Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 210700Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 210600Z NOV 25 – 210700Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. New kinetic data confirms sustained RF air pressure and UAF deep defense activity. High volume of IO focuses on peace negotiations and corruption, indicating a strategic attempt to fracture UAF resolve.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

STATUS: CRITICAL HOLDING PHASE / AIR DEFENSE INTENSITY HIGH. The main RF effort remains the mechanized exploitation west of Mirnohrad (Pokrovsk axis). RF media (Rybar) confirms historical analysis of the Myrnohrad storming, emphasizing the RF strategic focus on this sector.

NEW KINETIC DATA (RF):

1. Dnipropetrovsk Region: Confirmed RF UAV attack resulting in one confirmed fatality and two injuries. This attack confirms persistent RF effort to fix UAF AD resources away from the Pokrovsk salient and high-value strategic targets.
2. Black Sea Axis: Multiple groups of UAVs confirmed launched from the Black Sea, tracking toward Odesa/Chornomorsk area (UAF Air Force/Vanyok). This continues the pattern of low-volume, high-frequency probing to exhaust UAF AD.

NEW KINETIC DATA (RF ADAPTATION): RF forces in the Donetsk Direction are utilizing a remote-controlled UAZ van ("Тихон") for logistics and medical evacuation (Basurin). This indicates an adaptation to persistent UAF FPV/artillery fire by removing the driver element from high-risk transport, specifically for casualty evacuation ("300-х").

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, low-light conditions persist, favoring continued UAV operations for both sides. No environmental factors are currently limiting mechanized movement on the main axes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS:

1. Donetsk Direction: Active use of RF medical/logistics evacuation teams is noted, indicating high casualty rates associated with the active mechanized assault (Kerch evacuation group report).
2. Air Assets: UAV launch platforms maintain high operational tempo in the Black Sea theater.

UAF CONTROL MEASURES: UAF Air Force is actively tracking and reporting multiple new UAV groups approaching the Odesa region, indicating high AD readiness and engagement priority.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE):

1. Sustained UAV Attrition: RF possesses the ability to sustain daily, multi-axis UAV saturation and probing strikes to ensure UAF AD remains consistently strained.
2. Tactical Innovation: RF is adapting to UAF FPV and counter-mobility threats by fielding basic, remote-controlled logistical assets (UAZ "Tikhon") to preserve personnel.

Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): The primary RF intent is Decisive Action Synchronization through:

1. Psychological and Logistical Attrition: Maintaining kinetic pressure in the rear (Dnipropetrovsk casualties, Odesa probes) to force UAF expenditure and disrupt civil stability.
2. Political Paralysis: Utilizing diplomatic leverage (US peace plan leaks/interpretations) and IO (Zelensky corruption narrative) to induce strategic paralysis and distrust among international partners at the critical moment of the Pokrovsk ground assault.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed deployment of the remote-controlled UAZ van "Tikhon" for casualty evacuation is a significant tactical adaptation.

• Significance: This protects high-value medical personnel and drivers, while acknowledging the severe threat environment posed by UAF deep-strike FPV and loitering munitions on logistics routes supporting the Mirnohrad exploitation.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

High casualty rates on the Donetsk axis necessitate the development and deployment of unconventional evacuation methods (remote UAZ), suggesting conventional manned logistics/medical evacuation is becoming prohibitively risky.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing kinetic strikes (UAVs) with IO campaigns (TASS/Politico commentary). The quick media analysis of the Mirnohrad assault (Rybar) reinforces the RF narrative of methodical success.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are maintaining high AD alert status against persistent UAV threats (Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk). Defensive posture on the Pokrovsk axis remains the primary concern, requiring immediate commitment of reserves as previously recommended.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback: Confirmed casualties (1 KIA, 2 WIA) in Dnipropetrovsk region due to RF UAV strike. Success: UAF maintains AD effectiveness, but the continuous volume of RF air assets is taxing.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The strain on AD resources continues to be the dominant constraint. Personnel safety is paramount, especially on deep logistics routes now targeted by low-volume strikes. The need for counter-mobility and counter-drone defense remains critical on the ground front.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Primary Vectors (HIGH CONFIDENCE):

