Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 210800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 210700Z NOV 25 – 210800Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. Continuous kinetic data confirming RF deep-strike persistence and significant new IO data regarding the US/RF peace plan maneuvering.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

STATUS: POKROVSK AXIS: ACTIVE EXPLOITATION; SOUTHERN AD INTENSITY: HIGH. The RF continues the mechanized assault west of Mirnohrad (Donetsk Direction). Tactical observations from UAF sources confirm the desperate nature of RF logistics and assaults, noting the use of obsolete or improvised vehicles (GAZ-31029 Volga "Штурмовозка") for assault/transport, indicating high consumption of standard combat vehicles and personnel.

NEW KINETIC DATA (RF):

1. Odesa/Black Sea Axis: Confirmed persistent, low-volume UAV attacks. Reports indicate 2x new UAVs tracking toward Chornomorsk and 1x toward Odesa/Fontanka. UAF Air Force confirms the sustained attack from the Black Sea.
2. Kharkiv Region: Continued RF strikes on settlements (5x), indicating a fixing effort in the north despite the main effort in the south.
3. RF Deep Rear (UAF Strikes): RF MoD claims to have intercepted 12x UAF UAVs over Astrakhan and Krasnodar Krai. This suggests UAF deep-strike efforts targeting RF industrial/military sites persist.

NEW KINETIC DATA (RF MODIFICATION): UAF footage highlights improvised armored/assault vehicles (Volga sedan) being used for high-risk assaults. This aligns with the previous observation of remote-controlled UAZ vans ("Tikhon") and underscores RF difficulty in maintaining conventional logistics/transport assets under fire.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. Clear, cold weather favors persistent, low-altitude UAV and drone operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS:

1. Command: Russian state media (Дневник Десантника) widely broadcasts Russian President Putin visiting a "West" Group command post, meeting with Shoigu (Gen Staff) and commanders of "West" and "South" groups.
   • Judgment: This is a high-visibility, coordinated effort to project centralized C2 effectiveness and confidence during the critical phase of the Pokrovsk assault and the peak of international diplomatic pressure.
2. Forces Vostok: RF MoD claims Giatsint-B artillery successfully destroyed UAF UAV command posts in Dnipropetrovsk region. This suggests a concerted effort to target UAF deep-strike drone command infrastructure.

UAF CONTROL MEASURES: UAF Air Defense remains active and engaged on the southern axis (Odesa/Chornomorsk). UAF political leadership is publicly clarifying red lines on the proposed peace plan (UN Representative Khrystyna Galovishyn).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE):

1. C2 Projection: RF leadership is demonstrating centralized C2 and the intent to manage the Pokrovsk offensive directly (Putin visit to West CP).
2. Precision Targeting: RF maintains the capability to conduct targeted artillery strikes against UAF deep-strike assets (Giatsint-B on UAV C2, Dnipropetrovsk).

Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): The overarching RF intent is Maximum Pressure Synchronization:

1. Ground Success/C2 Image: Achieve a material breakthrough near Pokrovsk while projecting an image of unified, confident RF command structure (Putin visit).
2. IO Strategic Paralysis: Use the US "peace plan" as a lever to fracture Western consensus and force UAF concessions on NATO membership and territorial integrity, precisely when UAF ground forces are under the highest kinetic strain.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed use of obsolete civilian vehicles (Volga) and remote-controlled assets for front-line logistics/assault represents a quantifiable, short-term adaptation to offset catastrophic losses of dedicated armored vehicles and trained drivers/medics. While low-tech, it indicates RF persistence in maintaining pressure despite heavy attrition.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The reliance on non-standard, improvised vehicles for front-line assault suggests severe strain on the supply chain for standard armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and transports. Conversely, the successful RF interception of 12x UAF deep-strike UAVs (Astrakhan/Krasnodar) suggests RF domestic AD remains functional, but highly tasked by UAF rail interdiction attempts.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is currently demonstrating high-level strategic synchronization: Putin's command visit provides political cover and morale boost for the active ground assault, while state media (TASS, Operation Z) immediately coordinates global messaging regarding the "peace plan" debate.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are maintaining clear defensive red lines regarding sovereignty and NATO integration (UN Representative statement), directly countering the pressure generated by the US peace plan leak. Operational readiness remains high for AD, but the constant attacks risk AD fatigue and inventory depletion, as previously assessed.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: UAF forces continue active deep-strike operations against RF rear areas (12x UAVs intercepted by RF AD). Public clarification of UAF non-negotiable red lines strengthens the diplomatic position. Setback: None confirmed in this hour, but the increasing improvisation of RF assault vehicles suggests the effectiveness of UAF counter-mobility/anti-armor efforts is forcing costly RF adaptations.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The constraints remain concentrated on:

