TO GLOC THREAT (CRITICAL).

    • Action: Immediately establish Task Force Raven (Mobile EW/Motorized Patrol) to patrol the Kostiantynivka GLOC corridor (15km radius) on secondary routes, specifically utilizing advanced EW jammers to suppress potential RF SpN communications and FPV drone activity. All soft-skinned convoys must be diverted or provided with heavy machine gun/EW escorts.
    • Rationale: Preventing GLOC severance is the highest tactical priority within the next 6 hours to stabilize the Pokrovsk sector and prevent the MDCOA trigger.
  2. AIR FORCE/J4: AD RESOURCE ALLOCATION (URGENT).

    • Action: Implement Phase III AD Conservation Protocol: Restrict all Patriot/NASAMS engagement to confirmed Ballistic Missile Threats only. Assign all low-end/attrition threats (Shahed/Geran) exclusively to mobile fire groups (Gepard/MANPADS/Fixed HMG).
    • Rationale: Preserving strategic interceptors is non-negotiable given the confirmed build-up at the 260th GRAU base, anticipated within 24-48 hours.
  3. J5/STRATCOM: AGGRESSIVE IO COUNTER-PULSE (SUSTAINED).

    • Action: Launch a coordinated information campaign immediately leveraging President Zelensky's latest statement. The message should focus on UAF Sovereignty is Non-Negotiable and emphasize the preparation of UAF counter-proposals to defuse the narrative of intransigence spread by RF IO. Specifically target domestic media and key European capitals to reinforce UAF red lines (NATO, Territorial Integrity).
    • Rationale: To deny RF the political and cognitive advantage gained by synchronizing the Mirnohrad assault with the diplomatic pressure.

//END SITREP//

Previous (2025-11-21 14:45:28Z)

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