1. Political Fracture/Corruption (TASS/Politico/Operation Z): RF media is massively amplifying the narrative that President Zelensky is a "lame duck" due to corruption scandals and that UAF is modifying peace plan points to avoid exposing corruption (WSJ leak).
   • Goal: To delegitimize the UAF leadership both internally and externally at a critical juncture.
2. Peace Plan Discord (Fighterbomber/Podduvny): RF sources are actively commenting on internal European disagreement regarding the US-proposed peace plan, positioning RF as the party grounded in "chuqovnuyu zhopu real'nosti" (the iron ass of reality) and UAF as the obstructionist party.
3. UAF Atrocities (TASS - Kimakovsky): RF is broadcasting claims that UAF drone operators deliberately destroy their own surrendering soldiers near Krasnoarmeysk.
   • Goal: Demoralization and fostering distrust among UAF frontline personnel.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment requires urgent reinforcement via success narratives (Slavyansk-na-Kubani strike) to offset the fear and anxiety generated by constant deep strikes (Dnipropetrovsk casualties) and coordinated international political attacks (corruption narrative). UAF political commentary (STERNENKO) focusing on donation drives indicates a reliance on civil society resilience.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The debate around the US "peace plan" is now the dominant IO theme. UAF sources confirm a modification to the plan (RBC-Ukraine), which RF is immediately framing as obstructionist (Operation Z). This diplomatic pressure is synchronized with the ground assault.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6-12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Consolidation and Continued IO)

1. Ground Consolidation: RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) will prioritize consolidating their penetration west of Mirnohrad, utilizing the remote-controlled logistics to minimize casualty loss, and preparing for the next push toward Kostiantynivka.
2. AD Fixing/Attacks: RF UAV groups currently tracking Odesa will attempt penetration, likely resulting in further sporadic strikes on dual-use infrastructure (energy, transport) outside the major metropolitan areas (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk precedent).
3. IO Surge: RF will maximize the use of the peace plan and corruption narratives to influence Western opinion ahead of any potential high-level diplomatic meeting, increasing pressure on UAF leadership.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic Strike Execution / Preceded by EW)

The MDCOA remains the synchronized 260th GRAU strategic missile strike, now assessed as being potentially preceded by concentrated Electronic Warfare (EW) activity targeting UAF C2 and AD radar nets in the central/eastern theater. This EW effort would mask the trajectory and timing of incoming ballistic (Iskander) and cruise (Kh-series) missiles, maximizing the chance of C2 neutralization and GLOC interdiction simultaneously.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J6/Air Force: EW PRE-EMPTION AND AD PROTECTION (CRITICAL).

   • Action: Pre-position mobile EW units (Bukovel-AD or similar) to protect the main UAF C2 centers and high-value AD assets (Patriot/NASAMS). Issue a standing order to transition AD assets to maximum passive mode status immediately upon confirmation of large-scale RF EW activation (as per MDCOA).
   • Rationale: The threat of a combined EW/Ballistic strike is the MDCOA. Pre-emptive protection of radar and communications is essential to ensure AD system survival and response capability.

2. J3/J2: COUNTER-ADAPTATION TARGETING (URGENT).

   • Action: Immediately task FPV drone units on the Pokrovsk axis to actively search for and target the remote-control operator teams supporting the UAZ "Tikhon" evacuation system, rather than the UAZ platform itself.
   • Rationale: Disrupting the C2 link for this novel RF logistical adaptation will impose a greater cost (manpower, training, psychological) than destroying the basic vehicle, forcing RF to revert to higher-risk manned logistics.

3. STRATCOM/J5: COUNTER-FRACTURE IO (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Work with Western diplomatic contacts to issue a unified statement immediately rebutting the corruption and "lame duck" narratives. Shift the public focus to confirmed UAF deep-strike success (Krasnodar Krai, Sverdlovsk) as proof of UAF operational and governmental capability and resilience.
   • Rationale: To maintain confidence in UAF leadership and sustain international support during the peak of synchronized kinetic and information warfare.

//END SITREP//