Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 210600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 202330Z NOV 25 – 210600Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. All indicators point to the immediate execution of the RF mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk axis, synchronized with multi-domain pressure across the cognitive and air domains.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

CRITICAL STATUS (FACT/JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): The Mirnohrad breach zone (west of the town, following the FAB-3000 strike) remains the immediate center of gravity. RF mechanized columns (40th and 155th OMBR elements) are confirmed to be approaching the breach corridor, utilizing the destruction of hardpoints to bypass fortified UAF positions. The M-30/T-05-15 (Kostiantynivka GLOC) remains critical and highly vulnerable to anticipated RF Spetsnaz (SpN) interdiction, which is expected to synchronize with the main breach effort.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

UNCHANGED (FACT): Dry, firm ground conditions persist. This highly favors the RF heavy mechanized maneuver, allowing for rapid, off-road movement to exploit gaps created by the heavy ordnance. This operational window is closing as seasonal weather deterioration is imminent.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF DISPOSITIONS (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): Ground forces are in the final assault approach phase on the Pokrovsk axis. Air assets are confirmed to be executing the secondary objective of straining UAF AD/EW coverage across the northeast (Kharkiv/Sumy). UAF CONTROL MEASURES (JUDGMENT): UAF units are in maximum defense posture, focused on controlling the flanks of the Mirnohrad breach corridor and ensuring counter-mobility fires are pre-planned against anticipated RF vectors.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrates the capacity for synchronized multi-domain operations:

1. Kinetic Deep Strike: FAB-3000 delivery for rapid pre-assault terrain clearing.
2. Mechanized Assault: Immediate exploitation of the cleared zone by dedicated heavy brigades.
3. IO Warfare: Sustained, high-volume disinformation campaign synchronized with kinetic action. Intentions (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): The immediate intention is to achieve a decisive operational breach on the Pokrovsk axis and sever the Kostiantynivka GLOC within the next 12 hours. The secondary intention is to compel UAF High Command to draw down AD/EW assets from the Donbas to protect critical infrastructure in the northeast.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The adoption of the FAB-3000 for direct pre-assault operations is a significant tactical shift. It indicates RF prioritizing speed and mass destruction over precise fire and sustained preparation, suggesting a high commitment to securing the breach rapidly before UAF tactical reserves can stabilize the line.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF Tactical Sustainment: Sufficient for the immediate assault (40th/155th OMBR) over the next 48 hours. RF Strategic Sustainment (CONSTRAINED): The successful UAF Perm rail sabotage imposes a significant, if delayed, friction point on RF internal fuel and equipment transfers, validating UAF deep-strike reach. CRITICAL INDICATOR (FACT): The extreme surge activity at the GRAU Missile Arsenal strongly suggests RF is prioritizing the rapid reconstitution of its strategic strike package, indicating preparation for a massive follow-on missile wave (MLCOA is a strategic strike within 24-48 hours).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective, demonstrating sophisticated multi-domain synchronization across kinetic (Pokrovsk ground/Kharkiv air) and cognitive (TASS/FT peace narrative) domains. The only new informational message—a TASS-reported focus on Russian domestic biometric data regulation—is assessed as a background noise element, potentially establishing long-term digital control but having no immediate military relevance.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are under intense multi-domain pressure. The requirement to maintain tactical integrity against the mechanized breach while defending the rear area against UAV attacks is forcing resource allocation conflicts. UAF demonstrated effectiveness in strategic rear area operations (Perm rail sabotage) has imposed friction on RF deep logistics.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Strategic success confirmed with the Perm rail sabotage.
• Setback: Confirmed drone strike success in Kharkiv (Slobidskyi District) and the near-term threat to Sumy/Okhtyrka highlight the operational challenge in AD distribution.
• Unverified Setback: RF claim of destroying two UAF ATACMS launchers in Kharkiv remains a critical intelligence gap (Priority 1 CR).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint is the need to commit tactical reserves now (as the FAB-3000 strike was the "go" signal) without waiting for confirmed kinetic contact, while simultaneously ensuring sufficient AD coverage for the main GLOC and the increasingly targeted critical infrastructure in the northeast.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