1. Interceptor Depletion: Sustained UAV attacks (Odesa/Black Sea) continue to tax AD stocks.
2. GLOC Security: The active ground assault increases the vulnerability of the Kostiantynivka GLOC to SpN interdiction, requiring increased convoy protection assets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Primary Vector: Peace Negotiation Exploitation (HIGH CONFIDENCE):

• RF state media (TASS, Operation Z, Peskov via multiple outlets) immediately seized upon the US peace plan debate. The key message: "Moscow has not been notified of Kyiv's agreement to negotiate." This positions RF as the ready party and UAF as the obstructionist.
• RF is amplifying Western sources (Politico) suggesting the EU is "disappointed" with the US plan, intending to create a perception of Western fragmentation and diplomatic leverage against Kyiv.
• RF media continues to portray Putin's C2 effectiveness via the command post visit.

UAF Counter-Narrative (HIGH CONFIDENCE):

• UAF (UN Representative) clearly articulates non-negotiable red lines: No territorial concession, no abandonment of sovereignty, and no ban on NATO membership. This directly counters the implied terms of the rumored US plan and RF IO.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF channels are utilizing footage of captured RF POWs detailing "meat assaults" and RF use of dilapidated, improvised equipment (Volga) to maintain UAF morale and confidence in the face of the Pokrovsk offensive.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The international domain is dominated by the leakage of the 28-point US peace plan (Axios, RBC-Ukraine).

• Key Points (Rumored/Leaked): Includes a security system for Ukraine based on NATO Article 5 (Axios).
• Impact: This leak has triggered immediate IO synchronization from RF to manipulate Western and domestic Ukrainian opinion, requiring rapid, definitive counter-messaging from Kyiv.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6-12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Continued Ground and IO Pressure)

1. Ground Penetration: RF mechanized forces (40th/155th OMBR) will continue high-cost, high-attrition attempts to exploit the breach west of Mirnohrad, utilizing improvised logistics (Tikhon) and non-standard assault assets (Volga) to maintain operational tempo.
2. Air Denial/Targeting: RF will continue low-volume, high-frequency UAV probes on the Odesa/Black Sea axis to force AD expenditure. Concurrently, they will use long-range artillery/missiles to target confirmed UAF UAV control nodes (Dnipropetrovsk axis) to degrade UAF deep-strike capabilities.
3. Diplomatic Isolation: RF IO will intensify the narrative of UAF diplomatic obstruction and political division (corruption/peace plan resistance) to weaken Kyiv's position ahead of any proposed ceasefire talks.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic C2 Decapitation Strike)

The MDCOA is the synchronized Strategic Missile Strike (Ballistic/Cruise) targeting UAF National Command Authority (NCA) and key regional C2 nodes, not just energy infrastructure.

• Vector: Preceded by large-scale EW jamming (as per previous report) targeting radar and COMINT assets (0-4 hours pre-strike).
• Objective: The visible projection of RF C2 effectiveness (Putin visit) may prelude an attempt to demonstrate C2 superiority by paralyzing UAF decision-making via a decapitation strike on Kyiv/Central Command.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J2: COUNTER-MOBILITY AND LOGISTICS INTERDICTION (CRITICAL).

   • Action: Immediate priority must be placed on suppressing and destroying any RF logistical vehicle operating west of Mirnohrad, regardless of type (UAZ, Volga, standard military transport). Focus FPV/Loitering Munitions on known casualty evacuation routes.
   • Rationale: The enemy's dependence on improvised transport (Tikhon, Volga) is a critical vulnerability. Maximizing logistical attrition will rapidly stall the mechanized exploitation effort.

2. J5/STRATCOM: DIPLOMATIC/IO RED LINE REINFORCEMENT (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Coordinate with NATO and key European partners to issue synchronized public statements supporting the UAF's non-negotiable red lines on sovereignty and NATO integration. Do not allow RF to frame Kyiv as the diplomatic obstructionist.
   • Rationale: To counteract the synchronized RF IO campaign designed to destabilize international support during the ground offensive.

3. Air Force/J2: PROTECT UAV C2 NODES (URGENT).

   • Action: Based on the confirmed RF artillery strike on UAF UAV command posts in Dnipropetrovsk, immediately review and reinforce the physical security and electronic concealment (camouflage/EMCON) protocols for all regional UAV control centers. Consider shifting tactical control assets to mobile, hardened platforms immediately.
   • Rationale: RF is actively seeking to degrade UAF deep-strike capability, which is the primary tool for RF logistical attrition (Sverdlovsk/Perm rail sabotage).

//END SITREP//