Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 211445Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 210800Z NOV 25 – 211445Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. Continuous kinetic data confirming RF deep-strike persistence and significant new IO data regarding the US/RF peace plan maneuvering.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

STATUS: POKROVSK AXIS: ACTIVE EXPLOITATION. The main effort remains the RF mechanized assault exploiting the breach west of Mirnohrad (Donetsk Direction). Previous reports confirmed the use of non-standard vehicles (Volga/Tikhon) for assault/transport, indicating high attrition on dedicated armored assets but confirming RF commitment to maintaining tempo. The Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) via Kostiantynivka remains critical and highly vulnerable to Spetsnaz (SpN) interdiction, consistent with the threat assessment following the breach.

NEW KINETIC DATA (RF): No significant confirmed changes in kinetic strikes since 210800Z, suggesting a temporary lull or re-tasking following the previous UAV saturation (136 launched overnight 20/21 Nov). Focus remains on the Pokrovsk ground engagement.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold weather persists. Visibility and ground conditions favor RF continued mechanized movement and persistent low-altitude UAV/FPV operations. No environmental constraints on either force.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS: RF forces (primarily 40th/155th OMBR elements) are confirmed to be operating in the open, west of Mirnohrad, pressing the penetration point. RF Command and Control (C2) remains centralized and highly visible following President Putin’s visit to the "West" Group CP, projecting confidence amidst the ground assault. UAF CONTROL MEASURES: UAF Air Defense (AD) remains engaged in the south (Odesa/Chornomorsk) handling low-volume probes. Critically, UAF political leadership (President Zelensky) has issued a direct public statement (1444Z) responding to the diplomatic pressure.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF maintains the ability to synchronize major kinetic operations (ground assault, massive UAV saturation) with sophisticated Information Operations (IO) designed to achieve strategic paralysis. Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE):

1. Kinetic Objective: Consolidate the breach west of Mirnohrad, achieving tactical success (3-5km penetration) to force UAF withdrawal from the salient, followed by a coordinated strategic missile strike (MDCOA confirmed in previous report).
2. Strategic Objective: Use the perceived vulnerability created by the Pokrovsk assault and the leaked US peace plan to force Kyiv into immediate, disadvantageous negotiations, undermining UAF red lines on sovereignty and NATO.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed tactical adaptation remains the increasing reliance on improvised and non-standard civilian vehicles (Volga, UAZ) for high-risk logistical and assault tasks. This is a temporary measure indicating high attrition rates, but it must not be underestimated as it maintains operational tempo.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

STRAIN: Front-line logistics are demonstrably strained (improvisation confirmed). RISK: Deep-rear logistics (rail networks) are under sustained, effective UAF attack (Sverdlovsk/Perm sabotage confirmed). This forces RF to commit scarce security assets domestically, drawing them away from front-line support. BUILD-UP: The confirmed increase in activity at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base indicates preparations for a strategic missile strike wave are continuing, suggesting adequate munitions stockpiles for the upcoming MDCOA. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing strategic objectives (Ground pressure + IO). Putin’s CP visit reinforces C2 legitimacy. However, tactical C2 effectiveness is increasingly reliant on attrition-heavy "meat assaults" and improvised logistics, suggesting poor small-unit flexibility.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Ground: UAF forces in the Pokrovsk sector are under heavy pressure but are holding established defensive lines west of Mirnohrad. Tactical reserves are required to be in position for immediate counter-penetration duties (as per previous recommendation). Diplomatic: UAF leadership has demonstrated resolve (Zelensky statement) to control the narrative following the diplomatic leak.

