Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 212330Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 211000Z NOV 25 – 212330Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. RF continues to execute its coordinated multi-domain plan. The tactical kinetic pressure in the Pokrovsk-Mirnohrad area is sustained, now reinforced by immediate air support and continuous Information Operations (IO) designed to create internal friction.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

CRITICAL STATUS (FACT/JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): The Mirnohrad Breach Zone remains the main effort. Air Force reports confirm continuous delivery of KABs (Guided Aerial Bombs) onto UAF positions in the Donetsk Oblast (Confirmed Fact from UAF Air Force). This air-to-ground synchronization supports the 40th/155th OMBR penetration effort and indicates RF is successfully achieving air superiority/local air parity over the immediate contact zone. The Kostiantynivka GLOC (M-30/T-05-15) remains under immediate threat, validating the previous MLCOA prediction.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

UNCHANGED (FACT): Favorable dry, firm ground conditions persist, maximizing RF mechanized maneuverability. The weather window supports continued high tempo ground and air operations for the next 48 hours.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): The 40th/155th OMBR penetration is sustained by immediate air support (KAB strikes). A secondary, lower-priority UAV saturation strike appears to be initiating from the Black Sea towards Odesa/Chornomorsk (UAF Air Force report), likely a fixing operation or a further attempt to draw down AD stocks in a different theater.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE):

1. Air-Ground Synchronization: Immediate air support (KAB) capacity is being leveraged to reduce UAF strongpoints ahead of mechanized assault units.
2. Sustained IO: Capacity to immediately disseminate highly destabilizing "peace narratives" (e.g., Trump peace plan full text) across military-adjacent channels to maintain cognitive paralysis. Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF's core intention remains unchanged: rapid, shallow penetration on the Pokrovsk axis to force UAF tactical reserves into attrition while simultaneously preparing the strategic missile strike (24-48 hours window). The introduction of a new UAV wave from the Black Sea indicates an intent to sustain AD pressure across multiple OAs.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The immediate, close-air support application (KABs) directly onto the breach zone is an escalation from the previous report. It confirms the priority and synchronization level RF is applying to this specific operational axis.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain constrained by the internal rail sabotage (Perm/Sverdlovsk) but tactical resupply for the Pokrovsk thrust remains adequate. The build-up at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base continues to be the primary indicator of strategic prioritization.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrating real-time synchronization between ground maneuver (OMBR), immediate air support (VKS KABs), and strategic messaging (IO/Peace Plan dissemination).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are under intense tactical and cognitive pressure. While holding against the ground assault, the continuous KAB strikes increase attrition and risk of localized collapse. Readiness remains high but requires immediate decision-making regarding tactical reserve commitment.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: The strategic pressure from the deep-strike rail sabotage remains a key friction point for RF long-term sustainment.
• Setbacks: Sustained KAB strikes on the Donetsk axis increase kinetic pressure on frontline units, compounding the stress from the mechanized assault.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate need is the application of reserve forces to contain the breach, while the strategic constraint is the preservation of AD interceptor stocks against the imminent ballistic threat (MLCOA: 24-48 hours).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

ESCALATION (FACT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF-aligned media (Voenkor Russkoy Vesny/Операция Z) has disseminated the "Full text of Trump's peace plan," emphasizing specific points like nuclear non-proliferation agreements (SNV-1 renewal). Analysis: This is a coordinated psychological operation designed to achieve maximum effect (confusion, demoralization, policy paralysis) during the critical tactical window of the Pokrovsk assault. It directly targets the national strategic resolve and attempts to create an environment where High Command may delay decisive reserve commitment due to expectations of imminent negotiations.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is being tested by the combined kinetic violence (KABs, Lviv strike) and the highly visible, strategic IO pushing peace narratives.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The previous positive US UNSC messaging is now directly challenged by the rapid, high-visibility dissemination of the "peace plan," which RF will attempt to portray as a looming international reality.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Sustained Kinetic and Cognitive Pressure)

1. Tactical Consolidation: 40th/155th OMBR, supported by continuous KAB strikes, will attempt to consolidate a holding position 3-5 km west of Mirnohrad, likely within the next 6-12 hours.
2. GLOC Interdiction: Spetsnaz elements will likely initiate the ambush/interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC (M-30/T-05-15) simultaneously with the next operational shift (e.g., movement of reserves).
3. Missile Prepositioning: Movement of strategic missile assets (Iskander/Kh-101) from the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base to launch positions will be detected, preceding a strike wave launch (expected 24-48 hours from previous report).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Operational Collapse)

1. Localized Collapse: RF forces achieve a tactical breakthrough (>5km depth), cutting or pinning a significant UAF formation. The ensuing chaos is amplified by simultaneous communications disruption (via EW/cyber) and the successful severing of the Kostiantynivka GLOC, leading to ammunition shortages and forced, disorderly UAF withdrawal from the salient under KAB bombardment.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J7: Counter-Penetration Action (IMMEDIATE - TACTICAL).

   • Action: Execute the counter-penetration plan now. Do not allow the RF penetration to stabilize. Use the commitment of UAF reserves to conduct focused, synchronized flanking fire and counter-mobility operations (mine laying/remote detonation) to disrupt the RF flow rate and isolate lead elements under KAB strikes.
   • Rationale: The time for decision is past; immediate engagement is required to prevent operational depth achievement.

2. J4: GLOC Security and Diversion (IMMEDIATE - LOGISTICS).

   • Action: Immediately transition 80% of all high-value logistics (ammunition, fuel) off the Kostiantynivka GLOC to the secondary and tertiary routes. Establish dedicated QRF patrols, augmented with EW and counter-IED capability, to secure the remaining essential convoys.
   • Rationale: Proactively mitigate the predicted Spetsnaz interdiction (MLCOA) that could paralyze the defense.

3. STRATCOM: Aggressive Counter-Disinformation (URGENT - COGNITIVE).

   • Action: Issue an immediate, high-level official statement (Presidential Office or General Staff) categorically dismissing the RF/Media "peace plan" as an "information tactic designed to paralyze Ukraine during a critical battlefield assault." Pair this with heavy public emphasis on the Sverdlovsk rail sabotage as proof of continued, unwavering strategic offense.
   • Rationale: Neutralize the corrosive effect of the peace narrative before it affects the decision-making morale of field commanders and policymakers.

4. Air Force: KAB Mitigation (TACTICAL - AIR).

   • Action: Deploy mobile, short-range AD systems (Gepard/MANPADS clusters) closer to the Mirnohrad breach to target the low-flying launch platforms or the KABs themselves where possible. The primary objective remains conserving high-value interceptors for ballistic threats.
   • Rationale: Attempt to disrupt the immediate close air support that is enabling RF mechanized success.

//END SITREP//