STATUS (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The core disinformation campaign (RF/AXIOS "27 Nov Peace Plan") is active and synchronized with kinetic operations, designed to confuse UAF C2 and erode frontline morale. The new TASS report on biometric data regulation is irrelevant to the immediate operational environment but confirms RF focus on long-term internal digital security and control.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is under stress due to the combination of extreme kinetic terror (FAB-3000) and the destabilizing peace deal narrative. Counter-IO needs to be immediate and highly visible to stabilize the operational mood.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The physical presence of high-level US DoD officials (Driskill/George) in Kyiv is a significant counter-signal to the RF peace narrative, but this messaging must be reinforced by UAF leadership.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Multi-Domain Breach and Interdiction)

1. Mechanized Penetration (0-4 Hours): Elements of the 40th and 155th OMBR will initiate the primary assault, attempting to achieve a depth of 3-5 km into the UAF defense zone west of Mirnohrad, utilizing the FAB-3000 impact zone as the main thrust vector.
2. GLOC Interdiction (2-6 Hours): RF SpN teams, synchronized with the ground push, will activate pre-positioned IEDs or initiate coordinated ambushes on the Kostiantynivka GLOC (M-30/T-05-15) to halt resupply to Pokrovsk.
3. Consolidation and Follow-on Strikes (8-12 Hours): RF will use the ensuing chaos to fix UAF tactical reserves and execute a follow-on, localized strike wave (likely Lancet/Orlan) targeting identified UAF C2 and artillery positions around the breach corridor.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis and Collapse)

1. Double Severance: RF achieves significant depth on the Pokrovsk axis AND successfully closes the Kostiantynivka GLOC for >12 hours. This leads to UAF forward units exhausting anti-tank and artillery ammunition stocks, forcing a panicked, disorganized withdrawal that RF exploits via deep mechanized bypass maneuvers, threatening the encirclement of UAF groupings in the sector.
2. GRAU Strategic Strike Execution: The logistical surge at GRAU Arsenal culminates in a massive, coordinated strategic strike (Iskander/Kh-101 mix) targeting UAF strategic reserves, major POL/ammunition depots, or key AD/EW nodes outside the current combat area (e.g., Lviv, Dnipro), limiting UAF reinforcement capacity for the Pokrovsk crisis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3: Pre-Emptive Tactical Reserve Commitment (IMMEDIATE - TACTICAL).

   • Action: Confirm the immediate deployment of the designated tactical reserve (ideally reinforced with AT assets) to the pre-planned blocking positions on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis, regardless of confirmed deep contact. The FAB-3000 strike was the operational trigger.
   • Rationale: Prevent the RF mechanized spearhead from achieving operational depth and turning the UAF line into an unrecoverable breach.

2. J4: Hard Switch to Alternate GLOCs and Route Security (IMMEDIATE - LOGISTICS).

   • Action: Declare the Kostiantynivka GLOC (M-30/T-05-15) Amber Status (High Risk). Immediately shift all essential logistics convoys to pre-scouted secondary and tertiary GLOCs. Deploy dedicated, armed quick reaction forces (QRF) along these alternate routes to counter predicted SpN interdiction efforts.
   • Rationale: Maintain the flow of critical resupply (especially AT and artillery ammunition) to the front lines, mitigating the MDCOA of ammunition depletion and encirclement.

3. J6/STRATCOM: Immediate Morale Stabilization and Counter-IO (CRITICAL - COGNITIVE).

   • Action: Execute the highest-level counter-disinformation campaign immediately. This should include a brief, presidential-level recorded statement denying the peace plan rumors and a highly visible simultaneous dissemination of the strategic success (Perm railway sabotage imagery) to offset the terror impact of the FAB-3000 strike.
   • Rationale: Neutralize the cognitive component of the RF synchronized attack, stabilizing morale at the critical time of the ground assault.

4. J2: Prioritize ISR to Strategic Strike Preparation (CRITICAL - ISR/AD).

   • Action: Re-task all available long-range ISR/SAR assets immediately to the GRAU Missile Arsenal (59.9719, 29.3124) to resolve the strategic CR (missile type).
   • Rationale: Accurate identification of the missile type will determine the intended target set (military C2 vs. energy infrastructure) and allow for optimized AD allocation for the predicted strategic strike wave in the next 24-48 hours.

//END SITREP//