• New Message Analysis (Zelensky - 1444Z): "National Ukrainian interest must be taken into account. We will work calmly with Europe and America." This statement (a) confirms dialogue is ongoing, (b) sets the condition that UAF interests are paramount, and (c) signals calmness to domestic and international audiences, countering RF IO aimed at creating panic. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: Replication of UAF deep-strike rail sabotage (Sverdlovsk/Perm) is a strategic success, increasing RF logistical friction. UAF IO effectively countered the RF diplomatic push with clear red lines. Setback: The breakthrough west of Mirnohrad (40th/155th OMBR exploitation) represents a significant tactical setback that risks operational stability if not rapidly contained.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint remains the availability of protected transport/escorts for the Kostiantynivka GLOC, coupled with the need to husband high-value AD interceptors (Patriot/NASAMS) in anticipation of the confirmed strategic missile build-up (260th GRAU base activity).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Primary Vector: RF IO will continue to amplify the internal political fragility narrative (Rada pause/corruption) and attempt to portray President Zelensky's latest statement as a sign of weakness or pressure yielding. Expect messaging targeting European capitals accusing Kyiv of "intransigence" over negotiations. UAF Counter-Narrative: The UAF response is consistent: calm, rational engagement with partners, emphasizing non-negotiable national interests (sovereignty and territorial integrity).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale in the Pokrovsk area is likely stressed due to the active assault and FAB-3000 residual effects. National morale is being supported by the successful deep-strike BDA and the firm political stance of the leadership.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The international situation is focused on managing the US peace plan leak. The UAF response (Zelensky) is designed to stabilize the situation and prevent RF from gaining immediate diplomatic momentum. Key European capitals need immediate re-assurance of UAF intentions.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Synchronized Kinetic and IO Escalation)

1. GLOC Interdiction (Tactical/SpN): RF SpN will conduct a decisive effort to interdict the Kostiantynivka GLOC, likely synchronized with heavy artillery fires on UAF reserves maneuvering to counter the Mirnohrad breach. (Assessment: Immediate and critical threat.)
2. Kinetic Consolidation: RF forces will attempt to consolidate a holding line 3-5km west of Mirnohrad to establish fire support points and bring heavier indirect fire assets forward.
3. Missile Preparation: Activity at the 260th GRAU will continue to rise, indicating the strategic missile launch window is narrowing (24-48 hours).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic Synchronization)

The MDCOA remains the Coordinated Strategic Missile Strike targeting UAF National Command Authority (NCA) and key C2/AD nodes. This will be preceded by intense Electronic Warfare (EW) jamming and potentially a final, high-volume UAV wave.

• Trigger: Successful or perceived successful penetration of the Pokrovsk line.
• Objective: Paralyze UAF military response capability concurrent with a political/diplomatic ultimatum derived from perceived weakness.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J2: CONTAINMENT AND COUNTER-PENETRATION (CRITICAL).

   • Action: Immediate priority must be placed on deploying maneuver forces to establish hard flanks against the Mirnohrad breach exploitation, specifically targeting the fire support platforms and logistics points (confirmed Volga/Tikhon vehicles) rather than the assaulting infantry.
   • Rationale: The enemy is relying on non-standard logistics; severing these immediately will stall the advance with minimal UAF loss.

2. J4: GLOC SECURITY AND RESERVE STOCKPILING (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Immediately transition the Kostiantynivka GLOC to RED STATUS (Essential traffic only). Increase the frequency and firepower of convoy escorts (EW and Heavy Machine Gun systems) on all secondary logistics routes to prepare for the expected SpN interdiction MLCOA. Stockpile two days' worth of reserve ammunition at a hardened, dispersed location outside the MDCOA primary strike zone.
   • Rationale: The Kostiantynivka route will be targeted within the next 12 hours. Dispersion of stocks mitigates the MDCOA C2/Logistics strike risk.

3. J5/STRATCOM: DIPLOMATIC/IO RED LINE REINFORCEMENT (SUSTAINED).

   • Action: Issue follow-up diplomatic notes to key NATO partners (US, UK, Germany, Poland) reinforcing President Zelensky’s position (1444Z) that "National Ukrainian interest must be taken into account." Ensure the non-negotiable nature of NATO accession is reiterated to prevent RF IO from claiming a shift in UAF policy.
   • Rationale: To maintain international cohesion and prevent RF from fracturing support during the kinetic pressure phase.

//END SITREP//